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**THE PILGRIMAGE FOR LIFE, JUSTICE AND LIBERTY:
INSIGHTS FOR DEVELOPMENT**

A Dissertation

**Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University**

**in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

by

Kurt Alan Ver Beek

August 1996

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kurt Alan Ver Beek was born on January 14, 1964 to Arlene Joyce Vanden Bosch and Harley Dale Ver Beek. They raised him in a house filled with love and laughter, encouraged him to question and modeled a life of love for each other, others and for God.

Kurt met Jo Ann Van Engen in 1982 and they soon realized that they liked to question, learn and laugh together. Both were very interested in issues of poverty and development and from 1986-1992 they worked for the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee in Central America as Country Representatives. It was these years in Central America that sparked Kurt's desire to earn a Ph.D. in Development Sociology which would enable him to teach and research in this field.

In 1993, Anna Lynne was born to Kurt and Jo Ann and at three, she asks plenty of questions of her own. It is now Kurt and Jo Ann who are seeking to follow their parents' example of filling their home with love and laughter, encouraging questions and modeling a life of love for each other, others and God.

Kurt earned his B.A. in Sociology from Calvin College in 1986 and an M.A. in Human Resource Development from Azusa Pacific University in 1992.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all I would like to thank the villagers of San Francisco de Opalaca and the COPIN organizers. Their assistance including everything from sharing their limited egg supply with us to hauling the cement for the house we stayed in on their backs for seven hours. Many of them also spent hours answering my questions for a purpose I am sure was obtuse despite, or perhaps because of my many attempts to clarify it. While they will not all be pleased with what I have written, I can only hope that they will believe that I have attempted to faithfully convey what I have seen and heard. They have all gained my respect and in many cases my deep affection.

I would also like to thank several professors at Cornell. First, I would like to thank Chuck Geisler, for his willingness to invest his time in me and for his encouragement and confidence despite some tough times. Davydd Greenwood has been able to carry out the difficult task of being both encouraging and challenging. He was often more confident in me than I was in myself and for that I am deeply grateful. I would also like to thank both Max Pfeffer and Shelley Feldman for their ideas, encouragement and questions.

My research in Honduras was also partially supported by a Fulbright Fellowship, for which I am also appreciative.

I would also like to acknowledge the important role played by family, friends and coworkers who have shaped both who I am and how I see the world. Thank you.

Finally, I would like to thank Jo Ann Van Engen. While I probably would have finished this dissertation without her it would have been far inferior and a much more grueling affair. It was Jo Ann who encouraged me to study the pilgrimage, was willing to move to a village without electricity or running water and which we needed to hike seven hours with our daughter on our back to reach. In addition to doing the lion's share of the cooking, child-care and cleaning under difficult conditions, she also

interviewed dozens of villagers, assisted in the survey of almost half of the villages, discussed my latest theories, encouraged me when I was depressed, critiqued my latest brainstorm, translated all of the quotes into English and almost half of the dissertation into Spanish and was also an almost tireless editor. Both my gratitude and love for her are beyond words. I dedicate this dissertation to her.

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
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
INTRODUCTION

On Monday, July 10, 1994 over four thousand indigenous men, women and children peacefully marched into the Honduran capital carrying small children on their backs and singing religious songs. They called this event the Pilgrimage for Life, Justice and Liberty. Upon arriving at the Honduran Congress building a few started cooking fires while most of the pilgrims tried to sleep on the cement floor. They vowed to remain there until the government met their demands which included an end to all lumbering in three departments, the formation of an indigenous municipality called San Francisco de Opalaca (see map 1, 2 and 3) and a road connecting this municipality to the rest of the country. One of the participants, Doña Pascuala, told the president, "We haven't come to beg you for food or money, that's not why we are here. The only thing we want is for you to keep your promise. We have come only to demand our rights." On Friday, July 14, President Reina signed a fifty-two point plan, which included nearly all of the pilgrims' demands.


During the eighteen months following the pilgrimage, San Francisco de Opalaca became the focus of a flurry of development activity as local leaders and external organizations attempted to sustain and build on the mobilization for the pilgrimage. In addition to creating the new municipality, the government began to meet its other commitments in the forty-two point plan including building a road, schools and hiring health professionals. Leaders organized several more major mobilizations including two more pilgrimages. Several national and international programs in the new municipality. Each of these development activities required the continuing mobilization of many villagers for more "everyday" activities such as village meetings, training events and municipal assemblies.



Map 1: Honduras



Map 2: Southwest section of Honduras with inset of San Francisco de Opalaca



SIMBOLOGIA	
—	FRONTERA DEL ESTADO DE YUCATÁN
—	FRONTERA MUNICIPAL
—	FRONTERA DEL CENSO
—	FRONTERA DE LA COMUNIDAD
—	FRONTERA DE LA PARROQUIA
—	FRONTERA DE LA SECCION
—	FRONTERA DE LA MANZANA
—	FRONTERA DE LA QUINCE
—	FRONTERA DE LA CUADRILLA
—	FRONTERA DE LA CASERIO
—	FRONTERA DE LA CANTONADA
—	FRONTERA DE LA VILLA
—	FRONTERA DE LA ALDEA
—	FRONTERA DE LA FAMILIA
—	FRONTERA DE LA PERSONA
—	FRONTERA DE LA UNIDAD
—	FRONTERA DE LA PARTICIPACION
—	FRONTERA DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD
—	FRONTERA DE LA JUSTICIA

Map 3: Municipality of San Francisco de Opalaca

I arrived in Honduras in August, 1994, one month after the pilgrimage, seeking to better understand how "villages are able to carry out sustained, locally-led collective activities"¹ (quote from my dissertation proposal). I had two principal reasons for pursuing this question. First, my "academic" curiosity had been sharpened when several people argued that it was an extremely important but little researched subject. Second, my "applied" curiosity had been kindled during my six years working with development projects in Central America. I was often discouraged to find, despite the rhetoric, so few examples of development projects which resulted in sustained, collective activities; and even fewer locally-led examples. I was eager to study such a case in an attempt to understand how it worked and possibly gain insights which would help other villages, groups and organizations to improve their own development practice.

The pilgrimage and the subsequent events provided me this opportunity. My first goal was to understand and explain this example of sustained, locally-led collective activity. I explored with villagers² the history of the pilgrimage, how leaders mobilized villagers and other resources and why some villages mobilized significantly more people than others.

¹Collective activities are those which are perceived by the majority of the inhabitants as being done by and for the village.

²I have chosen to use the term "villagers" to refer to the potential participants in development projects for several reasons. First, I believe it has fewer negative connotations than other common terms including "peasant," "farmer" and "beneficiary." This term's principal disadvantage is that it gives the impression that all potential participants are in a non-city setting; however, I believe this preferable to using more general terms such as "people" or "individuals."

Exploring these questions led me to consider the more general question: how are villagers mobilized³ to participate in risky and costly but potentially beneficial activities? How are individuals mobilized for a pilgrimage, an irrigation or a reforestation project?⁴ And why is one villager mobilized and not another or why are they mobilized for one project and not another? These questions grow in importance when we consider that mobilization for most of these activities is not a once-and-for-all matter, but rather an on-going process. As a result, understanding the process of mobilizing villagers may yield insights into not only how they are initially mobilized but also how that mobilization is sustained or suspended.

Two models of the mobilization process currently dominate the development literature. The first model claims that villagers become involved in development projects which make "rational" sense to them. The "rationality model" stresses the importance of taking into account the villagers' calculations of factors such as costs, benefits and risks which often differ significantly from those of the project's designers. For example, a villager may "avoid the failure that will ruin him rather than attempting a big, but risky, killing" (Scott, 1976:4) If villagers fail to participate,

³I have chosen to focus this question on mobilization because I am principally interested in the villagers' action. Villagers who have *decided* the activity is a good idea may not participate and vice versa. While the question may appear to portray the villager as passive, the intended effect is to allow for the influence of many factors, including individual choice.

⁴This study is not primarily about what is development but rather about how to "do" development work. The findings of this study may be used to improve the mobilization for projects with very different motivations. However, to clarify my position I believe the goal of development is to improve people's quality of life. To understand what that means and how to accomplish it requires sustained dialogue, reflection and action by both villagers and outsiders. I believe the findings of this study can be used to better facilitate this process.

this model argues it is because the designers failed to factor in some crucial aspect of villagers' rationality.⁵

The second model claims that villagers are mobilized for development projects which they have participated⁶ in designing and implementing. The "participation model" argues that villagers' involvement translates into more appropriate and appealing project goals and methods as well as a sense of ownership and efficacy which fosters continuing involvement. If villagers fail to participate, this model argues that it is because they did not have sufficient participation/control in the process.⁷

My study both builds on and challenges these models. Through my examination of the pilgrimage, the events which followed and the development literature I recognized several shortcomings of the two dominant mobilization models. The rationality model is overly cognitive, failing to recognize the role of factors such as social relationships and emotions in mobilizing villagers. It also fails to take into account that cognitive considerations such as costs, benefits and risks are socially constructed and not absolute. The participation model treats the mobilization process largely as a black box, failing to explore **how** villagers are mobilized and the role of participation in the mobilization process. The participation model also promotes a more-is-better approach, failing to explore whether participation may have a threshold

⁵The "rationality" model builds on a broad literature including the moral economy (see Scott, 1976) and political economy (see Popkin, 1978) debate, each of which argued for different but "rational" explanations of peasant behavior. It also builds on rational choice literature and economic models of decision-making (see Bryant and White's (1982: 213-218) classic text for a review of "The Calculus of Participation").

⁶Participation is defined as "the active involvement of people in the decision-making process" (Uphoff and Cohen, 1979:3).

⁷The "participation" model is based on an extensive literature treating participation and development. Key authors include: Cohen and Uphoff (1976), Korten and Alfonso (1983), Oakley and Marsden (1984) and Burkey (1993).

level after which increasing participation may decrease mobilization. Finally, given the fact that the participation model argues that increasing local participation in the design and implementation of the project is the means to increasing involvement, external knowledge and experience are often marginalized.

Based on this study, I believe that the villagers' participation in the pilgrimage and the events which followed is best explained by a "mobilization model" which incorporates the strengths of the previous two models as well as recent social movement research. The mobilization model claims that villagers were mobilized for the pilgrimage and the subsequent events in the context of social networks and on the basis of relationships and frames.⁸ The framing of these events was important in gaining the sympathies of potential participants, which was most likely to occur if the frame was constructed with local participation and took into account factors such as local rationality, history, economics and spirituality.⁹ The strength of the relationships between villagers and organizers also influenced the amount of costs and risks villagers were willing to tolerate for uncertain benefits. The strength of these relationships was also influenced by villagers' participation in planning meetings as

⁸A **frame** is defined as "an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment" (Snow and Benford, 1992:137). **Social networks** are the collection of individuals with whom one regularly interacts. Network relations vary by degree of attachment and type of relationship (familial, friendship, etc..) Relationships are an affinity between individuals or groups characterized by trust and respect and perceived as yielding mutual and relatively equal benefits. See Chapter 5 for more complete definitions and an in-depth treatment of these concepts.

⁹I define spirituality as a relationship with the supernatural or spiritual realm which is a source of power and a basis for personal and communal reflection and action. While it is only one aspect of culture, it often provides the basis for cultural values, beliefs and institutions.

well as historical, economic and spiritual factors. Finally, socially constructed networks provided the context within which members constructed, discussed and evaluated frames, applied and received incentives and ultimately made their individual but highly influenced decision about whether or not to participate (or continue participating). If the networks failed to mobilize potential participants, this mobilization model argues that it is because they were not sympathetic with the framing of the event and/or did not have a sufficiently strong relationship of trust and respect with the organizers.

In addition to incorporating the strengths of the other two models, this model attempts to overcome their shortcomings. The mobilization model recognizes both the rationality of villagers as well as the influence of factors such as social relationships. This model also specifies the role of participation and external knowledge in the decision-making process: to strengthen frames and relationships. As a result, this model also suggests that a threshold level of participation may exist; that is a point at which increasing participation may be counterproductive because it weakens relationships and dilutes frames. Finally, this mobilization model also recognizes the social construction of both the project, its costs, risks, benefits as well as village factors such as history, economics and spirituality.

Some readers may wonder if findings from a study of a pilgrimage by a poor, isolated, indigenous group can be generalized to broader development theory and practice. "Rigorously speaking [generalization] requires both sending and receiving contexts to be at least random samples from the same population" (Guba and Lincoln, 1989:241). In development research, it is seldom possible for such standards to be met and as a result I prefer Guba and Lincoln's standard of "transferability," which is "an empirical process for checking the degree of similarity between sending and receiving contexts" (1989:241). Transferability implies shared responsibility for the author and

the reader. The author uses "thick description" (Geertz, 1973) to describe as completely as possible the context of the study. This description will highlight both the unique and common characteristics of the study "in order to facilitate transferability judgements on the part of others who may wish to apply the study to their own situations" (1989:242).

In the chapters that follow I will highlight both the unique characteristics of this study as well as those similar to other situations which may allow the transfer of the findings. The pilgrimage was in many ways exceptional. It was a one-time mobilization of thousands and an atypical method of seeking to improve their quality of life. Like many development activities it was risky, costly, had uncertain benefits and was promoted by outside organizers. It was also able to achieve something few development projects are able to--sustained, locally-led collective activity. In addition, the events following the pilgrimage (described and analyzed in Chapter Six)--training, projects and meetings, are more commonly thought of development activities.

The participants were also both unique and typical of participants in development projects. Although they held communal land titles, had excess arable land as well as a favorable climate, they were by many measures among the poorest people in Honduras. While the vast majority of the participants were Lenca Indians, the Lenca language has not been spoken in Honduras since the turn of the century and the participants were largely unaware of their indigeneity until 1991. Finally, although the Lencas are relatively isolated, they are clearly integrated into national and international economics, politics and society. The participants represented a poor, isolated indigenous group, which was struggling with global issues including indigenous rights, land tenure, development, faith, participation and democracy.

The unique features of this case and, I would argue, of most development research, make generalization in a strict sense, impossible. However, I have not

sought to test or develop any grand development theory nor create a recipe for development practice. Rather I have sought to understand a particular mobilization process and seek any insights it had to give other mobilization processes. It is on that basis that the commonalities between this case and other types of development activities may allow the questions and insights of this study to be "transferred" and applied to other development contexts.

While Chapter 7 will explore the potential implications of this study and mobilization model for development theory and practice, I will highlight a few here. First, this study illustrates the power of consciously and actively framing development projects using convincing local themes. Second, the study illustrates how history, economics and spirituality were all powerful factors in the framing of the pilgrimage. While history and economics are elements commonly considered, the power of spiritual themes in framing the pilgrimage and in villagers' everyday decisions challenges its relative absence from development theory and practice. Third, the mobilization model questions the dominant development models which unquestioningly encourage broadening participation with the unintended consequence of weakening both relationships and frames. Fourth, this model reveals that relationships between outside "organizers" and local leaders can encourage villagers to participate in riskier and more costly but potentially more beneficial activities. This insight has implications for the type of staff hired and the importance of staff continuity and stability. Finally, this model demonstrates the importance of networks in the mobilization process, a fact which challenges the current practice of grouping "beneficiaries" not by social network but by other factors such as socio-economic level, a practice which separates them from trusted but slightly wealthier friends and family and instead often groups villagers with members of "enemy" networks.

While Chapter 1 will describe my methodology in more detail, I will describe its fundamental nature here. After deciding to study the pilgrimage, my family and I moved to Monteverde, the municipal seat of San Francisco de Opalaca. Because the village was only accessible by a eight hour hike (40 kms) on a mule trail and had no running water or electricity, a larger than normal percentage of our time was spent learning and carrying out daily activities such as cooking on a wood stove and bathing and washing clothes in the river. My research methodology, which was qualitative, historical and participative, became intertwined with our daily routine.

My data collection methods relied on qualitative interviews, participant observation, a twenty-one village survey and a review of secondary data. I also used historical methods to set both the pilgrimage and my findings in their historical context, believing with Whyte that "without historical data, our theories of development and change are bound to be faulty." (1984:161). I also used participative methods. I involved both external pilgrimage organizers and villagers in the process of refining my research questions and methodology, collecting data, analysis and reviewing my findings. This last step included a month-long trip to the region with a draft of most of the text in Spanish to receive feedback from both villagers and organizers.

I am very aware that this dissertation is my own construction and I would like to share a few of the decisions I have made in preparing it. First, I have included a large number of quotations and description of events rather than simply my own inferences or summation. While this results in a lengthier text, it also provides a stronger basis on which to assess the findings and may yield insights beyond those I intended. Second, I have chosen to translate all of the quotations into English for the non-Spanish reader, although I occasionally footnote the original Spanish. Finally, I

have made an effort to use first person throughout this text to both recognize my role in constructing it as well as my influence in the entire research process.

I will conclude this introduction by giving a brief overview of the chapters which follow. Chapter 1 describes my principal decisions regarding both research questions and methods. I have attempted to provide enough information to judge both the credibility and dependability of my findings. Chapters 2 and 3 will discuss the "Landscape of Mobilization," including the history of the Lencas, the international and national context, daily life in San Francisco de Opalaca and villagers' explanations for their participation. These historical and contextual factors directly and indirectly shape the mobilization process and also provide essential information for judging the transferability of the findings. Chapter 4 outlines the highlights of the Pilgrimage for Life, Justice and Liberty, which clearly demonstrates the costs, risks and potential benefits involved in this mobilization. Chapter 5 will examine the mobilization effort for the pilgrimage and the role of frames, networks, participation and relationships in the mobilization model. Chapter 6 will examine the events in San Francisco de Opalaca during the eighteen months following the pilgrimage and highlight the continuing importance of the mobilization model in the "everyday mobilizations" which followed the pilgrimage. This chapter will also demonstrate the power and volatility of spirituality, participation and coercion. Finally, Chapter 7 will explore how the concepts of frames, networks, relationships and spirituality can both expand and improve development theory and practice. It will also question development assumptions and propose alternatives regarding broadening participation, marginalizing local leaders and grouping participants by socio-economic level rather than by networks.

CHAPTER 1: METHODS

Introduction

This chapter will highlight my principal decisions regarding both research questions and methods. Such information is crucial for judging the accuracy and reliability, or what Guba and Lincoln (1989) refer to as the credibility and dependability of the research findings. I will begin by outlining my initial research question and method as well as explaining why I chose qualitative, participative and historical methods. Second, I will describe the process I followed for choosing to study the Lenca pilgrimage, including some of the obstacles and subsequent refinements of my research questions and methods. Third, I will relate the mix of methods that I used in collecting and analyzing data including qualitative interviews, secondary data reviews, a twenty-one village survey and participant observation. This section will also detail some of the problems encountered in the data collection and analysis process. Finally, I will describe the variety of techniques I used to determine the accuracy or credibility of the information I collected, the theory I developed and my representation of both in this text.

Research Question and Methods

As I explained in the introduction, I arrived in Honduras seeking to better understand how villages are able to carry out sustained, locally-led collective activities. I also arrived having decided to research this question using qualitative, participative and historical methods. I chose qualitative methods in part, based on the research and recommendations of two highly respected social scientists (Jacobs, 1971 and Uphoff, 1979). Each used quantitative methods to attempt to explain sustained collective action at the village level but failed to find statistically significant predictive

factors.¹⁰ As a result, both recommended that additional "close to the ground" research be conducted to examine the issue of sustained, locally-led collective activity.

In addition, my research question and the concepts I believed were potentially important also made qualitative methods far preferable. Because I believed sustained, locally-led collective activity to be relatively rare, a quantitative comparison of these few examples would have been difficult.¹¹ More importantly, qualitative methods are best suited to discerning the social construction of frames and resources which I believed to be key to explaining these activities. I believed that extensive interviews and participant observation in one site would provide me the opportunity to observe how villagers construct frames and resources, how they define their problems and attempt to resolve them. Based on recommendations and my research question and guiding concepts, I determined that qualitative methods were most appropriate.

The qualitative method I used for data collection and analysis is most similar to Strauss and Corbin's (1990) "grounded theory" methodology. I attempted to "discover, develop and provisionally verify a theory through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that phenomena." (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:23) While I did arrive with what Strauss and Corbin classify as "sensitizing concepts," I did not attempt to test a predesigned theory for explaining sustained, locally-led collective action, but rather sought to let the theory emerge from the interviews and my study of the case as a whole. My sampling and analysis procedures also followed

¹⁰The Jacobs (1971) study consisted of a four year, four country, four thousand interview study with top social scientists in each site and attempted to find statistically significant factors predicative of collective activity. Uphoff's (1979) study attempted to do the same but was "closer to the ground." He studied thirty-two villages, all in Sri Lanka.

¹¹I now believe that sustained, locally-led collective activity is ubiquitous in Honduras, but seldom is of the type or reaches a level which calls attention to itself.

Strauss and Corbin's (1990) suggestions of becoming increasingly focused, moving from most "open" (least focused) to most "selective." Thematically, my interviews also became increasingly focused. I followed Jorgensen's (1989) method of moving from a "grand-tour" of the history of the pilgrimage, to "mini-tours" of specific events and finally focusing on the construction of meaning and analysis.

Tesch's (1990) ten principles and practices of qualitative methods were also very influential in guiding my data collection and analysis decisions. My decision to integrate data collection and analysis was based on Tesch's first principle:

Analysis is not the last phase in the research process; it is concurrent with data collection or cyclic. It begins as soon as a first set of data is gathered and does not only run parallel to data collection, but the two become 'integrated' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:109). They inform or even 'drive' each other (Miles and Huberman, 1984:63).

The qualitative method that I describe more fully below integrated both data collection and analysis, becoming increasingly focused while underscoring the importance of inductive logic.

Before arriving in Honduras, I also chose to use participative methods in my research. While I recognize that the concept of participation is problematic (see Chapters 5 and 7), I also believe that individuals have a right to be involved in research which affects them (see Horton, 1989). Several authors have highlighted other values of participative research methods including Guba and Lincoln's argument that "stakeholder's" participation is preferable for several reasons including 1) they "are in a position to broaden the range" of inquiry and 2) they "are mutually educated" (1989:54 and 56). Whyte (1991) states that participation in the research endeavor 1) increases the impact of the research and 2) challenges both the findings and the researcher with the rigor of reality. These arguments and others convinced me of the value of seeking to involve the "researched" in the research process.

Finally, I chose to use historical methods, that is, methods which seek to place an event or idea in its historical context. Emphasizing the power of history to shape decisions and actions in the present is not new in Sociology. Weber, in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, argued that one could not explain the development of Capitalism without understanding the history of Protestantism. He stated that "It was the power of religious influence, not alone, but more than anything else, which created the differences of which we are conscious today (1958:89). Weber built on this argument to develop a methodology which depended heavily on historical knowledge of its subject in order to develop a *verstehen* (understanding). According to Weber, *verstehen* provides the foundation for all good analysis and theory.

Marx's *18th Brumaire*, a precursor to modern studies of social movements, is an analysis of the messiness, changing alliances and intrigue of the French Revolution. Marx's study demonstrates both the power of history to shape events and how such in-depth studies can serve to both develop and defend theories. In the following passage, Marx eloquently affirms the importance of understanding the past in order to explain and interpret the present.

Men make their own histories, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The traditions of all the dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes..."(1963:15).

Many modern sociologists are critical of their colleagues who, often in the name of science, have strayed away from integrating history into analysis and theory. Whyte believes that "without historical data, our theories of development and change are bound to be faulty" (1984:161). Roseberry is one of the most outspoken social

scientists in advocating for historicizing modern social sciences. He states the argument quite simply, "To understand what people are saying and hearing in particular situations, we need to turn to history" (1989:5).

Site Selection

Finding an appropriate site for my research was more difficult than I had expected. The difficulty was not related to the lack of appropriate cases, of which I had several. Rather, the difficulty was more related to who I was and the process I needed to go through to find the cases. After arriving in Honduras I spent three months visiting the offices of dozens of NGOs, cooperative federations, indigenous organizations and government programs and many of their project sites. It was difficult to coordinate trips to isolated regions and their interest in a PhD student with few resources and a lot of questions was usually tepid. My biggest difficulty however, was to weed through the dozens of suggested cases, most of which were initiated and led by outside organizations, despite their attempts to convince me otherwise.

One of the sites I visited was San Francisco de Opalaca, a region which had been the dynamo for a pilgrimage of over five thousand indigenous people to Tegucigalpa in July of 1994. I arrived in Honduras in August of 1994 and many of those I spoke with suggested that the pilgrimage fit my criteria for a sustained, locally-led collective activity. For over a month I remained uninterested. I had never been particularly interested in indigenous rights issues; I assumed that the movement had been initiated and led by outsiders and would probably be short-lived; I realized that it would be difficult to find a matched comparison; and finally, I felt the movement did not fit my definition of a "development" activity.

The series of recommendations, however, began to both wear down my resistance and spark my interest. I arranged an interview with Salvador Zúniga, the

coordinator of COPIN (*Comité de Organizaciones Populares de Intibucá*),¹² which had organized the pilgrimage. My family and I traveled to La Esperanza to meet with Salvador, hoping to also visit San Francisco de Opalaca that afternoon. Salvador found that idea amusing, and explained that a one way trip was seven to eight hours hiking on rough trail. However, COPIN must have deemed us sufficiently trustworthy¹³ and potentially helpful despite our ignorance because after one more visit they invited us to San Francisco to discuss the research proposal with village leaders.

During each of these visits I was conscious that not only was I weighing the case for its possibilities, but also the "case" was weighing me. I was careful to follow suggestions by many authors (Shaffir and Stebbins, 1991; Whyte, 1984; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983), who advocate the cautious use of gatekeepers and the importance of disclosure and seeking informed consent, defined by Gilbert as "explaining as fully as possible, in terms meaningful to the participants, what the research is about, who is involved, why it is being undertaken and how it will be disseminated" (1993:78).

I also found that many of my assumptions regarding the pilgrimage were false. As I demonstrate below, the pilgrimage would prove to be the result of a sustained movement and leadership and initiative were largely in local hands. Regional comparisons were feasible and indigenous rights, economics, spirituality, history and other themes melded together to form an extremely rich framing of the pilgrimage. The process of mobilizing participants for the pilgrimage also proved to be very similar to the processes used to mobilize participants for the more typical development activities following the pilgrimage. Finally, both COPIN and village leaders were

¹²See Chapter 3 for a detailed description of COPIN.

¹³As I will detail below, COPIN and San Francisco de Opalaca had reason to be cautious given some of their recent conflicts with the military, the government and local elites.

interested in my research questions and approach and especially interested in having someone document the pilgrimage and its history.

Despite these positive considerations, I hesitated. Both the size and complexity of this case made it more difficult than other sites I was considering which were centered in one village and focused on one issue. The majority of the pilgrims resided in twenty-one villages and sought to redress a whole series of issues which resulted in a richer but far more complex case. After long consideration, I decided that the richness of the case outweighed the potential problems.

Another practical issue which needed to be decided was where my family would live. Because I hoped to use participant observation methods, I preferred to live in Monteverde, the geographical and political center of San Francisco de Opalaca. But COPIN and San Francisco leaders discouraged such a move. Monteverde, like the rest of the villages in the region, had no electricity or running water and all of the homes lacked latrines, had dirt floors, mud walls, and grass roofs which harbored an insect which carried a fatally debilitating heart parasite. In addition, Monteverde was forty kilometers from the nearest road, meaning that my wife and I would have to pack in all our supplies and our two year old daughter on foot and by mule. After much discussion between COPIN, village leaders, the parish priest and myself, we decided to move to Monteverde as soon as the parish house was built. To speed the process along, I provided half of the money for materials (about \$750), the parish priest contributed the other half and the parish provided all of the labor.¹⁴

¹⁴In order to provide the labor, each village was assigned one day a month for which they had to send ten to fifteen laborers to work on making mud bricks, hauling sand and helping with the construction of the house. In addition, villagers hauled roof tiles and one hundred pound bags of cement on their backs for the 40 km hike from the end of the road. The construction of the parish house gave me a "storehouse" of insights into local organization, leadership and authority as well as a tremendous

Question and Method Refinement

Through discussions with COPIN and San Francisco de Opalaca leaders we refined and clarified my research questions and methods. Because we were all interested in situating the pilgrimage historically, we decided to begin by documenting the story of the pilgrimage and its history as perceived by both COPIN and the people of San Francisco de Opalaca.¹⁵ Second, we decided to explore how leaders mobilized such a large number of people and resources for the pilgrimage. And third, we sought to understand why certain regions, villages or groups mobilized more or less people and resources than others. To answer this third question, I planned to compare San Francisco de Opalaca which had mobilized several thousand "pilgrims" with neighboring Intibuca Norte which had mobilized only several dozen. In an attempt to increase the participation in the study's ongoing design, data collection and analysis, both COPIN and San Francisco de Opalaca appointed a coordinating group to work with me.

We also decided that we would live the first three months in the town of La Esperanza in order to interview both COPIN members and other important departmental officials as well as to review extensive secondary data and make several

gratitude to and admiration for our neighbors. Our role in facilitating its construction won a great deal of good will among residents but also reinforced our image as wealthy outsiders. Once the house was finished it also became a source of subtle conflict as we sought some degree of privacy from the constant flow of visiting outsiders searching for a place to sleep, eat and store their things.

¹⁵COPIN and the villager's principal expectation of my research was to produce a written account of the pilgrimage and its history. Although I had negotiated the research questions and methods with both groups, over time it also became clear that COPIN hoped to gain some intellectual benefits from my research, for example, insights into the opposition's strategies; while villagers, individually and as a group, hoped for some material benefits.

preliminary visits to San Francisco de Opalaca. The interviews with COPIN¹⁶ were essential because, as organizers, they had played a key role in the mobilization for the pilgrimage. The following six months we would live in Monteverde in order to interview villagers, carry out a survey of all twenty-one villages and participate in and observe daily life in the village and region.

Data Collection and Analysis

La Esperanza

Secondary Data

While in La Esperanza I reviewed COPIN documents, newspaper clippings, NGO and government studies and books about the Lencas in order to broaden my knowledge of the case and its history and to "triangulate" data from other sources. Secondary data was especially necessary in reconstructing the history of the Lencas and traditional practices such as the *compostura*¹⁷ in Chapters 2 through 4. I reviewed Honduras' four daily newspapers in order to "triangulate" COPIN's version of events such as the pilgrimage. I used NGO documents to substantiate data I was collecting and accounts of events such as the *hambruna*¹⁸ (see Chapter 4).

¹⁶COPIN was formed in March of 1993 as a coordinating committee for fifteen popular organizations including campesino organizations, unions and environmental groups. The member organizations formed this committee in hopes of using their combined power and influence to effect change. The committee prioritized local issues of concern such as deforestation, lack of roads and price controls and then attempted to organize written and physical protests to address these issues. The committee also elected officers from among its members. Salvador Zúniga was the president during the pilgrimage and throughout my research period.

¹⁷The *compostura* is a traditional Lenca religious ceremony which includes the sacrifice of animals and prayers asking for God's blessing on a person, activity or object. See Chapter 2 for a complete treatment.

¹⁸The *hambruna* (or "famine") took place in August of 1993 during a presidential campaign. I place the term in quotation marks because while there is no doubt that

Interviews

My principal objective in La Esperanza was to conduct and process interviews with COPIN and others involved in the pilgrimage. I will begin this section by reviewing briefly the interview method I used both in La Esperanza and in San Francisco de Opalaca. With regard to the structure and process of the interview I was guided by Lofland (1971), Gilbert (1993) and Whyte (1984). For each interview I developed an interview guide which dealt with the topics and issues I wished to explore (see appendix A). I taped nearly all of my interviews and took thorough notes both to demonstrate my interest and in case there was a problem with the tape. Initially, I worried that villagers would be nervous about my tape recorder; however, I found that after demonstrating some initial curiosity, they appeared to completely forget it was there.

I tried to review each tape within twenty-four hours of the interview. I began transcribing the interviews, then hired someone else to transcribe them but both means proved too costly. As a result I took extensive notes, in Spanish, on the entire tape and transcribed any sections I thought might be especially important. In taking notes on the tapes I made great effort to maintain accuracy, often replaying a section a dozen times or asking a native Spanish speaker to clarify a word or phrase so that my notes contained the speaker's own terminology and phraseology.

I used mixed sampling techniques to select my interviewees. I began by interviewing nearly all COPIN members, and continued to regularly interview the five members who were working with me.¹⁹ I most often met with two or three of them

there was a severe shortage of grain in the San Francisco de Opalaca region, the issue became a political football. See Chapter Three for a complete treatment.

¹⁹Of the five informants, two were men, three were women and four of the five were COPIN officers.

to discuss a particular event and then would meet with two or three others to get their perspective. Working with groups created both a synergy for the interview and a critical audience for the story. Discussing the same event with two different groups also allowed me to build on the first interview--clarifying, filling in gaps and digging deeper into particular events. In addition to COPIN members, I also interviewed people COPIN recommended (chain sampling) as well as other proponents and opponents of the pilgrimage (extreme case sampling).²⁰

All of the interviews focused on some aspect(s) of the three questions outlined above. With non-COPIN members, I usually tried to touch on all three questions in a typical one to two hour interview. COPIN had agreed that they would begin by giving me their history through the second pilgrimage. After completing the history, we would begin to discuss questions two and three. However, because of our mutual fascination with history, their busy schedules and the relatively low priority of my research compared to their continuing protests; by the end of my stay in La Esperanza, COPIN and I had a very complete, in-depth history of COPIN and the pilgrimages but had done only superficial analysis. While I was quite frustrated at the time, I now think that failing to begin analysis may have been a blessing in disguise, because it allowed me to enter San Francisco de Opalaca much more open to villagers' theories and ideas.

San Francisco de Opalaca

Methodology Revision

Soon after arriving in San Francisco de Opalaca I made another important revision in my research methodology. During my first interviews I discovered there was significant variation within the region in participation in the pilgrimage--over a

²⁰The labels for the sampling techniques are taken from Patton (1990).

hundred participants came from some villages and only a handful or none from others. I began to consider comparing villages within the region, rather than the region of San Francisco de Opalaca to the region of Intibucá Norte. Comparing neighboring villages had several advantages. In addition to being logistically more practical, neighboring villages were more likely to have similar economic, cultural and historical conditions and to have more comparable motivations for participating (or not) in the pilgrimage. I soon decided to further specify the third question as "why did some villages within San Francisco de Opalaca mobilize more people and resources than others?"

Participant Observation

Every waking moment in Monteverde, and some of my sleeping ones as well, were spent as a participant observer. Whyte (1984) helped to clarify and legitimize this method for me. The opportunities were limitless. During our stay in Monteverde my family and I ate lunch every day at a neighbor's house, allowing us to enjoy both food and friendship but also to learn about and become part of a social network which shares resources and affection. Having my desk in the municipal office (a crumbling house with a dirt floor and mud walls), allowed me to listen in on the conflicts which came to the judge and complaints against COPIN and the mayor. Spending a substantial amount of our first month helping to build our house (which we thought was done) allowed me to observe village leaders at work and hear residents' praise and critiques. The latest rumors from the village gossip who sometimes babysat our daughter, the long trips in and out of the region, going to church and sharing "our" house with the priest and NGO staff all served as "grist for the mill." In order to document these observations I journaled daily and analyzed these notes together with the interviews.

Participating in and observing daily village life was personally rewarding but often anxiety-provoking. Carrying out my first major qualitative research project and

adapting to an isolated region like Monteverde were individually quite stressful and the two together often felt overwhelming. People piled up rocks to stare into our bedroom window, we felt self-conscious about our "stuff," we had to deal with daily requests for loans, and the ever-present over-night guests. At the same time my inexperience and isolation from my professors and other professionals bred stress that I would leave without some key information or was committing some blunder. In addition a local leader spread a rumor that I was a CIA agent (a rumor that was fairly easy to dispel) and most villagers had a general impression that I was going to write a book and "make a lot of money" (this rumor, depending on your perspective, was largely true and therefore much more difficult to dispel). These personal and professional pressures often weighed heavily on our family.

Despite these stresses, by participating and observing daily life my family and I made life-long friends and learned that we can enjoy life without running water, electricity or electronic gadgets. As a participant observer, I also gained nearly enough personal experiences with frames, networks, participation and relationships to write this dissertation without the pilgrimage. Those experiences both guided and reinforced my belief that these concepts are essential to understanding the mobilization for the pilgrimage and the events which followed.

Survey²¹

The idea of a carrying out a survey of all twenty-one villages in the new municipality was principally the mayor's. He required information on population, literacy, agriculture and poverty/wealth for his negotiations with the government and NGOs as well as for internal purposes such as taxes. I was interested in cooperating

²¹Appendix 2 is a translated version of the survey guide. Appendix 3 is a complete summary of the findings. See also Chapter 5 for a partial summary and analysis of the findings.

in part because the survey would serve as a practical benefit to the region, but also because it would help me to gain entry into and information on each of the villages and would give insights into why some villages mobilized while others did not.

The municipal corporation participated in the design of both the survey's content and methodology. Originally we planned to visit each village to carry out three tasks. First, the mayor would moderate a village assembly which would evaluate the municipal corporation and give suggestions. Second, a group of ten village leaders would give general data on the village including the types of functioning village organizations, school enrollment and several health indicators. Third, the same ten leaders were divided into three or four groups to meet with me, or one of the municipal officials I had trained to collect household data. We collected information on each household including the names of the adults, their political affiliation, whether or not they participated in the pilgrimage and the amount of area they planted in corn, beans and coffee.²²

We carried out a pretest in La Union and made several minor adjustments, the most significant of which was to begin the third step by drawing a map which included every house and the name of its owner. We used the map to ensure that each household was included in the survey. After carrying out this same format in two more villages, the mayor decided that he and the municipal officials who helped me

²²I was originally very doubtful that leaders could give accurate information on the whole village but I am now convinced that this data is as accurate as if we had collected it by going house to house. First, the group both questioned and helped each other, showing concern for details. In every group there would be discussions about whether someone had 1/8 or 3/16ths of an acre of coffee or whether a cousin lived in the house or merely visited a lot. Second, a certain *repartee* develops between the researcher and the group, that would have been difficult to establish with each household. Finally, I did spot checks on several villages and found that the data was always very close to self-reports (which may have been inaccurate as well.)

collect the household data did not have time for the two days required to travel and collect data on all twenty-one villages. After much discussion we decided that the mayor would invite ten leaders from each village to Monteverde so that I could interview them and then the municipal officials could help me with the third section.

Between June and August of 1995, we collected data on fifteen of the twenty-one villages. Leaders from the other six never arrived despite the mayor's requests and later threats. When I returned in January of 1996, I spoke with leaders from these six villages who were attending a regional assembly. I asked them to return to Monteverde while I was there to finish collecting the data. All of them complied and stated that previously they had either not received, had misunderstood the messages or had been too busy. I suspect that there was or had been some problem between the mayor and these villages.

Given that when we designed the survey I knew little about the themes that would prove important for the mobilization, my data collection and analysis focused on descriptive statistics and basic comparisons. The data gives an overview of each village and the region as a whole including the number of inhabitants, literacy percentage, area cultivated by crop per household and the participation in the pilgrimage. I also compared households which had and had not participated in the pilgrimage, villages which had high and low participation and villages which were distant or close to La Esperanza (the staging area for the pilgrimage).²³ I was able to triangulate some pieces of this data (ie. number of houses and literacy rate) with a Ministry of Health survey done during the same period.²⁴

²³For a summary of these comparisons and their analysis see Chapter 5.

²⁴I had three problems with the data analysis phase. First, I lost the file on El Venado (thirty-six houses) somewhere between Monteverde and Ithaca. As a result the totals are based on twenty and not twenty-one villages. Second, I did not get data on

Interviews

As with COPIN, I began my interviews in San Francisco de Opalaca focusing on the history of the pilgrimage. I used the same interviewing method as I did in La Esperanza and again used Jorgensen's (1989) model of beginning with "grand-tours" and becoming increasingly focussed. Both the villagers and I became engrossed with the region's history and how it shaped their decision to participate in the pilgrimage and Chapter 4 is largely the product of these interviews. However, their accounts of the *Toma del Aserradero*²⁵ and the Pilgrimage themselves were often confused and lacking in detail²⁶ when compared to COPIN's and the newspaper's--as a result the description of the events in Chapter 2 draws heavily on COPIN's accounts while my interviews with villagers offer local perspectives and interpretation of the events.

For these interviews regarding the history of the pilgrimage, I again used mixed purposive sampling procedures. My first interviews were with the municipal corporation (politically important cases) and subsequently I interviewed several recommended people such as elders and leaders of particular events (chain sampling).

nine of the fifty-one houses in Santa Maria. The leaders I interviewed did not know these families well and I did not have time to get a message to other leaders who could have given me that information. Finally, some of the detail that I had hoped to include was lost because it was either too time consuming and/or the forms I designed did not include necessary categories. For example I hoped to know the number of men vs. women who participated as well as the frequency with which they went to church. Given the data I had these distinction were not possible.

²⁵The *Toma del Aserradero* was a strike organized in April of 1994 by COPIN which was aimed at closing a saw mill and pressuring the local government to meet several other demands.

²⁶Villager's narration of local events was usually very clear and detailed. Their confusion surrounding the *Toma del Aserradero* and the Pilgrimage may be explainable because of the extraordinary nature of these events--the emotions, pace, risks and setting were all very different and must have been overwhelming to participants, some of whom had never before left their region or seen a car.

Finally, I sought out other perspectives including women, poorer villagers, opponents of the pilgrimage and residents of more distant villages (stratified purposeful sampling). Over fifty people contributed to the construction of the history of the pilgrimage in Chapter 4.

The focus of the majority of the interviews slowly began to shift from the history of the pilgrimage to an analysis of how they mobilized participants. My sampling procedure during this stage concentrated on three methods. First I gradually developed a group of seven informants who were both interested, willing and able to analyze the mobilization.²⁷ These informants were fairly diverse. They included two women and five men, represented three villages and four of the seven had participated in the pilgrimage. However, six of the seven were in the upper third economically and the same six were considered leaders in their villages.²⁸ While I most commonly met with individual informants, I occasionally met with subgroups of two or three and on several occasions all eight of us met to discuss, test and evaluate explanations which seemed to hold promise.

²⁷I did not find that "People are more cooperative about participating in the research than I anticipate" (Shaffir and Stebbins, 1991:72). Rather, it was a relatively small group of people who were regularly willing to sit down with me to discuss my latest questions and theories and an even smaller group who were able to think at that level of abstraction and/or with whom I was able to make myself understood at that level (it was probably some of both.) While I did not directly compensate any of these individuals, my relationship with each of them taught me much about the importance of networks for both social and economic transactions.

²⁸Some may argue that the positive portrayal I give of village leaders in this text was overly influenced by my relationship with them. However, in addition to the verbal portrayal of their role, my close relationship with them and my presence in the village allowed me to see the sacrifices they made to represent the village at meetings in La Esperanza, the countless hours they spent motivating and organizing neighbors to repair the church or build a bridge and finally the respect and trust their networks placed in these individuals.

In addition to the informant group, I also interviewed villagers who came to participate in the survey. These interviews allowed me to explore other villages' perceptions of the pilgrimage and its history as well as their explanations of their participation (or lack of it). These interviews also allowed me to test my emerging theories against the experience of villagers from all over the municipality.

Finally, I also compared three villages with high participation/household ratio with three villages with low participation/household ratio (extreme-case sampling). I interviewed five to ten residents from each village to explore their perceptions, explanations and to test developing theory.

During these interviews, I began to ask villagers to help me answer the two questions we had agreed upon: "how they were able to mobilize such a large number of people and resources for the pilgrimage and why did certain villages mobilize more people and resources than others?" I wanted to build on both their experience and my own to develop an explanation that made sense to us both. Both directly and indirectly, villagers suggested explanations such as networks, respect for authority, sickness and food supplies. I suggested other explanations such as wealth, political party, perception of resources and frames.

For each explanation which seemed to hold promise, I developed a series of three to four questions seeking to either disprove or further substantiate it. I would meet with some of my "informants," discuss the questions with visiting villages and anyone else I could find until I reached the point of "redundancy" (Patton, 1990:184). By that point those I had talked with had raised new questions, puzzles or explanations and I developed a new set of questions. In time, this process made most of the potential explanations including sickness, food supplies, wealth and political party seem relatively unimportant. However, the few which survived this iterative process

of data collection and analysis-- frames, networks, participation and relationships, I incorporated into the theory presented below.

Analyzing Fieldnotes

The ongoing analysis of my fieldnotes not only informed the interviews by producing new questions and puzzles, but the fieldnotes themselves also became the most tangible basis for analysis. My approach can be divided into four fairly distinct and formal analysis processes. First came the initial note-taking and review of the tape of the interview. This initial analysis, coupled with informal discussions, literature I was reviewing, or casual observations in the village often moved me into a second type of analysis--reviewing my notes (or portions of them) looking for other examples, contradictions or related themes. Three times during the research process I also carried out a third type of analysis recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1990)--a systematic, inductive²⁹ analysis of all my "data" coding sections, developing tentative labels and looking for new connections. Based on the first two of these reviews I sent a brief summary of my research to date to my committee for feedback. The third review, after my return to Ithaca, led to the development of my initial outline. Finally, after having developed this outline, I carried out seven or eight systematic deductive analyses of all of my "data," looking for sections which referred to or contradicted specific concepts and themes. While the inductive analysis was less than purely inductive, the deductive analysis also resulted in many inductive insights. Each of these reviews, except the last two, were interwoven into data collection and the continuing analysis with villagers.

²⁹Even proponents of this process recognize that it is less than purely inductive. Strauss and Corbin define grounded theory as "one that is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents" (1990:23) However, they also mention the appropriateness of "sensitizing concepts" (1990:42) and state that "while coding we are constantly moving between inductive and deductive thinking" (1990:111).

Accuracy/Credibility Checks

The accuracy or "credibility" of the findings is a sticky issue in qualitative research. Guba and Lincoln argue that by using the term "credibility," "the idea of isomorphism between findings and an objective reality is replaced by isomorphism between constructed realities of respondents and the reconstructions attributed to them" (1989:236). Given the participative nature of my research and the importance of the social construction of meaning in this dissertation, credibility rather than the objective standard of validity is more appropriate for determining the quality of the findings. As a result, I attempted to follow Guba and Lincoln's suggested techniques for supporting the credibility of my findings. I have already described that my research included 1) "prolonged engagement" 2) "persistent observation" 3) "peer debriefing" (by COPIN, informants and my wife, Jo Ann) and 4) "negative case analysis." I will now describe my efforts to carry out 5) "member checks" defined as "the process of testing hypotheses, data, preliminary categories, and interpretations with members of the stakeholding groups from whom the original constructions were collected"³⁰ (1989:238).

I carried out three different types of "member checks" during my research. As I described above, villagers and COPIN members were integrally involved in the process of creating, developing and testing explanations and interpretations. Their involvement gave them ample opportunity to question my understandings and explanations of the mobilization process. Second, before leaving my research site, I spent a day with both COPIN and villagers to discuss my preliminary findings. In

³⁰The purpose of these member checks in my case were not only to test the credibility of my findings. They were also a means of giving potentially helpful information back to the groups which had invested time and energy into the research project.

both settings I summarized what I was tentatively planning on writing for each of the three questions we had agreed upon and gave short synopsis of the survey data I had calculated by hand. The villagers agreed with my understanding of the role and importance of frames, networks and participation. Most of their comments focused on clarification or pertained to subtleties of the process and in the end several authorities said they were both satisfied and pleased with my work. However, COPIN organizers, and especially Salvador Zúniga wanted to clarify that while participation of local leaders had plummeted in San Francisco de Opalaca, it was skyrocketing in other regions (addressed in chapter 6). He also wondered, given the fact that he does not share the villagers' spirituality and faith, how he could have treated that theme more appropriately (addressed in Chapter 7). Finally, they asked for my suggestions regarding their then current conflict with ONILH and San Francisco de Opalaca leaders (addressed in Chapter 6). I encouraged them to defuse the conflict, allow villagers to make "mistakes" and to increase their participation.³¹

In January of 1996, I made a final "member check." I returned to La Esperanza and Monteverde with a draft of what is now Chapters 2 through 6 translated into Spanish. I spent two days with COPIN discussing what I had written. Despite the fact that its portrayal of COPIN was often less than favorable, the six organizers I met with said they were "very satisfied," and Salvador stated that "the study has helped to clarify many things." It was difficult for villagers to read and

³¹This day of discussions with COPIN was the first time COPIN had requested my input and I gave them extensive feedback and suggestions. Some would argue that I was overstepping my role as researcher and influencing the process I was studying. However, I believe they deserved such feedback because it had been a part of our initial agreement. It also allowed me to reciprocate for all of their assistance. I also believe participants in research have the right to ask for even tentative conclusions and that both COPIN and villagers had the maturity to carefully consider each suggestion before acting.

evaluate so much text in such a short time so I formed two discussion groups with my informants. In addition to many relatively minor changes and clarifications, these discussions with COPIN and the villagers and my observations during that month resulted in the inclusion of two new themes, relationships and coercion, and their role in the mobilization process for the pilgrimage and the events which followed.

Summary

In hindsight, of course, I would have done many things differently. I would have invested more time and energy in developing and maintaining relationships with COPIN and local leaders. I would make changes in my survey instrument to acquire more information on networks, participation and relationships. I would have spent more time as a participant observer and in informal discussions and less time on formal interviews. While I believe these changes would have strengthened my arguments here, I do not believe they would have substantially altered them.

If given the opportunity to do this research process again, I would again study the pilgrimage and live in Monteverde, and I would maintain my focus on sustained, locally-led activities, on local history, on how they mobilized and why some villages mobilized more than others. I would also use basically the same methods. My questions and methods led me where I hoped they would. They helped me to understand and explain a sustained, locally-led activity. This explanation also yielded questions regarding dominant development paradigms and insights into development theory and practice. Chapters 2 through 6 will outline the history of the pilgrimage and develop my explanation and Chapter 7 will apply those explanations to development theory and practice.

CHAPTER 2: THE CONTEXT OF MOBILIZATION

This study seeks to explain how over four thousand indigenous people were mobilized for a risky and costly event like the Lenca pilgrimage and whether this case gives any insights into the mobilization process for other risky and costly but potentially beneficial activities. This chapter and the next explore the role of historical and contextual factors in mobilizing participants for the pilgrimage and discuss whether these same factors make the case so atypical that its findings are inapplicable to other situations.

These chapters will demonstrate that while the historical and contextual factors do not provide a sufficient explanation for the mobilization for the pilgrimage, many of these factors clearly influenced the mobilization process. The factors range from pre-conquest Lenca culture and the modern indigenous rights movement to broken presidential promises made to San Francisco de Opalaca and the effect of a "famine" many Opalacans deny existed. The role of some of these factors was subtle and subconscious such as the historical and spiritual power of labeling the event a pilgrimage or the use of social networks to mobilize participants. However, other factors were openly discussed, contested and framed as justifications for either staying home or marching into Tegucigalpa. Those promoting and those opposing the pilgrimage each framed past mobilization efforts such as the *Toma del Aserradero* as either successes or failures in hopes of influencing potential participants. Other factors such as the long string of broken political promises and the lack of government aid to the region were consciously framed by proponents but go largely uncontested. Although a detailed history of the Lencas or a complete compendium of international, national and local factors which influenced the mobilization process is neither necessary nor feasible, I will attempt in these two chapters to outline the major features of the context of mobilization.

These chapters will also highlight both the unique and common historical and contextual factors in order to facilitate judgements of transferability. These factors were cited by many of the non-residents of San Francisco de Opalaca I interviewed to explain away the pilgrimage and the events which followed. Most searched for some unique characteristic the participants shared which would explain the mobilization--an effort which implied the irrelevancy of this to other cases and the improbability that similar mobilizations could be repeated. These outsider explanations for the mobilization could be grouped into three categories: social, historical and cultural. Outsiders argued that socially, the mobilization for the pilgrimage could be explained by the extreme poverty and marginalization of the Lencas; or historically, by factors such as the region's successful land titling project or the broken political promises; or culturally, by the region's intense spirituality or the Lenca's highly communal society.

I will demonstrate below that while the mobilization for the pilgrimage was influenced by a set of unique historical and contextual characteristics, these do not make its lessons irrelevant nor do they make another similar mobilization impossible. The mobilization for the pilgrimage, like mobilizations for other social movements, collective action or development projects, took place in a unique context, but one which shares common features with other contexts. However, as I explained in the introduction, it is not my task to demonstrate generalizability but to describe the context in a way which permits the reader to judge transferability. In addition, the social, historical and cultural factors cited as explanations for mobilization are socially constructed. These same characteristics of poverty, marginalization, political promises and Lenca spirituality now handily used to explain the pilgrimage, were employed just as readily before the event to explain decades and even centuries of compliance.

As a result, the purpose of these chapters is two-fold. First, to describe the historical and contextual factors which explain in part why over four thousand indigenous people participated in a risky and costly event like the pilgrimage. And second,

to provide an extensive and careful description of the time, place, the context, the culture...in order to facilitate transferability judgements on the part of others who may wish to apply the study to their own situations (Guba and Lincoln, 1989: 242).

In providing that description I will also attempt to highlight both those factors which appear to be unique and those which Opalacans may share with other poor and marginalized groups.

Before beginning I will briefly explain how I have laid out the description which follows. During my first weeks in San Francisco de Opalaca, I interviewed over fifty villagers exploring with each the historical and contextual factors which they believed influenced the mobilization for the pilgrimage. These events and themes as highlighted by these villagers in their explanation of why they did or did not participate in the pilgrimage provide the basis of Chapter 3 and include decades of mistreatment by municipal authorities, political promises made and broken every four years and events such as a successful land-titling initiative. While some of these events fit under the themes in this chapter I have chosen to keep them all together as the local explanations for their mobilization.

As important as these factors are, I came to believe that there were other factors which, though not mentioned by villagers during interviews, were influential in the mobilization process.³² In this chapter I have grouped these factors into three

³²While these themes were not mentioned by villagers in initial interviews, many of them were highlighted by COPIN and other outside participants or observers of the pilgrimage who I interviewed. Several villagers also reviewed these two chapters

themes: Lenca history, the national and international context and present-day Lencas. These themes, although mentioned rarely by residents of San Francisco de Opalaca, certainly played an influential if less obvious role in the mobilization for the pilgrimage. Few would disagree that a movement like the pilgrimage would have been nearly impossible to organize and extremely dangerous to participate in ten years ago, before the end of the Cold War and the accompanying hostilities in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Similarly, the effect of five hundred years on marginalization and the imposition of Catholicism had powerful, subtle and even contradictory influences on an event labeled an *indigenous pilgrimage*. In addition, factors such as the social and religious organization of the village were also powerful factors in the mobilization. These themes go almost completely unmentioned in villagers' own explanations of their participation and therefore, this chapter presents largely an "outsiders'" perspective (principally my own and COPIN's) on the historical and contextual factors which affected the mobilization process.

Lenca History and Culture

The following section will explore the history and culture of the Lencas. It demonstrates both the uniqueness of the Lencas and characteristics they have in common with many groups in Honduras and Latin America. It will also recount a history and culture with powerful events, people and symbols. Some outsiders I interviewed argued that it is this history and culture which explain the mobilization for the pilgrimage. However, this chapter will demonstrate that much of this history and culture has been lost, at least at the conscious level, among residents of San

during my visit in January of 1996 and agreed with my presentation and the importance of these factors.

Francisco de Opalaca, making it difficult to measure the impact of its influence in everyday decision-making.

Who Are the Lencas?

At the time of the Spanish conquest, the Lencas were the most numerous of Honduras' six indigenous groups and covered nearly a third of its territory. The earliest Spanish reports regarding the region now inhabited by the Lencas include references to several distinct indigenous groups. The term Lenca was first applied to all of these groups by Squier who, in 1853, constructed vocabulary lists in four different regions and discovered many similarities between them (Chapman, 1992). While Squier and subsequent investigators have used this name to refer to the subgroups that inhabited the region, linguists and archaeologists believe that the people now considered Lenca were not actually a single nation but rather at least four (Chapman, 1992) and as possibly as many as nine (Stone, 1957) independent groups with a common or very similar language. The Lencas are thought to be the descendants of Mayans who did not follow the exodus at the fall of the Mayan empire (Barón Castro, 1978).

Despite the disagreements regarding the identity of the pre-conquest³³ Lencas, the term currently describes a people whose attributes make them distinct from other Honduran populations. Chapman (1992:13, translation mine), an anthropologist who began studying the Lenca people in 1965, outlines seven characteristics of modern Lenca populations:

³³I will use the terms pre and post-conquest to refer to the periods prior to and after the Spanish conquest of Honduras.

- 1) physical appearance
- 2) forms of religious expression
- 3) importance of women's participation in agriculture
- 4) military fervor of the men³⁴
- 5) manufacture of baskets and pottery
- 6) distinctive Spanish dialect
- 7) women's dress

The uniqueness of the Lencas and their commonalities with Honduran and Latin American *campesinos* is clearly reflected in Chapman's (1992) struggle to categorize them. She coins the term, "*campesinos* of the Lenca tradition," which many authors have since adopted, "since it refers not so much to an ethnic group but to communities and even isolated families who preserve and practice a tradition" (1992:13, translation mine), and also because "the Lenca tongue died out in the last decades of the last century and the first decades of this one" (1992:14, translation mine). However, I will refer to these people as Lenca for four reasons. First, it is the term they use to describe themselves. Second, Lenca communities are not merely isolated villages. All 21 villages in San Francisco de Opalaca and many neighboring villages fit all seven of Chapman's characteristics. Third, many people groups which no longer speak a distinct language are considered ethnically distinct. And finally, many Lencas are just beginning to discover and value their cultural distinctiveness and I believe Chapman's term minimizes that uniqueness.

³⁴While this was clearly true during the first half of this century, those I interviewed in San Francisco de Opalaca argued that this characteristic seems to be fast waning.

Pre-Conquest Lenca³⁵

Social Organization

Each of the groups now considered Lenca had its own territorial limits and its own *cacique* (translated as chief or lord) who held the ultimate authority in all communal matters and who passed his title on to his eldest son. Each group also had a judge and four lieutenants who were responsible for:

the business of the Republic, such as War, Government, Wrong-doing, Agriculture, Marriages, and other business such as consulting with the priests and referring all to the Lord, and giving their opinion in everything (Herrera 1730: vol 2, 158, translation mine).

The indigenous priests were so venerated that no one could speak to them except the highest nobles. They led the temple worship and consulted the gods regarding important communal decisions. They were "old men, naked, with long hair wrapped around their head" (Ibid). All of these officials were part of the noble class and were not responsible for working at subsistence activities.

Commoners and slaves carried out the work of farming, trading and making war. They were responsible for paying tributes of honey and fine cloth to the cacique (Chapman, 1992). Women produced cloth and pottery and the men were primarily responsible for cultivating the land.

The population of each Lenca settlement ranged from a few hundred to several thousand. While the majority were probably small, they were also quite densely distributed (Newson, 1992). Their houses consisted of packed dirt floors, stick walls (sometimes covered with mud) and thatched roofs. Many of these settlements also had

³⁵The following description depends heavily on what are often superficial, unreliable and contradictory observations and descriptions by Spanish colonizers regarding the internal organization and in some cases the most private and sacred parts of the conquered societies.

a temple which Herrera describes as "long narrow rooms, high off the ground where they kept their gods of clay, stone and wood with the faces of tigers and other animals" (1730: vol. 4, 116, translation mine). On nearby mountaintops, the Lencas also constructed fortifications with only one approach which they used to defend and protect themselves for extended periods. They first used these fortifications during wars with other indigenous groups and later against the Spanish.

The Lencas were also infamous among the Spanish for their cruel internal wars:

Tradition seemed to be the motive for war but perhaps it was also stimulated by the need to acquire slaves. Peace prevailed during the periods of the year in which they conducted business, but those groups which spoke in different tongues were never at peace. They carried out attacks and ambushes, as in open warfare, and they maintained forts in the hills where they could retreat for long periods. As a prelude to battle, they would send an ambassador under the pretext of achieving peace, but with the purpose of verifying the size and nature of the enemy. Then the war would begin. As arms they used round shields of sugarcane, bow and arrows with fine points of stone, and swords of poisoned wood which caused wounds from which the victims never recuperated (Newson, 1992:85-6, translation mine).

A traditional ritual, the *Guancasco*, is said to originate from the celebration at the initiation of a period of peace and trading between two warring groups.

Religious Organization and Practices

Little is known about pre-conquest Lenca religion. Lencas worshipped many gods including the Great Father, the Great Mother and the god of the past, present and future represented by images of wood, clay and stone. They also believed in *naguals*, or guardian animal spirits, and the importance of dreams in understanding the present and predicting the future. Although little is known about their religious

celebrations, Herrera (1730) described them as including food, chicha³⁶ and sexual freedom.

Production

The Lenca appear to have inhabited the Honduran highlands for centuries, possibly displaced by the lowland dwelling Mayan Indians. Regarding land tenure,

there is little evidence regarding the system of land tenure in the pre-columbian period, however, it was probably a communal system in which the lands were assigned to individual families to be cultivated (Newson 1992:77, translation mine).

The Lenca's principal staples were corn and beans, supplemented by yucca and sweet potatoes. The Spanish were impressed with the productivity of the Lenca's corn and their ability to harvest three crops each year (Newson, 1992). The Lenca probably did not eat their corn as tortillas but made balls of ground corn and grilled them over a fire. Their diet was also supplemented by fruits such as pineapple and avocado, vegetables like squash and peppers and meat from wild game and domestic turkeys. The pre-conquest Lenca also grew cotton for cloth-making and to a lesser extent cocoa for consumption and trade.

The pre-conquest Lenca's agricultural system is classified as semi-permanent, or slash and burn. A parcel was set on fire, semi-cleared and then planted for a few years before moving on to another parcel. Their tools included rock axes, wooden hoes and planting sticks. Labor was most likely not communal but household based and exchanged equally between households during peak labor periods.

Lenca crafts-people were quite highly skilled. The men made baskets as well as tools and weapons. They hunted animals including deer, rabbits, iguanas, pumas

³⁶Chicha is a home-made drink made from cooked corn, water and *dulce* (a form of sugar) which is allowed to ferment.

and jaguars with traps, bows and arrows and poison-tipped spears, all of which they manufactured themselves. The women spun thread, made dyes, wove cloth and made clothing. They also threw and fired pots, jugs and other cooking utensils from clay.

The pre-conquest market was most likely very limited.

Among the Lencas, [commerce] was hindered by wars between tribal leaders. Trade was carried out during certain times of year, when peace was announced with tambourines and drums. During these periods, cotton cloth, birds, feathers, cocoa and *achote* was traded (Newson, 1992: 84, translation mine).

Conquest Period

In 1502, on his fourth trip to the "New World," Christopher Columbus landed on the North Coast of Honduras. However, it was not until 1522-1525 that several other *conquistadores* arrived in Honduras to claim land, "pacify" and "christianize" the Indians and to fight among themselves as they divided up their spoils. The pacification of Honduras was especially difficult because of:

the presence of numerous groups of independent indigenous groups who often formed weak confederations. This resulted in the Spanish being unable to achieve an effective control through political alliances with just a few principal indigenous leaders. Instead they were forced to conquer each group individually, and no sooner had they pacified one group, when another would turn against them (Newson, 1992:145, translation mine).

In 1530, Cocumba (a Xicaque or Mayan) led a rebellion in Northwest Honduras which the Spanish forces in Honduras were not able to quell. Pedro de Alvarado was called in from Guatemala to crush the revolt. The brutality of Alvarado's men and their Guatemalan indigenous army increased the indigenous' hatred for the Spanish. In 1537, the *cacique* Lempira, a Lenca, formed an alliance to expel the Spanish. Some indigenous groups voluntarily joined Lempira while others, including the Cares (one of the groups now considered Lenca) had to be conquered

first and forced to participate. Lempira surprised the Spanish with the ferocity of his insurrection but eventually was cornered and killed.³⁷

These defeats dampened indigenous resistance and also diminished their population. While demographers believe the principal factor in the depopulation of Honduras during this period was European illnesses, the rebellions and slave trade also had a significant impact. Mistreatment, overwork and severe changes in the indigenous economic and social structure contributed to reducing the number of indigenous people in western and central Honduras from six hundred thousand in 1520 to thirty-two thousand around 1550 (Newson, 1992:180).

Social Changes³⁸

The social trauma resulting from the decimation in thirty-five years of ninety-five percent of the population is difficult to imagine. It is certainly true that Honduran indigenous groups, and undeniably the Lencas' history was replete with warfare, conquest and slavery. It is also likely that there existed isolated pockets of indigenous people whose lives changed very little. However, it seems unlikely that Honduras had ever seen a time in which nineteen of every twenty people were shipped away as slaves or died from unknown illnesses, warfare or mistreatment. While social and cultural characteristics such as traditions and languages were certainly not forgotten, it would be improbable that factors such as the indigenous family structure, social

³⁷See appendix 4 for Herrera's (1730) description of Lempira and the Lenca revolt.

³⁸Secondary data on the Lencas from early colonial times until the 1950s is very sketchy. As a result, the following sections draw on broader descriptions of the social, religious and economic processes taking place in Honduras during this period.

values and ideals were not drastically altered during this "pacification" and depopulation period.⁸

After "pacification" the Spanish imposed their colonial system on the indigenous groups. The *encomienda* was one of the first manifestations of that system.

The *encomienda* was an Indian concession through which an individual, in exchange for protecting his charges and offering them instruction in Catholic doctrine, was allowed to impose a tribute in the form of goods or money and, until 1549, was also allowed to demand payment in labor (Newson, 1992:27, translation mine).

The first *encomiendas* were given to the *conquistadores* who had "pacified" a region, later they were granted to Spanish officials and their friends. The owners of the *encomiendas* commonly abused their rights of exacting tribute and labor and greatly neglected the responsibility of educating and caring for "their indians."

While the *caciques* were allowed to retain their titles within the *encomienda* structure, their responsibilities and authority were greatly decreased. They were not allowed to own slaves or exact tribute. However, they often became relatively wealthy by taking bribes, selling slaves or stealing from communal funds. The Spanish authorities also had the right to name a governor, a privilege of which they frequently availed themselves if the *cacique* was "uncooperative." The Spanish also sponsored, and often manipulated, local elections for a host of ecclesiastical and secular positions. This variety of indigenous authorities decreased the *cacique's* power but it also provided space within the colonial system for the indigenous population to protect and retain elements of their culture and society.

Religious Changes

In addition to political and social conquest, the Spanish sought to impose upon

⁸This incredible depopulation of indigenous society makes it even less likely that Spanish observers gained an accurate picture of pre-conquest indigenous culture.

Honduras their religious system. Resistance to this process is evidenced by the many documented cases of the murder of missionaries and their military escorts, as late as 1690 (a practice which demonstrates the continued resistance to Spanish rule, the failure to achieve total "pacification" and the probable existence of small pockets of indigenous populations relatively untouched by the conquest).

The parish priest was to be the Church's agent of conversion and education in Honduras and theoretically, each parish priest was to be supported by the indigenous people of that parish. However, the multitude of languages, the disperse nature, contracting size and the poverty of the indigenous population, as well as the lack of priests interested in serving indigenous areas in Honduras made conversions slow. As a result, Honduran converts with very little training, were often charged with the conversion and Catholic education of the indigenous people. These missionaries, often more interested in commerce than Catholicism (Newson, 1992), by their absence, ignorance or sympathy, also provided opportunity for the indigenous groups to retain much of their traditional beliefs:

In this way, although Christian religious symbols became dominant among the aborigines, indigenous beliefs remained essentially autonomous, with some aspects of Christianity grafted in (Newson 1992:325, translation mine).

Economic Changes

The *conquistadores* were seeking quick and large profits and the slave trade and mining initially offered both. The first slaves were taken to serve as pack animals for exploratory and "pacification" expeditions. Although few survived long due to overwork, malnourishment, illness and rebellion they were easily replaced by new "recruits" along the way. Quickly however, slaves became Honduras' major export. While the Spanish authorities in Honduras were required to closely supervise the

branding of all new slaves, many *conquistadores* risked the small penalties and fabricated counterfeit brands in order to export as many indigenous people as they could capture. This "illegal" trade sent thousands of Honduras' indigenous people aboard Spanish boats to Cuba, Jamaica and later Panama and Peru.

Gold was arguably the principal motivation for the conquest and the crown received millions of gold pesos from Honduras. In just one valley during the 1540s, between twenty and twenty-seven thousand indigenous people panned for gold for their Spanish masters. By 1560, these slaves mined the equivalent of two million gold pesos from this one valley (Newson, 1992). While the principal work was done by indigenous men, many children and women were also enslaved.

It was only after the indigenous population was nearly decimated, the slave trade outlawed (arguably for both ethical and economic reasons) and mining output had decreased, that the Spanish became interested in agricultural production. The Spanish introduced wheat and rice to Honduras, neither very successfully. However, they also introduced citrus, various vegetables, metal tools and cattle; all with great success. In a few short years, Honduras became a major exporter of cattle and pack animals for neighboring colonial areas. While the indigenous populations benefitted slightly from the metal tools and alternative crops, the cost was high--Spanish expropriation of the best land left the indigenous population to meet their own subsistence needs and pay their tributes by working increasingly marginal plots.

Summary

Historically, the Lencas have much in common with other indigenous groups in Honduras and Latin America. The social, religious and economic subjugation as well as the near decimation of their population were typical of the conquest period. At the same time, the Lenca's resistance, including the rebellion led by Lempira was somewhat unique. This resistance and the resulting repression may have contributed

to the extinction of the Lenca language and a higher degree of cultural assimilation than other smaller indigenous groups.

Culturally, it is difficult to discern the remnants of Lenca culture after over four hundred years of oppression. There are some strong similarities between Herrera's descriptions of factors such as Lenca's agricultural and construction methods and respect for authority and present day practices; however, many of these characteristics are common to most of rural Latin America. The seven characteristics mentioned by Chapman do distinguish Lencas from other Hondurans, but few reflect cultural elements which effect daily decisions. Traditional Lenca religious practices (see the discussion of the *compostura* in this chapter) and the accompanying spirituality is probably the strongest (or at least the most easy to distinguish) link between the present day Lenca culture and their heritage.

Despite outsiders' arguments, Lenca history and culture offers a subtle and relatively weak explanation for the pilgrimage mobilization. The organizers called the event an *indigenous* pilgrimage and used symbols including Lempira to frame the event for external agents. However, as the last section of this chapter and Chapter 5 will demonstrate, much of this unique and powerful history and culture has been lost from popular knowledge and was not effective in mobilizing participants. As a result, while factors such as preconquest Lenca beliefs and practices and the conquest and its effects certainly shaped contemporary culture and the mobilization for the pilgrimage, its effects are were subtle and difficult to discern.

National and International Context

The national and international context of the mobilization for the pilgrimage is another potential explanation for the pilgrimage and provides information to better judge the transferability of the findings. COPIN believes that the pilgrimage took place in an extremely favorable context. COPIN's perception of the contextual factors

go far in explaining why they chose this moment to launch such an effort, why they framed the movement and demands as they did and why the government granted approximately 80% of their demands. COPIN carefully considered the factors described below, and believes the government did likewise, when making decisions about timing, framing, violence and negotiations.

The influence of these international and national factors in San Francisco de Opalaca was much more subtle. None of the factors listed below were mentioned by villagers to explain their mobilization. However, radio reports and residents' observations may have led them to believe that certain previously dangerous forms of protest were now acceptable. They also heard about shifts in national politics, the discourse of the environmental and indigenous movements and the power of the global media. While residents did not necessarily analyze these factors consciously, they certainly had at least a subtle influence on their calculations regarding the potential risk, the probability of success and ultimately their mobilization for the pilgrimage:

Villagers didn't say, "we went because the cold war ended." COPIN did this kind of analysis but for them it was more subtle. They heard environmental or indigenous discussions on the radio and this influences their decisions" (Berta Cáceres, COPIN organizer).

Environmental Movement

The environmental movement has become a powerful global actor over the past two decades. Each year, millions of dollars are spent on international conferences and projects. The issue of deforestation is central to the environmental agenda. Within Honduras international organizations fund environmental radio programs, conferences, material development and environmental projects such as reforestation. Environmentalism has reached even remote regions such as San Francisco de Opalaca

by radio⁴⁰ and in 1990 ADRO added an environmental component to its training for that region.

The international and national environmental movement and its discourse were powerful in shaping and supporting the pilgrim's demand for a thirty-year ban on lumbering in the region. COPIN believed that while the ban was of only marginal interest to Opalacans, it was central to building powerful alliances with environmental groups and the sympathetic public and media (see Chapter 5).

Indigenous Rights

Indigenous rights have vaulted onto the international agenda of the 1990s. In 1992, Rigoberta Menchú, a Guatemala indigenous leader received the Nobel Peace prize. The UN declared 1993 the Year of the Indigenous People and 1994 launched the Decade of the Indigenous People. In addition to the UN, organizations such as the World Bank, the Organization of American States and the United States Agency for International Development designed programs which specifically targeted indigenous groups and began to revise their project guidelines to protect indigenous interests.

The armed uprising of indigenous people in Chiapas, Mexico in 1993 also demonstrated the power of and international sympathy for indigenous movements. COPIN followers followed the events in Chiapas closely and recognized an openness and sympathy in the Honduran public and press which they believed they could use to their advantage in their mobilization of indigenous groups. At the same time they were confident that the context of Honduras would neither require nor accept an armed uprising as it did in Mexico:

What happened in Chiapas convinced us to do something big and irreversible...(Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer) We have seen in

⁴⁰World Vision has sponsored a fifteen minute regional radio program on environmental issues since 1993.

Central America that armed protest is not a good idea...something peaceful would have more impact, we were willing to die of hunger (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

In Honduras by 1990, two indigenous umbrella organizations existed in addition to each individual indigenous organization. These organizations received mostly European funding to educate their groups regarding indigenous rights as well as to provide programs to improve their standard of living. The Honduran Congress also approved the International Labor Organization's Agreement 169 (1989) regarding Tribal and Indigenous Groups in Independent Countries which states that the government "should recognize the indigenous peoples' rights to property and the possession of the lands which they traditionally inhabit." (OIT, 1994, translation mine). COPIN organizers were involved in land titling initiatives in 1991 and 1992 which successfully appealed to this agreement and received communal titles at no cost.

The environmental and indigenous movements are closely tied not only in this pilgrimage, but worldwide. Brysk argues convincingly that indigenous rights movements have long depended on alliances with environmental movements:

The Indian rights movement harnessed the power of the international environmental regime... This has been effective in part because "international mechanisms to deal with environmental problems are stronger than those treating human rights, since ecology draws on consensual scientific knowledge... (1993:30 and 35).

The alliance is so strong that some international bodies list indigenous rights as an environmental issue. COPIN also saw the power of linking both the indigenous rights and environmental issues. Salvador Zúniga (COPIN organizer) told me that "our idea was to articulate the environmentalist angle, where there was little participation but a lot of sympathy with the indigenous connection."

End of Cold War, Demilitarization and Democratization

The end of the cold war and the armed conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador had some contradictory effects on Honduras. International humanitarian, multilateral and military assistance plummeted along with Honduras' "global importance" in a "post-conflictual" Central America (see Montes, 1993; Brockett, 1987). The decrease in humanitarian and multilateral aid together with prescribed structural adjustment has made it increasingly difficult for the Honduran government to meet the population's demand for employment, affordable necessities, higher wages and ultimately improved standards of living (see Navarro, 1993). The end of armed conflicts in neighboring countries also means increased industrial competition. At the same time, the reduction in international military assistance has weakened its role and its power in civil society (see Fitch, 1993; Levitsky, 1992).

Honduras was one of the first countries in contemporary Latin American to begin the transition from military to civilian rule, a process which is often labeled demilitarization and democratization. Honduran national governments have been elected since 1981, ending nearly twenty-five years of relatively uninterrupted military dictatorships. While the Honduran elite, both civilian and military, have never been as repressive as their neighbors (see Acker, 1988; Brockett, 1990) and its civil society has traditionally been quite strong (see Ruhl, 1984), the decrease in military power have decreased the levels of repression and subsequent fear.

COPIN organizers were very conscious of these shifts. They recognized that the decrease in repression and fear made a massive mobilization possible, "if there would have been war in El Salvador, forget about it. No one would have moved!" (Berta Cáceres, COPIN organizer) They also made it very clear that they intended to strengthen civilian rule and not do anything which would strengthen the military's hand:

At this time we played a role in a debate which was growing between civil society and the military and we preferred with all our heart to support the civil society and not a meaningless opposition to the government" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

The pilgrimage also provided the government with an opportunity to attempt to frame itself as concerned and desirous of helping the neediest elements of Honduran society.

Popular Action

The banana strike in 1954 marks the first national-level popular action in contemporary Honduras. Forty thousand banana workers went on strike against the extremely powerful banana companies. After two months of high-stake struggle, the company conceded to the majority of the worker's demands including eight-hour shifts, overtime pay, raises and paid vacations (see MacCameron, 1983). That strike also resulted in a very labor-friendly labor code which was passed in 1957. Not only did this strike demonstrate that political change was possible in Honduras, it also resulted in the emergence of experienced organizers, many of whom assisted the *campesino* organization in the 1960s and 70s (Ruhl, 1984).

Pushed by increasing land scarcity and pulled by a variety of favorable political and social factors including the experienced organizers and a socially active Catholic church, *campesinos* began pressuring the government for land reform. Honduran *campesinos* "became the strongest and best organized in Central America" (Ruhl, 1984:51). They used two principal methods to pressure the government--land invasions and marches on Tegucigalpa. They organized three major marches between 1967 and 1975, the largest of which included an estimated twenty thousand participants. Although each of these marches was either a response to or resulted in

violence, torture and the assassination of *campesinos* and organizers, each gained weighty concessions from the government.⁴¹

COPIN chose to build on this proven but dangerous method when planning their protest. As Marx stated, "in periods of revolutionary crisis [men] anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes" (1963:15). However, while COPIN borrowed the popular organization's methods, they were uncomfortable standing under their umbrella. COPIN believed that during the 1980s and early 90s, popular organizations (unions, campesino, human rights and even indigenous organizations) had come to be viewed as socially and ethically corrupt by the general public. Ideologically, they had failed to adapt to the country's dynamic context and ethically the public believed the leadership had become self-serving:

What motivates them is the dollars they receive from the outside. We decided we could not go as popular organizations. We had to take advantage of the indigenous connection...maximize the indigenous potential (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

President Reina

President Carlos Roberto Reina took office in January of 1994. He had earned his doctoral degree from the Sorbonne and had a reputation for being ideologically left of center and socially progressive. He campaigned with such "sound bites" as *del pueblo al poder* (from the people to power) and claimed he would lead a moral revolution and promote sustainable development with a human face. Soon after entering office he created a stir within and without Honduras by initiating the process of normalizing relations with Cuba and China. COPIN believed that at the time of the

⁴¹For more information regarding the campesino land reform movement see Durham, 1979; Anderson, 1981; Ruhl, 1984 and Lapper, 1985.

pilgrimage (July, 1994), Reina's government was "open but weak. All [of the popular movements] wanted to take advantage of the opportunity. All of us wanted to make demands of him" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

Global Media

Honduras has six dailies, many TV news programs, several twenty-four hour radio news stations as well as CNN and other international TV news services on cable networks. News items including Chiapas, environmental problems, Reina's promises and the weakening of the military are broadcast to any household with a radio and spread from there. International news agencies also have correspondents in Honduras and both the Hambruna and the First Pilgrimage made international news which influenced a government concerned with its international image.

COPIN not only considered how to win the media's sympathy when framing the pilgrimage, they also worked to maintain that sympathy. Salvador told me, "I learned one thing in Tegucigalpa, the worst mistake a leader can make is to argue with the media." The media was fascinated with the pilgrimage, "the reporters were like children with a new toy. When we got ready to leave, they said 'no, don't go'" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

Summary

This background information on the national and international context for the mobilization should increase the reader's ability to judge its transferability. In addition, each of these factors shaped the mobilization process. While these factors were not mentioned by villagers, some of them undoubtedly influenced the decisions of residents of San Francisco de Opalaca regarding whether or not to participate in the pilgrimage. The weakened military, the election of president Reina, the increasing economic pressures, the heightened awareness of the effects of deforestation and the

support they had experienced in the past as indigenous people most likely made the decision to participate somewhat easier.

However, these factors had greater influence on COPIN and the government. COPIN's decision to launch the pilgrimage at that moment was certainly a product of its prediction of the expected response from President Reina, the national and international press, development organizations and the military. COPIN's crafting of the pilgrimage and its goals directly responded to their perception of the bankrupt character of popular organizations and of the saliency of indigenous and environmental movements. The government's favorable response could also be interpreted within the context of a developing democracy's attempts to strengthen civil society, avoid another Chiapas, compete for increasingly scarce international aid and seek a positive international image by supporting environmentalism and indigenous peoples.

Present-day Lencas: San Francisco de Opalaca⁴²

This description of present-day Lencas will focus on the Lencas of San Francisco de Opalaca rather than Lencas as a whole, in part because the vast majority of pilgrimage participants live in San Francisco de Opalaca but also because Lencas are dispersed throughout Honduras and have assimilated much of the culture in the area in which they live. As a result this portrayal can only accurately depict the segment of Lencas who live in the region studied.

This description will also highlight both the unique and common social, cultural and economic characteristics of this group in order to facilitate judgements of transferability. I will demonstrate that while the Lencas of San Francisco de Opalaca have unique characteristics such as the *compostura*, health practices and land

⁴²This overview will treat San Francisco de Opalaca before the First Pilgrimage for Life, Justice and Liberty. I will discuss some of the changes that have taken place since the pilgrimage in Chapter 6.

tenure; much of their social, cultural and productive characteristics are similar to those of other Honduran and Latin American groups. I will also illustrate that while these factors influenced the mobilization process, no one individual or even combination of these factors is sufficient to explain the mobilization.

I will begin by explaining the principal economic and social motivations for the pilgrimage which include geography, climate, production, housing, diet, health and education. Each of these factors was used to justify the pilgrimage and to motivate villagers to participate. I will end this chapter by describing the social and cultural factors which influenced how participants were mobilized. These factors include communal behavior, gender relations, religion, formal and informal organizations, leadership, incentives and decision-making.

Economic and Social Motivations

Many of the non-residents of San Francisco de Opalaca I interviewed argued that the poverty and marginalization of the Opalacans explained their high level of participation. This section will describe their pre-pilgrimage context, how it influenced their mobilization and finally draw conclusions about its explanatory power. I will include in my description explanations of how these factors are framed in contested manners by different groups, a fact which demonstrates the heterogeneity within the region.

Geography and Climate

San Francisco de Opalaca is extremely mountainous with only two plateaus of any significant size. It is sliced by several rivers, hundreds of streams and miles of rugged foot paths which during the rainy season are too dangerous even for mules. It is one of the highest regions of Honduras (peaks of 600 to 2162 masl and villages between 1000 and 1600 masl) and as a result also one of the most temperate [average temperature of between 6.5 and 22° C and an average yearly rainfall of 1600 mm

(Mejía, et al; 1992)]. The soils are relatively fertile but shallow.⁴³ While large sections of virgin forest around the villages have been cut and burned over the last forty years, extensive pine and oak forest still exist which protect small populations of wildlife. The relatively large tracts of untilled land, coupled with abundant water supplies and virgin forests make this region rich in potential for both residents and outsiders.

The geography and climate made two of the principal goals of the pilgrimage, the road and the municipality, very attractive to residents. The municipality would reduce their need to make the difficult trip to Yamaranguila and the road would not only simplify travel but also allow residents to better tap the region's resources. However, some residents opposed the pilgrimage and its goals because they feared that a road would only make the region more accessible and attractive to outsiders who would rob them and the region.

Production

Until 1992 all of the land in San Francisco de Opalaca was national or municipal (*ejidal*). Only a few hundred acres had been bought by outsiders and the rest was controlled by local inhabitants. This facilitated a communal land titling initiative which in 1992 successfully titled all of the land in the twenty-one villages (described at length below). The total land area corresponding to each village under the communal title averages about ten hectares per household, although arable land is sometimes significantly less.⁴⁴ Presently however, no one's agricultural activities are limited by a lack of available land.

⁴³For a complete treatment of soil types and fertility see Mejía, et al, 1992.

⁴⁴Unless cited, the statistics in this chapter come from my own research, many of them are collected in Appendix 3.

Corn is the principal agricultural product of the region with the average household planting between two and four acres twice a year. Bean cultivation in the region averages about 1/4 acre per household. Nearly every house is surrounded by banana trees which produce year-round as well as a few citrus and other fruit trees which produce a few weeks a year. Most households also plant squash (similar to small pumpkins), yucca and sweet potatoes and a few plant other garden vegetables such as tomatoes, cabbage and radishes. Nearly every family keeps a small number of chickens, turkeys and dogs. Chickens, turkeys and the occasional pig or cow are kept in reserve to be sold or traded for corn in times of crisis.

Cash crops at present are minimal due to the expense and difficulty of transporting harvests to market. Coffee production averages about one acre per household in the region. Many villagers also have small plots of sugar cane. These supply the coffee and *dulce*⁴⁵ for household consumption and a very small cash income. In most villages there are three or four farmers who have enough coffee or sugar cane to make a significant impact on their income (up to two or three months salary). Although the region is suitable for potato and other vegetable production, the lack of roads makes it almost impossible to take the crop to market.

As a result of training and the use of test-plots carried out by visiting agronomists in the last ten years, most farmers in the region have switched from slash and burn to permanent agriculture. Their principal tools have remained the same since colonization: the machete, a broad-faced hoe and a planting stick. Nearly no one uses a plow and no one in the region has a tractor. Chemical fertilizer use has remained limited for two reasons. First, almost everyone who uses it depends on loans from

⁴⁵Sugar cane is squeezed through a hand or animal turned mill. The resulting juice is boiled until almost all of the water has evaporated and then it is cooled in small molds to produce *dulce*.

NGOs and campesino organizations whose funds are very limited. Second, farmers must either rent a mule or more often carry the hundred pound sacks of fertilizer on their backs for six to eight hours over rugged mountain trails (most Lencas do not weigh one-hundred pounds themselves). While irrigation is possible throughout the region, only a very small minority is experimenting with it, in part due to the expense and difficulty in transport.

While twenty five to fifty percent of villagers will hire a neighbor or two to help them for a few days during peak labor periods, no one in the region can survive by working only in the village and no one is wealthy enough to hire out even half of their agricultural labor. As a result, agricultural labor depends almost solely on the participation of the household, including women. Hired laborers are often women or young men who do not yet have their own farms and are paid to help prepare the soil, plant, weed or harvest. One man or woman can earn five to ten lempiras (\$.50 to \$1.00) a day, (depending on the task and if the employer provides lunch), which is enough money to buy corn for five to six people for one day (five to ten pounds of corn).

Because of the insufficient internal demand for day laborers, most laborers supplement their incomes by searching for work outside the region among the larger landowners. During June, July and August, when the corn supply is low or depleted, men usually travel to nearby regions and work for a week or two at a time, earning fifteen to twenty lempiras a day (\$1.50 to \$2.00) and then use their earnings to buy corn and carry it on their backs the six to eight hours home (again in one hundred pound sacks). During the coffee harvest, December through February, a high percentage of men and some of the women and children travel to nearby regions to pick coffee and earn cash. An average picker earns about twenty-five to thirty lempiras (\$2.50 to \$3.00) a day, but some earn up to one hundred lempiras (\$10.00)

a day. For most villagers, this is the primary cash income of the year and for those who don't drink away their earnings, this cash will buy "new" used clothing, shoes and maybe a few other small items for the household.

The principal non-agricultural products of the region are baskets and pottery. Because the external demand is very small, women make pottery chiefly for household use and for sale within the village. They manufacture and fire water jugs, fry pans, *comales*⁴⁶, and all sizes of pots. However, even the internal demand for pottery is decreasing since most women prefer metal pots and pans and plastic water containers, dishes and glasses. Basket-making is principally a male activity and is the major cash income for a very few households in the region. The baskets are carried to nearby markets and sold by the dozen for the equivalent of two to three days wages. Salt, shortening (*manteca*) and an occasional bag of rice are the only food items regularly purchased. Most clothing is purchased used, although women prefer to make their dresses from brightly colored cloth when they can afford it. Tools, candles and shoes are the only other regularly purchased items since all goods purchased outside the region come at great cost in travel time and expense.

The vast majority of the residents of San Francisco de Opalaca believe that the inaccessibility of transportation is the greatest hindrance to their agricultural growth. While a few individuals opposed the pilgrimage and the road out of fear, most residents believed a road would facilitate staple and cash crop production and marketing, reduce the price of inputs and imports and expedite travel for laborers. The pilgrimage, the promise of a road and other production-related projects were

⁴⁶A *comal* is a flat skillet about thirty inches wide which is placed over the fire for cooking tortillas. Other pots can also be placed on its cooking surface.

powerful mobilizers when framed as a means to increasing production and incomes while decreasing costs.

Housing and Diet

The size of the villages in the region varies from twenty to over one hundred homes. Often, smaller villages have broken off from larger villages which separated for political, social and/or logistical reasons. The average village usually has four to five *cacerías* (neighborhoods) of five to twenty households which are often made up of family or close friends. Unlike many Honduran villages, the homes are extremely disperse--one home is often not within sight of another. The center of the village is therefore defined by the locations of the school and church.

The description of Lenca homes five hundred years ago is still amazingly accurate for San Francisco de Opalaca. The average home has four to six inhabitants. Fifty-seven percent of the homes are of *coiquin* (vertical stick walls), thirty-five percent are of *bajareque* (mud-covered stick walls) and eight percent are of adobe bricks. Ninety-two percent of the roofs are grass and eight percent are of *teja* or clay tiles. The technique for making these grass roofs is quite complex and although they are thoroughly waterproof they do harbor a variety of very dangerous insects. In the peak of each roof is a small attic, in which the household stores its surplus corn and beans. The smoke from the cooking fire, while the cause of many respiratory problems, does serve to reduce insect infestation.

Most homes are a single room with a roughly crafted wooden table and a few stools or benches. While some women still cook at a fire on the ground, the majority now cook on clay stoves without chimneys. Almost all grind their corn on a stone and cook on clay-fired *comales* and pots. Women and children are usually responsible for hauling all water and firewood. While a few families may have a single bed, the vast

majority sleeps on woven reed mats on the dirt floor. Each house has a small garden, fruit and shade trees and often a plot of coffee.

The typical diet consists of five to ten tortillas three times a day. The tortilla diet is supplemented one time a day by either eggs, beans or another vegetable often prepared as a soup. Consumption of meat is rare and fruit consumption follows a feast or famine cycle.

Trips to La Esperanza and the arrival of visitors have made residents aware of the deficiencies of their housing and diet. While there were concerns that politicians and the media would twist their poverty by framing it as laziness and begging (see the *Hambruna*, Chapter 5) the majority viewed the pilgrimage as an opportunity for them to demand in person the fulfillment of the government's many past promises.

Health

Traditionally, the villagers' illnesses are attended to by individuals, often *rezadores* and midwives, who through training, interest and experience have demonstrated their abilities. Typical treatments include prayers, purges, body rubs, natural medicines, the application of kerosene or tobacco and sometimes long outdated pills and syrups still available in Honduras. The *rezadores* and midwives live in the village, charge very little, are available day and night and will often stay with their patient indefinitely.

Before the Pilgrimage, the nearest health centers were two to six hours away over rough trails. If a seriously ill patient survived the trip and if the nurse's assistant (often with less than a high school education) was present at the health center with its few medicines, s/he usually sent them on to the nearest hospital. A trip to the hospital implied paying for bus fare, meals, lodging and medicine (the actual hospital care in Honduras is free). Many seriously ill patients died in the hospital or were sent home

to die. It is not surprising that the vast majority of inhabitants of the region entrusted their healing to the village health experts.

Child malnutrition in the region is eighty-five percent (Zelaya, 1995), one of the highest levels in Honduras.⁴⁷ Over the last several years, immunization campaigns have covered every village in the region and nearly all children are protected. However, three major health problems exist. First, the grass roofs harbor a beetle which carries a fatally debilitating heart parasite. Second, the use of wood stoves without chimneys results in a high rate of chronic respiratory diseases. Finally, because ninety-five percent of homes have neither latrines nor potable water, chronic intestinal infections are endemic.

Through trips to La Esperanza and visiting medical brigades, residents of the region have heard the promises of "modern" medicine but have yet to learn of the limitations of both the medicine and its professionals. However, as citizens of Honduras they argued that they deserved similar access to medical care as that enjoyed elsewhere in Honduras including regular vaccination campaigns, clinics, health professionals and an adequate supply of medicines.

Education

Every village in the region has a school and one or two teachers assigned to it. While over ninety percent of the school-aged children enter school, few complete the fifth grade and many leave after several years without even learning how to read. There are several reason for this.

1. **Teachers:** while a few dedicated teachers work in the region, the only outstanding feature about most of them is their ability to make excuses for why

⁴⁷Although malnutrition is certainly high, after being present during some of the weighing sessions I believe that this statistic is very unreliable.

they are not able to make it to school. Some go months without teaching or have a political friend transfer their position to a nearby city, making it impossible for the village to get another teacher. The reluctance of teachers to work in the region is understandable--the villages are four to ten hour hikes, often in rain and mud; the quality and quantity of food is very limited, they have no social life and their pay is minimal.

2. **Teaching methods and materials:** both are antiquated, relying on rote memory and repetition. This situation is greatly exacerbated by the fact that each classroom may have four or five grade levels.
3. **Poverty:** many of the teachers complain that they can not teach students who arrive without their homework, unfed, tired, sick and dirty.
4. **Household labor and parental ambivalence:** parents regularly keep their children out of school if they need help at home or in the fields or if the child does not want to go.

Obviously these factors create vicious circles as teachers blame parents and students for the lack of learning. Parents see their children are not learning or do not want to attend school and that the teacher is frequently not even present and as a result they become skeptical of the educational process. Together, these factors result in a forty seven percent illiteracy rate in the region and a rate of ninety five percent of children who leave school before finishing grade five.

Without ever leaving their village Opalacans were well aware of the deficiencies of "modern education:" their children were not learning and the teachers were not teaching. After the goals of the road and the municipality, the improvement of the schools (both human and structural resources) was one of the highest motivations for participation in the pilgrimage.

Summary

While all of the factors highlighted above motivated villagers to participate in the pilgrimage, their explanatory power is fairly weak, taken individually or as a group. First of all, while outsiders argue that the Opalacans' extreme poverty motivated participation, even the extent of their poverty is ambiguous. While the quality of their housing and diet, their substandard education and health services and their lack of access to credit and markets demonstrates their poverty, they are also endowed with favorable climate and soils, forest resources, two crops a year and most importantly, excess arable land. These contrasts demonstrate the fact that poverty is relative and socially constructed. In addition, poverty itself is a weak explanation for protest for while poverty and marginalization exist around the world, protests by such groups are the exception and not the rule. As a result, their poverty and marginalization is at best a weak explanation for their mobilization.

This section has also demonstrated the uniqueness and commonalities between Opalacans and other poor and marginalized groups. Their communal titles, favorable climate and excess land are probably uncommon to marginalized groups however, their lack of access to markets and credit, the quality of their housing, diet, education and health care as well as their isolation are common to most poor and marginalized groups.

Social and Cultural Factors Influencing Mobilization

While the previous section highlighted the economic and social motivations for mobilization, this section will describe the social and cultural factors which influenced the mobilization of participants and highlight both those factors unique to the Lencas as well as those shared with other groups. Non-residents have used some of these factors such as communal behavior and traditional religion as explanations for the mobilization. I will argue that while these factors played a role, their power was

limited. In addition, the last themes treated in this section: formal and informal organizations, leadership, incentives and decision-making are important elements in the mobilization model that I will develop in Chapter 5.

Indigeneity

Before the land titling initiative, people in the region had not heard the term Lenca and did not consider themselves culturally distinct from other Hondurans, although they clearly were. I have included here extensive quotes by four village leaders to demonstrate how Opalacans previously perceived their ethnicity:

They often called us indians in the city and it would bother us because we were just as good as they were. They called us indians just because of the kind of clothes we wore. There were people who would kill somebody for calling them that word [indian]. Not long ago I first heard the word Lenca, when a group when to find out about land titling (Valentín Gómez, villager).

I had no idea what Lenca meant. A lot of people didn't like it because they didn't know what it meant. They said 'now they come and say we're this or we're that.' No one knew that we were Lencas. Sometimes we find it strange or think it's a joke (Julian Lémuz, villager).

EV: It used to be we didn't think we had the same capability as a teacher or a priest, because we hadn't gone to school. But we didn't think about our culture--we are all Hondurans." *KVB: Didn't you think you had a different culture?* EV: No, we didn't realize, we just lived. I went to the Pedagogical University [during the first pilgrimage] and they told us we had lost the Lenca culture, we didn't speak it anymore, even though we are Lencas--from the actual ones--but we lost the culture. Now we pass for Lencas because that's what they tell us now" (Entimo Vásquez, villager).

We knew that city dwellers didn't practice the *compostura* and we said it was because city dwellers were unbelievers, they didn't believe in God. Now that they thought they had money, they set God off to one side. But we said, we are catholics and we do all that God commands us since the beginning of time...Sometimes when our elders were in the city and were carrying a bag of supplies [for the *compostura*], city-

dwellers would ask unnecessary questions and laugh and the elders would get mad and tell us that they weren't Catholics (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

Some in Honduras and elsewhere will use these statements to argue that the people of San Francisco de Opalaca are not a culturally distinct group. However, I would argue that their cultural distinctions are clear and that these statements demonstrate the power of the state, church and mass society to nearly extinguish their historical and cultural distinctions.

The statements above demonstrate that Opalacans' indigeneity was not a powerful mobilizer. They had only recently learned of their cultural distinctiveness and it was as much or more a source of shame and confusion as pride and mobilization. As a result, organizers of the pilgrimage worked to frame the pilgrimage to external agents as an indigenous event, but the indigenous frame was not used to mobilize Opalacans, and may have even dissuaded some.

Communal Behavior

Outsiders, such as NGO employees trying to explain the remarkable participation of San Francisco de Opalaca in the pilgrimage often argued that they have a very communal culture, a sort of one-for-all, all-for-one mentality. However, I experienced social life in San Francisco de Opalaca as very much a mix of communal and self-interested behavior. Rather than attempting to make generalizations about community behavior I will give a few examples from everyday life.

1. **Personal Labor Exchanges:** One tradition often cited by outsiders I interviewed was *mano vuelta*, a practice in which neighbors exchange labor for labor and in which reciprocation was assumed but often delayed. This practice, according to these interviewees, illustrated a higher level of communalism than present in the rest of Honduras. However, during my interviews with

Opalacans they stated that *mano vuelta* had nearly vanished and nearly all labor exchanges outside of the household now involve financial exchanges or nearly immediate reciprocation.

2. **Communal labor:** about five to ten percent of the population occasionally donates a day's labor, without being summoned (*citado*) for a communal project such as repairing the church or fixing a bridge. About eighty percent of the population will work on a communal project if they are summoned (which means they receive no economic compensation, not even a meal). We commonly saw examples of groups of people who had been summoned and left before dawn, walked six hours to pick up one hundred pound sacks of cement or water pipes and arrived after dark with the cement or pipes on their back. About ten percent of the population will not participate in communal activities unless they are threatened with significant sanctions.
3. **Loans:** small loans (less than a day's wages) of food, money or labor are occasionally given to acquaintances without a high expectation of repayment, although they are not forgotten. Larger loans are seldom given except in great emergency or in a relationship with a high degree of trust.
4. **Vandalism:** one of my neighbors built a dam to channel a small part of the river to make mud bricks. Someone regularly knocked the dam down.
5. **"Borrowing:"** One story or another existed about nearly everyone in the village taking undo advantage of some situation--using a bag of fertilizer that they had been asked to deliver, keeping a tool someone had loaned them, appropriating a good that was to be communal.
6. **Trust and *Bestias* (mules or horses):** if someone needed to buy corn or fertilizer, the owners of pack animals charged four to five days wages to make the twelve-hour round trip to Ojo de Agua. If the owner needed to go into La

Esperanza by truck, he would not ask someone in Ojo de Agua to watch his animals even for a few hours but would take a family member with him to watch the animals or if staying overnight, to walk the animals the six hours home and then pick the owner up for the return trip.

While these examples demonstrate the interdependence of the people of the region, the degree of trust\mistrust and giving\taking is fairly similar to other areas of Honduras and therefore does not offer a very strong explanation for the success of the pilgrimage.

Gender Relations

Outsiders also attempted to explain the surprising number of women⁴⁸ who participated in the pilgrimage by citing the Lenca's more equal gender relations. However, gender relations in the region are similar to those in other parts of Honduras and Latin America. Men are usually responsible for agricultural production and travel to buy, sell or work as day laborers. Men's free time is spent publicly-- playing soccer or cards in the afternoon and on Sunday. Serving on village committees and boards is still mostly a male responsibility although women are slowly increasing their presence. Men are much more likely to drink and abuse alcohol. Men are also seen as the initiators and principal actors in dating and sexual relationships although women both act and have power to reject suitors, express their interest in someone and to leave their husbands.

Women carry out nearly every task related to child care, food preparation and the cleaning of dishes, clothes and the house. Preparing tortillas for an average size

⁴⁸COPIN estimates that between two and three hundred of the participants were women.

family is nearly an all day job--removing the corn from the cob, boiling it, grinding it two or three times between two rocks, forming the tortillas and cooking them.

Women also plant, weed and oversee the household garden of flowers and vegetables as well as any small animals. Most women also make pottery and their own clothing. Women's free time is spent more privately than men's--visiting friends or neighbors under the guise of looking for eggs or vegetables and talking after church on Sunday.

Religious Organization and Practices

Non-residents argue that Lenca spirituality explains their participation in an event labeled a pilgrimage. This section both describes present-day Lenca spirituality and explores this hypothesis.

Traditional Religion

While I have labeled this section "traditional religion," it is important to note that older residents of San Francisco de Opalaca consider their practices and beliefs to be true Catholicism. They believe that the modern Catholic beliefs and practices promoted by the *delegados* are unfaithful to the "Catholicism" of their forefathers. They state that abandoning the traditions has displeased God and is the cause of decreasing agricultural production and other difficulties. Thirty-six percent⁴⁹ of the population of San Francisco de Opalaca continues to practice the principal Lenca domestic worship ceremony--the *compostura*. They believe that when Adam began to cut down the first trees to make his *milpa*, the trees began to bleed and scream. God

⁴⁹I believe this statistic is lower than actual practice of the *compostura*. Village variation in this statistic is extremely high (from four to ninety-five percent). Some of my informants argued that because of the shame associated with the *compostura* in front of outsiders, the rate of its practice was under-reported.

gave Adam the *compostura* as a way to atone for the violence he was doing to creation (see Chapman, 1992):

For the *composturas* an altar is built (see diagram 1 [Figure 2.1]), forming a framework of branches,... into which green pine branches are inserted...Parasitic plants called *zomos*, which grow in trees in the mountains are placed on the altar. These plants symbolize the spirits of those to whom the ritual is dedicated. At the foot of the altar burn two, four, nine or eighteen candles. Two jars of chicha are also placed there, as well as birds to be sacrificed, a *copal*, a stone for grinding the grains of cocoa which are to be used during the ritual, cups, small clay pots, etc (Chapman 1992:88, translation mine).

Traditionally, *composturas* were held for each phase in the corn's development, a child's birth, other crops and animals, new houses, lightning strikes, the purifying of springs and weddings. The *compostura* most commonly held today is for the planting of corn. Those present for the *compostura* include the hosts, the *rezador* (prayer leader) and the invited guests. The *compostura* begins with the shooting of the first *cohetes* (bottle rocket), prayers, incense, candles and the first offerings of chicha with cocoa to the angels and the earth--poured into the *zomos* and shared by the host and prayer leader. Next the invited men begin to plant the host's plot with corn, beans and squash. While they work, the hosts serve them *chicha*, sacrifice the chicken and turkey and sprinkle the animals' blood on the altar and the ground. The hosts and the invited women then begin cooking the birds and preparing the rest of the food for the feast. Before, during and after lunch more prayers are offered to ask God's blessings on the crop and incense is used to signify the blessing of all of the elements. After lunch the guests finish planting and rest. Near dusk several men take out their guitars and the dancing begins (see Chapman, 1992).

Nearly every Lenca home also has a small altar. These usually consist of small pictures or images of Christ, the Virgin and/or a saint as well as a candle and wild




Figure 2.1: Diagram of a Compostura Altar (taken from Chapman, 1992:99)

flowers. The deities worshipped include: God the Father, the Virgin Mother, the Holy Earth, various saints, the Good Angel and nine others as well as San Desiderio or the Bad Angel.

The *rezador* (prayer leader) is the only surviving traditional religious role and is usually an older man who has learned his art from his father or another family member. The *rezador* leads the *compostura* and may also be called on to offer prayers at other celebrations or to diagnose and treat the ill and usually receive some in-kind payment for their work.

Catholicism

Over eighty-five percent of the residents of San Francisco de Opalaca regularly attend Catholic public worship. Each Sunday morning and on holy days, the lay leaders (*delegados de la Palabra*) in every village in the region lead the congregation in singing, prayer, Bible reading and a short reflection on how one of the passages applies to daily life. The lay leaders follow an order of worship published by the church, which includes the week's Bible passages. They take turns leading the different parts of the worship and giving the impromptu reflection.

The traditional Catholic deities are worshipped including God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as well as the Virgin Mary and several saints (principally Saint Francis, the patron of the new municipality). However, Catholic beliefs (especially Old Testament narratives) are often mixed with traditional Lenca spiritual chronicles.

The parish priest is responsible for about fifty villages and a small urban area where he resides. He usually visits each village about once a year, offering mass, baptizing all new babies and marrying any interested couples. All priests have finished high school and seminary and many have studied at least briefly outside Honduras. The priest's income depends primarily on the support of a larger urban church and is supplemented by fees and donations from services in rural areas.

Lencas have a tradition of organizing pilgrimages to holy sites in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador although it is not clear if this tradition has roots in Lenca heritage. Some Lencas go on these pilgrimages for tradition's sake or as a sort of sacred tourism, others to request a miracle, or most often to keep a promise they or a family member made during a crisis (often illnesses and injuries). The pilgrimages are often planned to coincide with the holy days for the saint or site that they are worshipping. This means that there are special masses, music, fireworks, large markets of goods and full-scale celebrating. The pilgrims often travel by foot, even if buses are available, believing that God will look compassionately on their sacrifice. They often go with a small group, carrying their provisions and gifts for the saint. "Whoever goes in front carries a conch shell which he blows occasionally to ensure that the pilgrims don't lose their way" (Chapman 1986:153, translation mine). When the pilgrims arrive in the city they go directly to the church, often on their knees to leave their promised gifts and say prayers. After their initial visit they inquire about the schedule for masses during these holy days and explore the town. The pilgrims attend prayers, confession and mass before returning home, most often with a small image of the saint and a few purchases for those who stayed behind. Traditionally, the pilgrims

upon returning to their homes abstain from bathing or changing their clothes, even to sleep, for nine days in order to avoid losing the blessing given by the priest in the sanctuary (Chapman 1986:155, translation mine).

The continuing role of *composturas*, pilgrimages and public worship demonstrate the centrality of faith to all aspects of Lenca life. By calling the march to Tegucigalpa a "pilgrimage," as well as involving priests and *delegados*, the organizers invoked powerful mobilizing symbols and elements. While religious practices such as the *compostura* are clearly unique to the Lencas, the centrality of

religion and spirituality in the lives of the "third world" poor is common. While the Opalacans' spirituality is not a sufficient explanation⁵⁰ for their mobilization it was certainly a powerful influence and plays a key part in the mobilization model (see Chapter 5).

Formal Organizations

Despite the Lenca's unique history and culture, the structures and functions of San Francisco de Opalaca's formal organizations are very similar to those of other villages in Honduras. They appear to be primarily the result of state interventions which gave legitimacy and/or required specific forms of organization in order to receive certain benefits. For example, villagers told me they formed a *Patronato* in order to receive a new school and a *Sociedad de Padres de Familia* in order to receive a school lunch (*merienda*) program.

1. ***Patronato Communal*** (Community Board): This is often the most powerful formal organization in most communities. It is responsible for identifying priority needs and resolving them. *Patronatos* are locally evaluated by the quantity and quality of the projects (schools, fences, churches...) that they have carried out. Election of officers is theoretically carried out each year but as long as everyone is relatively satisfied with the present group, or if they are in the midst of some project, elections are often postponed. Young men are often elected because "it is their turn," or in hopes that the responsibility will encourage them to mature. Membership is almost exclusively male.
2. ***Delegados de la Palabra*** (Delegates of the Word): are the Catholic lay leaders in the village. The modern lay leaders movement began in Honduras in the

⁵⁰Lenca spirituality is not a sufficient explanation because it fails to explain why neighboring villages which shared same spiritual practices and beliefs had very different levels of participation (see Chapter Five).

mid 1970s, in large part to compensate for a lack of priests⁵¹. The lay leaders usually begin as young men when they volunteer or are chosen by the village because they are perceived to possess above average intelligence and moral standards (the importance of this moral rectitude is evidenced by that fact that several have been removed due to immoral behavior such as drunkenness or adultery). They are responsible for leading Sunday worship, the functioning and care of the local chapel and the spiritual care of the village. They are accountable to the parish priest but often are trained by other more advanced delegados from other regions. Nearly all delegados in the region are men. Although technically the delegados are responsible only for church-related activities, in practice, they are often the most respected and deferred to leaders in the village both because they are chosen from among those who have already demonstrated leadership and high ethical standards and because of the authority conveyed upon them by the church.

3. ***Padres de Familia*** (Parents Association): This group is officially made up of all parents of enrolled children who in turn elect a board which is to be responsible for the proper functioning of the school. In reality the group is usually organized by the teacher, who calls a meeting if (s)he needs support to carry out an activity or correct a problem such as building a latrine, fixing the school's roof or planning a party. The board usually consists of men and women and is relatively weak.⁵²

⁵¹The lack of priests has apparently been a problem in Honduras since colonial times and the modern lay leaders movement mirrors the colonial solution (see section on Lenca History, this chapter).

⁵²Teachers, depending on their reputation in the village, may have some formal authority but it is far from automatic.

4. ***Alcaldes Auxiliares*** (Auxiliary Mayors): have two principal responsibilities, to *citar*⁵³ village residents if they are needed for some community project and to serve as the local peacekeepers and investigators. Elections for this unpopular and unrewarding task theoretically take place each year and the role is often handed out as a punishment or in the hope of maturing young men. The auxiliares are all men and are responsible directly to the mayor.
5. ***Grupo de Mujeres*** (Women's groups): Nearly every village has at least an informal group of women which cleans and decorates the church and provides for the priest during his visits. Several of these groups also take on small projects such as communal gardens and food and beverage sales. Often the leaders are the wives of the delegados and in more formal groups election of officers is held. Their influence in village affairs is mostly indirect.
6. **Production Groups**: Most villages have at least one group formed by an outside organization in order to channel training, material aid and credit. Most but not all groups are exclusively for men and nearly all are agriculturally oriented. While training seems to have been a strong motivation in the past, membership now is based almost exclusively on the need for access to credit.
7. **Soccer Teams**: every village has at least one at least one loosely-organized team and schedules Sunday games with neighboring villages. Only men play and selection for the team is based on friendship and performance in informal afternoon games.

⁵³*Citar* is best translated as serving a summons on someone. When there is some communal work project, the auxiliary mayors must summon the required number of people and keep a list of who arrives. For the next day's labor they summon another group and those who did not attend the first summons to evenly distribute the task. If someone does not attend three summons, the *auxiliar* has the responsibility to impose some sanction but seldom does.

8. **Others:** several other groups periodically function such as health and water committees.

Informal Organizations: Networks

In addition to these formal organizations a multitude of informal networks exist which include family relationships, friends, *compadres* (godparents of children) and political party members. Any one individual is a member of several networks including his own family, his spouse's family, his friends and any team or organization to which he belongs. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 5, these networks are powerful in influencing members' decisions and actions regarding activities such as the pilgrimage. However, predicting an individual's decision based on his networks is very difficult because networks often give contradictory advice and the role of a particular network in a specific decision depends on factors such as the type of decision, the current relationship and the amount of contact with each network. For example, in one village in which nearly all of the respected leaders in the village were opposed to the pilgrimage, nearly all of the members of the soccer team participated. Presumably the excitement of the event and their own mutual encouragement outweighed the opposition of the village leaders.

While socio-economic status is often considered a significant cleavage because of the differing interests of the rich and the poor, people in the region do not believe it is a significant factor in San Francisco de Opalaca, perhaps because of the relative economic homogeneity in the region. When asked to divide village residents into different socio-economic groups, most interviewees began by stating that everyone in the village was poor. However, when asked to clarify divisions of poverty it was fairly easy for them. The poorest groups were households without men and without any agricultural plot of their own or young or old men who for some reason seemed to prefer wage labor. A middle group consisted of households that planted a small or

average size plot of staples (one-half to two acres) and possibly a very small plot of cash crops (coffee or sugar cane). The relatively wealthiest group⁵⁴ had only slightly larger plots of staples (two to four acres) but had another small source of cash income--coffee, sugar cane, or a profession such as carpentry, masonry, lumbering or, increasingly, employment in some organization.

Leadership⁵⁵

When I asked villagers how individuals gained and lost leadership in formal and informal organizations they mentioned five themes: 1) ethics: especially in money management, 2) self-sacrifice 3) willingness to consult the group 4) friendliness and sociability and 5) above average intelligence and education:

People aren't easy to manage, it's difficult. If they see that someone is bad, they won't support him. They try him out in a small leadership position and then they give him a position in a patronato or as a *delegado*...First he has to manage the money well. The treasurer here in San Bernardo misspent a few cents, it wasn't much but people kicked him out. Apart from managing money, he has to be sociable and friendly and willing to sacrifice. He should be the first to arrive

⁵⁴It is worth noting that even in this wealthiest group, those dedicated to agriculture never planted more than ten acres (and only ten people in the whole region approach that amount) and would not hire more than two to three people for a few days to two weeks to help them. Probably not more than three to four people in the whole region came close to reaching the average Honduran income of \$700 per year. The difference between the poorest and wealthiest individual is very small.

⁵⁵Leaders of rural third world villages are often distrusted by development organizations and other outsiders. This is often because these leaders coerce fellow villagers based on land, wealth or violence. Because of communal titles, excess land, and a populations which is relatively homogenous economically, leaders are not able to gain power by manipulating these factors. While this may be another unique characteristic of this region, I would argue that the leadership processes described below take place even in villages with coercive leadership, the difference being that *below* the coercive leader networks of trusted and respected leaders and their followers would develop. At the least this description questions the general suspicion of all traditional leaders.

and the last to leave. If he says we are going to build a bridge a eight o'clock, and then he arrives at ten o'clock, people will grumble and say 'See, look what time you show up.' Then they don't trust him anymore....The other thing is that a leader shouldn't make a decision alone...if he likes to impose decisions, people grumble (Bernardo Bejarano, Entimo Vásquez and Julian Lémuz, villagers).

Julian went on to tell me of a past *patronato* president who sold some left over bricks to another village without consulting anyone. He was publicly reprimanded in a village meeting and soon voted out of office.

Two other generalizations about leaders are that they are male and not among the poorest in the village. When I asked interviewees they explained these characteristics like this:

Well, that's because most women don't have the ability, they are illiterate, they don't have the ability to negotiate, to appeal, to analyze, to enter offices...(Basílico Lara, villager). We know we have to give women more participation...but they have to prepare themselves (Julian Vásquez, villager).

The group also argued that the problem is not that the poorest people in the village can not become leaders, but rather that the type of person who becomes a leader is also one who plants a little coffee each year or works a little harder than average and as a result become a member of the middle-bracket poor.

Becoming a network leader in San Francisco de Opalaca is a position not easily gained and quite easily lost. The loss of leadership is often facilitated by competing leaders all too ready to frame their competitors' actions negatively. There are many examples of the dynamic and contested nature of leadership. One current municipal officer will probably not be reelected and may even be ousted because he is involved with three women, regularly breaks the municipal ordinance against alcohol consumption and has caused many to doubt his financial rectitude. His strongest critics also happen to be potential candidates for his position. In another case, a leader of San

Gonzalo was nearly kicked out of the village by competing leaders and their networks because of his opposition to the pilgrimage, but he has regained much of his former status by his self-sacrifice in handling a school construction project. "People pay attention when they see [a leader's] work or knowledge. If he works well, they follow him; if he doesn't appear to be knowledgeable, they pay him no attention" (Zacarías Gómez, villager).

In addition to the most respected leaders in a village, a variety of secondary leaders also exist, respected within certain limits. These leaders' opinions may not sway the majority of the village but they are fairly powerful within their smaller networks. Several people told me that although a San Gonzalo leader was very smart and they respected his opinions, they would not trust him as mayor because when he was in the *patronato* he kept several items which had been donated to the community. Bernardo Bejaranos (villager) describes how these secondary networks sometimes develop:

Sometimes it's because they loan money. So they say "if you help me work, I'll give you this much in advance" Other times they say, "loan me five or ten Lempiras so we can go get a drink." "OK," says the one who has a little more money. And so they hang around together and suddenly they have become a group.

Competition between leaders obviously translates into competition and often conflict between networks and vice versa. Different women's networks vie for control of the women's group in the church, strong opposition between networks has already divided several villages in the region and is currently dividing another. Regarding a current water project, one village leader confided that "the people of El Tabor [a neighborhood within the village] are not cooperating, nobody shows up to work because they say the water won't reach them" (Entimo Vásquez, villager). But, a resident of El Tabor told me that:

we help them but they don't help us. The authorities say we don't work but they are the ones who don't work. There are few people here who don't cooperate (Doña Nicolasa, villager).

In December of 1995, old grudges, a probable theft of one family's corn and mutual accusations between the two families and their networks led to a pre-planned machete attack which left one dead, one amputee and five in prison. Because all are neighbors and interdependent, open conflict is quite exceptional, while cooperation and subtle competition are the rule.

Incentives

Social incentives used by villagers are fairly familiar: prestige, respect and friendship. Individuals who are perceived as self-sacrificing or more intelligent are given prestige, respect and positions of leadership. Individuals who are not perceived to share these characteristics are told directly or indirectly "its true that all of us are in need at times, when we ask for help they never want to give it but when they need help they come running" (Bernardo Bejarano, villager). A common phrase women used to embarrass a man who is not working hard is "*si andás de venta, te compro*" (if you're for sale, I'll buy you). Both social slights and the promise of social rewards are used to encourage villagers to conform.

The economic incentives controlled by networks in rural villages are even more important than in western, urban settings. The high degree of interdependence in village life greatly increases the importance of social networks. Each day households depend on their networks for bartering for food, loaning money, trading labor, loaning animals and seeking health and midwife services. While the costs of angering one's network in an urban setting may be high--losing a job or friends; the costs in a small village of few secrets and many overlapping obligations can be devastating.

While eating lunch at my friend Maximino's house one day, I witnessed economic incentives at work. A neighbor came and asked to borrow his sharpening stone but Maximino said he did not have one. About thirty minutes later he took a sharpening stone out of its box and went to work on his axe. I must have looked surprised because he laughed and then explained that the neighbor knew perfectly well that he had a sharpening stone but that because he had recently borrowed two tools from Maximino and returned one broken and the other not at all, Maximino needed to show him that if he wanted to borrow anything else, he would have to return the items and find a way to repair their relationship.

Maximino and his wife explained that men and women have different incentives available to them. Men principally negotiate tools and loans, while women buy and barter food items. Those in especially good favor (close network connections) are charged below "market" rates for the goods when the owner is able. The majority of neighbors are charged "market" rates. Those who are out of favor, for example those who have refused to grant a favor or work on a communal project, may be helped but also dealt a social slight, "I'll sell to you this time, but next time you will have to look somewhere else" (Doña Angela, villager). The owner may also deny the ability to help as Maximino did (despite the fact that the item asked for may be in plain sight). For serious offenses, the owner may shut the door and pretend to be gone, (despite the fact that smoke is visible coming out of the chimney) or look for other ways to punish the wrongdoer:

For example, in community projects,...one person may have worked three days and then turns around and claim he worked fifteen. The leaders meet and decide, "We're not going to pay him that. He has no right...let's give him half of what he actually earned since he likes to ask for money but he doesn't like to work" (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

While researchers usually focus on the pressure applied by the leader and the group on a recalcitrant individual, the group also carefully observes the leader and pressures him to take a stand. The position taken by the leader may result in either gains or losses of prestige, respect and power; both within and outside the village depending on the results of the activity. If they support a failure or vice versa they will lose prestige and respect in the village, but if they lead a successful activity or oppose one which turns sour, they gain respect. The application of social and economic incentives demonstrates the complex pressures and exchanges between leaders and followers as both stand to gain or lose.

Decision-Making⁵⁶

The decision-making models used at the village level begin with a proposal which may originate within or without the village. The proposal is initially discussed within the network and often with other network leaders (which leaders are involved will depend on the issue). Those involved draw their conclusions regarding the proposal and then call a meeting or present the proposal after the Sunday worship service along with their recommendations (leaders will present a proposal (although probably not very evenhandedly) even if they are opposed to it in order to avoid accusations of not consulting the village). Those present will discuss the proposal and then accept or reject it by raising their hands and possibly signing up for some activity. Following the meeting leaders will often visit the homes of their network members to further discuss and motivate potential participants.

⁵⁶Because chapters 5 and 6 will include a more complete treatment of the decision-making process surrounding the pilgrimage, its treatment here will be brief.

Decision-making at the regional level is very similar.⁵⁷ Village leaders visit leaders from other villages to informally discuss a proposal or idea. If they decide a meeting is warranted, they send a note and make a personal visit if possible to each village asking them to send two to three leaders to a meeting to discuss the proposal. Those present at the meeting discuss the issue, formulate a proposal and then promise to present it to their villages. The village level decision-making process is then used and the leaders inform the regional body of their village's decision. This was the same process used to plan the pilgrimage.

Election of officers to village positions is carried out by nomination and then by acceptance or rejection by the whole group. After the moderator opens the floor, someone nominates a single candidate, another seconds the nomination and then the moderator asks if everyone is in favor. It is very uncommon for a nomination to be rejected, although some nominees do reject the nomination before it is voted on. Because often only one candidate is nominated, the village networks often select their candidate, "nominator" and "seconder" before the meeting. However, as is the case in other proposals, the village is allowed to accept or reject the nominee.

While the information above on leaders and decision-making may appear to paint a very leader-centered model, I would argue that the leader's power is balanced and checked by the network. Individuals elected to formal positions do not necessarily gain the respect and leadership of the village and in several villages in the region the secretary or treasurer rather than the president of the patronato is invited to meetings. Informal, and often more powerful leadership roles are gained over years and within relationships of mutual respect. Despite the familial, friendship and other ties holding

⁵⁷Since at least 1963 there has existed a regional board which analyzed and sought to resolve regional problems (see chapter 4).

these networks together, the network leadership is still dynamic and contested as the perception of kindness and mistreatment, social snub and money loaned erode and create allegiances. While the network leaders may have strong influence on a particular decision such as participation in the pilgrimage, their position is in large part dictated by their networks and other village leaders are willing to lead dissenters or to point out self-serving positions or "wrong" decisions.

Summary

This chapter examined the role of Lenca history, the international and national context and the effect of present-day Lenca culture and society as it relates to two questions. First, what historical and contextual factors help to explain why over four thousand indigenous people participate in a risky and costly event like the pilgrimage? Lenca history, although replete with powerful symbols for mobilization, has largely been lost from popular knowledge and its effects on the mobilization for the pilgrimage are difficult to determine. The international and national context is essential to understanding decisions made by COPIN and the government, but its effect in San Francisco de Opalaca was largely subtle and indirect. In contrast, a series of economic and social factors such as health, education and production clearly motivated participation--but given the lack of historical link between poverty and protest and the socially constructed nature of need, these motivations are less than sufficient. Finally, a series of cultural and social factors such as communal behavior, informal organizations and spirituality influenced how Opalacans were mobilized. While these factors are influential, they are not adequate to explain the mobilization of four thousand indigenous people for the pilgrimage. In Chapter 5, I will develop a model which seeks to sort out the role and power of each of these factors.

This chapter also examined whether these same factors make the case so atypical that its findings are inapplicable to other situations. The Lencas of San

Francisco de Opalaca and the context of the mobilization are clearly unique. Lenca history, the national and international and Opalacan context all contained favorable elements which make the pilgrimage and its mobilization a unique event. However, Opalacans have much in common with the poor and marginalized around the world--a powerful history which has been all but erased from popular memory, a history of persecution, a context of repression which has recently allowed the space, means and motivations for protest. The next chapter will continue to recount, from the villagers' perspective, the history of San Francisco de Opalaca as a means of understanding the mobilization for the pilgrimage. Within the unique details of these local histories, the reader may continue to find both sources of oppression as well as the spaces, means and motivations for protest.

CHAPTER 3: LOCAL EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR "AWAKENING"

This chapter will recount the stories and themes residents of San Francisco de Opalaca cited to explain their own mobilization or, as they put it, how they "woke-up" and saw the need to act. These local histories and explanation complement the historical and contextual factors influencing mobilization outlined in Chapter 2. To construct this section, I interviewed over fifty villagers, exploring with each the historical and contextual factors which they believed influenced their mobilization for the pilgrimage. While no one mentioned Lenca history or the national and international context, all of them cited themes and examples from their local history which they believe "woke them up."

By citing local history to explain their mobilization, villagers were demonstrating that their participation in the pilgrimage was deeply tied to their constructions of the past. To attempt to explain their mobilization for the pilgrimage without understanding the region's mistreatment by government officials or the long series of broken political promises would be like trying to explain the U.S. civil rights movement while ignoring the history of slavery and Jim Crow laws. Emphasizing the importance of history to shaping decisions and actions in the present is not new to Sociology, but is often forgotten (see Chapter 1). The people of San Francisco de Opalaca clearly drew a connection between their history and any theorizing about their participation in the pilgrimage. As a result this chapter will reflect their focus on that history and its influence on their mobilization.

This chapter presents the ten themes and events most commonly cited by villagers in chronological order.⁵⁸ For each theme or event I highlight how the theme

⁵⁸The themes and events mentioned by villagers were surprisingly similar. This similarity is probably due in part to the fact that a set of themes and events were repeatedly framed by pilgrimage organizers to justify and promote participation.

influenced the mobilization process, which includes how groups opposing and those promoting the pilgrimage constructed and framed these themes to support their position. The fact that nearly all of these themes and events were constructed to both oppose and promote participation as well as the variation in village participation (see Chapter 5) clearly demonstrates that local histories are not a sufficient explanation for the mobilization. However, this chapter and Chapter 5 will demonstrate that they are a powerful factor in the mobilization model.

These themes and events are not only important for explaining the mobilization of the pilgrimage, they also form an important part of the "thick description" which facilitates judgement regarding transferability. This "thick description" demonstrates that while the Opalacans' local history is unique, it shares many common threads with other poor and marginal groups.

The Settling of San Francisco de Opalaca

The first modern-day settlers of San Francisco de Opalaca arrived in the 1930s and 1940s. Nearly all were Lencas and many were fleeing Ladino-imposed pressures. The region's lack of people and public services such as schools and roads, the great distance to the municipal capital, Yamaranguila, as well as the abundance of fertile land, virgin forest, game and water were all attractive to people who sought anonymity or a new start. Some early settlers were fleeing accusations of stealing property and others of "stealing brides."⁵⁹ A Lenca accused of theft had little faith in Ladino justice and had good reason to try to disappear. Those who had "stolen" their "brides" also had good reason to run, for although the woman's family was

⁵⁹The practice of "stealing" your bride is fairly common in Honduras when the father of the woman thinks the couple is too young or the man does not meet his standards. Usually the woman is a consenting partner, or she runs away the first chance she gets.

almost always Lenca as well, if the couple was found quickly they were separated and given a good thrashing or worse. If they were not found, they often returned to the "bride's" home when she became pregnant or after the birth of their first child.

Other early settlers were fleeing military service.

The Lencas have always been warring groups...and the traditional parties took advantage of this...this region was a great source of soldiers and it is where the greatest battles were fought (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

One of the oldest residents of San Francisco, Macario Gómez Sánchez, told me that "our fathers at times fought to overthrow a government. If they said they would overthrow it--they did. They were fierce fighters." However, the soldier's life was not all glory. Another elder, Fabián López Pérez, told me:

my father was a lieutenant with the liberal party. In those days, if they saw a liberal they threw him in jail. He was with general Barrera.⁶⁰ If he won the presidency it was by pure bullets and machetes, not like today, now they win with, what is it called... politics. My father died in Tegucigalpa, stirring things up with Barrera.

When I asked Don Fabián if his forefathers were braver than the young men today he said,

yes, they were brave--but in fighting, making war and stirring things up. Already as young boys they were training with rifles. Nowadays the people have the courage to defend themselves and their people. Now they study and play sports. They defend their rights with good words and that is for the best. Things are better now.

Despite the Lenca's fame for surviving on little, for enduring much and for extreme courage in battle--many Lencas who were not interested in fighting for their

⁶⁰This is probably a reference to General Gregorio Ferrera who led major uprisings in 1923 and 1925.

Ladino generals or who tired of the suffering, danger and killing, avoided forced recruitment by fleeing to isolated regions such as San Francisco de Opalaca.

Still other settlers were fleeing political persecution. Honduran politics is dominated by two parties, the Liberals and the Nationalists. During much of this century a military/nationalist alliance has governed Honduras. Yamaranguila, the former municipal capital of San Francisco has always been in the control of the nationalist party which regularly persecuted liberals in the region. Macario Gómez (villager) recalls that:

during the government of Julio Lozano the liberals from here [San Francisco] didn't cast their vote. A teacher in the region reported them. They came and burned their houses and ate their corn in the fields. They left them with nothing and imprisoned many of them in Yamaranguila.

Another elder, Isaías Vásquez Lorenzo illustrated another manner in which Yamaranguila persecuted the liberals of the region:

The inspector would come--his name was Natividad. He would go house by house looking for chicha. And since money was scarce, people would give him cows or oxen to pay a small fine. That's how the people from Yamaranguila got rich. Later, people would hide their chicha in the mountains or bury it.

These jailings, fines and violence were focused on Liberals. This persecution pushed them farther and farther from Yamaranguila, a movement which ultimately shaped the political demographics of the region. In an overwhelmingly nationalist department, forty-five of the first fifty families in the region were Liberals.

While the elders who lived through military service and political persecution recognized the failures of the political parties--their suffering has deeply ingrained their allegiances. "All of us are liberals like our fathers and we'll die liberals... Even

Jesus Christ was a liberal because his blood is red just like ours"⁶¹ (Fabián López Pérez, villager).

The characteristics of the first fleeing settlers colored the nature of future residents relationships to each other and to political authorities. The high percentage of liberals in a nationalist department and those fleeing Ladino "justice," political repression or military recruitment resulted in a deep antagonism toward local authorities as well as distrust of neighbors and hostilities toward nationalist who moved into the region. This fear of authorities and distrust of neighbors may have shaped even settlement patterns for seldom is one house within site of another and residents often reside on hilltops which though windier and colder allow them to see visitors coming.

While distrust and political parties tended to divide the residents, the second generation and the friends and family that joined them were attracted less by the regions isolation and more by its natural endowments. Several leaders began to attempt to bring in public services which inevitably brought nearer the civilization which the first generation had fled. Residents, especially Liberals, began to blame the nationalist governmental authorities for their lack of road, poverty, poor education and health.

Although they blamed the government authorities, the pilgrimage organizers attempted to overcome political allegiances by blaming both parties and framing the problems regionally. They also emphasized the Opalacans' courage and the years of persecution they had suffered without cause or benefits. The Yamaranguila authorities and local residents aligned with them emphasized the importance of maintaining

⁶¹The use of red is a play on words because red is the color of the Liberal party.

allegiance to the party and highlighted the political and military dangers and risks of angering the authorities by participating in the pilgrimage.

Mistreatment and Abandonment by Yamaranguila

Although in recent years the violence against the people of San Francisco de Opalaca has diminished, residents still had many complaints about the political authorities in Yamaranguila. First, all official business such as registering a birth or death, paying taxes, filing a complaint or responding to a summons could only be carried out in Yamaranguila. Because there was no road, a trip to Yamaranguila involved "three days there and three days back" (Expectación Rodríguez, villager). Such a trip was extremely costly for a people living at subsistence level. Besides the physical costs of the long hike, the trip entailed the economic costs of leaving their fields for a week and having to pay for transportation, food and lodging.

Once they arrived in Yamaranguila, their situation seldom improved:

They called us "mountain indians." But we are all indians, there aren't any people with different blood here. Just because they have a little more money and can dress better they say they have different blood (Valentín Gómez, villager). ...and if you didn't have any money, they wouldn't wait on you. If you didn't take off your hat or your knife or if you came in smoking they would give you a fine. But there they sat with their guns in their belts, smoking their expensive cigarettes (Expectación Rodríguez, villager).

In return for all the mistreatment and taxes exacted from the region, the inhabitants complained that they had received little or nothing. While the region is one of the poorest in Honduras, "during the last ten years, the only assistance that has come from there has been £300 (\$60) to buy barbed wire to enclose the school. That's our only souvenir" (Justiniano Vásquez, villager). The present mayor of San Francisco de Opalaca, Eucevio Gómez Sánchez compared the two regions. "They had schools, health centers, even a high school, but here we had nothing."

Despite the fact that the political authorities gave very little aid to the region, every four years at election time they would arrive with posters, free food and tape players for dances. They would explain why it had not been possible to get approval for a road, health centers or the new municipality during their last term but would go on to argue that their reelection would assure the realization of all of these dreams. "The mayors would only come to make promises about the road. We have never gotten a single project from them" (Agapito Gómez, villager). Thanks in large part to their historical and emotional ties to their respective parties, both liberals and nationalists could usually be counted on to make the costly trip to Yamaranguila to cast their vote.

The most common explanations for the participation of Opalacans in the pilgrimage involved a recitation of the history of violence and mistreatment, the costs involved in trips of Yamaranguila, the social slights and the long stream of broken promises which resulted in a population extremely dissatisfied and disenchanted with the municipal authorities in Yamaranguila. The pilgrimage organizers mobilized that discontent by highlighting the physical, economic and social costs of continuing to live without a road or a municipality of their own. Again, the Yamaranguila authorities and their allies did not address the history of mistreatment which they could hardly deny but instead emphasized the potential costs of participating in such a risky endeavor.

Primeros Luchadores

The struggle for a separate municipality, motivated by the dissatisfaction of residents, dates back to 1963. Regional liberal candidates had promised a group of local leaders that if their presidential candidate, Villeda Morales, won the election, they would see to it that the region became a separate municipality and that a road would connect it to the outside. A group of five leaders: Martiniano Gómez of Plan

de Barrios, Gregorio Sánchez of Ojo de Agua, Encarnación Gómez Lémuz of La Ceibita, Jose Gómez of Monteverde and Juan Gómez of El Naranjo; traveled throughout the region explaining the importance of the promises and organizing each village to vote for the Liberal candidate. Villeda Morales did win the presidency, but the military and the national party overthrew the Morales government before he was able to keep his promises.

The succeeding years were dangerous for Liberals. Every adult was forced to carry a card identifying his or her party affiliation and because the authorities in Yamaranguila knew that the Liberals in the region had been seeking independence they treated them with even greater hostility:

They almost, *almost* set fire to our homes for presenting that petition. Sometimes we would show up with petitions and they would throw them away or rip them up. They didn't punish us but they almost set our homes on fire (Isaías Vásquez, villager).

By 1977 emotions had cooled and the leaders began another attempt at independence. Several of the original leaders were involved in a spiritual retreat for lay leaders of the Catholic church. They discussed the social responsibilities of the church and planned how to address the needs of their parish. Martiniano Gómez, two of his sons and several other lay leaders decided to invite one or two representatives from all twenty-one villages in the region to form a regional board (*patronato sectorial*) in order to fight for their two highest priorities: the construction of a road and the establishment of a new municipality.

Interest in the villages was high and the board functioned well for several years. Its plan was to circumvent local politicians by hiring a lawyer to assist them in achieving their goals. They approached two lawyers in La Esperanza, both of whom regularly worked for local politicians and the elite. Each asked for £9,000 (\$4,500 in 1977), an exorbitant sum for people earning only about \$50 to \$100 a year.

One of Martiniano's sons told me that they did not know of any other lawyers and, "of course, we couldn't pay that. That's as far we got" (Eucevio Gómez, villager).

After the failure of this initiative, the leaders turned again to local politicians. In the early 1980s, Honduras began its transition from military to civilian rule. Political candidates began to visit the region, repeating the promises the people wanted to hear--the creation of a new municipality and the construction of the road. Several politicians even stated that "next year the road will be here" (Bernardo Bejarano, villager), and one went so far as to pay a surveyor to pound stakes through the largest villages. A liberal congressman, Melecio Domínguez, did draft and present a pre-proposal for the new municipality but neither he nor the region had the political weight to warrant much attention.

Local leaders were also very active during campaign years. "The Nationalists would say 'I have a good congressman who will help us' and the Liberals would say the same thing" (Fabián López Pérez, villager). These leaders would go house-to-house collecting signatures, filling out surveys, making lists and writing petitions and requests that they would present to "their" candidate. "They got them the votes, but the politicians would go off to govern and forget all about them. They just filed away all of our petitions" (Fabián López Pérez, villager).

Over the decades, local leaders seesawed between attempting to seek favors by cozying up to local political leaders (which resulted in continued suffering) or sidestepping them completely (which resulted in continued suffering and the authorities' hostility). By the early 1990s, after thirty years of struggle, many inhabitants of the region were thoroughly disenchanted with traditional political channels. The pilgrimage organizers built on the common discourse and identification of priority needs now thirty years old. The opponents of the pilgrimage did not attack the ends of the pilgrimage but attempted to destroy the continuity argument by calling

the organizers outsiders, leftists and delinquents who would only be successful in shedding blood.

The *Palabra de Dios* Movement

Father Iván de Jesús Ayala initiated the *Palabra de Dios* movement in San Francisco de Opalaca. In 1971, he first visited the larger villages of the region to recruit *delegados* (lay leaders). Most of the initial *delegados* were literate young men, as young as fourteen. After a very brief training session with Father Ayala, they began "celebrating" (their term for holding worship services) each Sunday morning under an *enramada*.⁶² Initially, the congregation was limited to the spouses and children of the *delegados*.

During the first five or six years the vast majority of the village was highly critical of the *Palabra de Dios* movement. They accused the *delegados* of being communists, Cubans, Protestants and of bringing a new religion contrary to true Catholicism. "The elders said the Catholic religion was making *composturas* and offering prayers. Whoever spoke against these things was a communist" (Fabián López, Pérez, villager).⁶³ The *rezadores* (traditional Lenca prayer leaders) were often the most hostile to the *delegados* movement.

The most popular *rezadores* were the most upset. People stopped paying attention to them. They would pass by [where the *delegados*

⁶²An *enramada* is a structure built by standing forked logs in the ground in each corner and then placing long poles in the forks--forming a rectangular frame about eight feet off the ground. This frame is then covered with shade-giving branches under which people can sit or stand.

⁶³When asked to define what communist meant, one of the first *delegados*, Entimo Vásquez, replied like this, "I don't understand it, I don't know. I have heard that a communist is when a campesino works and takes everything to the municipality and the municipality shares it and your children aren't your own, they belong to the state."

were holding the services] with their machetes in hand, just aching to hurt us" (Macario Gómez, villager).

Time and the increasing formal support of the church slowly began to erode resistance and attract adherents. The national church and local parishes began to strengthen the *delegados*' authority by formalizing their role and responsibilities. The national church published pamphlets and other helps for *delegados* and the parishes and dioceses organized monthly meetings and regular spiritual retreats. Later each parish named a team of more experienced *delegados* who took responsibility for visiting villages and training *delegados*. One of the church's decisions seemed especially effective:

The *delegados* said that, "whoever does not come to church regularly can't be baptized." Baptism was a holy sacrament of God's grace. That's how God's family is formed. So whoever is not baptized is like a worm in the weeds. That's why it made people think. And we started accepting it (Macario Gómez, villager).

Most people in the region seem to believe that the *delegados* movement has been a cause of dramatic changes in village life. Three changes were most often mentioned. Several positive emotions were used to describe the first change, such as respect, trust and love. "Now we respect each other more--like brothers. Before there were fights and killings every month. Before people would lose cattle, mules and food. People still lose things but now its just small things" (Juan Lara, villager). They attribute this changing relation between inhabitants to several inter-related factors: the teaching of the *delegados*, regular meetings between a large percentage of villagers, a dramatic decrease in alcohol consumption and God's power working through all of these factors.

Secondly, the *delegados*, reiterating the teaching of the priests, taught that the *compostura* was not biblical, resulted in drunkenness, fights and violence and that true

Catholics should not participate. The most common justification I heard for abandoning the *compostura* was the drunkenness which commonly accompanied it:

[The host] got together with his friends. Well, maybe they started out as friends but then they would start fighting because of the *chicha* (Entimo Vásquez, villager). In those days, sometimes they wouldn't even take the time to plant or eat [during the *compostura*], they would just throw seed down, they wouldn't even plant well, sometimes they wouldn't even eat the food--because they were drunk. They were sick in the head (Maximino López, villager).

However, the rising economic costs of following the traditions were also used to justify their abandonment:

Before everyone held *composturas* for everything--for the birth of children, for the harvest, for the planting. Everyone had their chickens, their pigs, their turkeys. A chicken cost three cents, now just a chicken costs thirty lempiras [\$4.00] Back then, with three lempiras [\$1.50] you could buy anything and it didn't seem like you had spent that much money (Maximino López, villager).

However, today the cost of even a modest *compostura* can easily reach two hundred lempiras (\$25.00). A *delegado* argued that:

It used to be we would look for a *rezador* and he would want to drink and eat. We would have to find a turkey, a chicken, cocoa, candles, *chicha* and fireworks. The prayer leader was being fed but maybe your wife and children were malnourished or sick. That's where we threw our money away (Entimo Vásquez, villager).

Others used social and economic arguments:

Instead of wasting money on these people, it is better to pay a good worker a fair wage and feed him well. That's what I think (Fabián López Pérez, villager) There they are all day, wasting time and it makes no difference, we still get the same harvest (Avelino Gómez, villager).

Despite the social pressure exerted by the church and the economic costs of the *compostura*, over thirty percent of the residents of San Francisco de Opalaca still

practice this tradition and a few remain its very vocal champions.⁷ "Thanks to the few of us who still listen to the Word of God and do the *composturas*, there is still corn and beans. God help us if we stop doing it" (Isafás Vásquez, villager).

The decrease in *chicha* consumption and its effects were expounded upon by nearly every interviewee. "The older people drank at all the celebrations. There were always fights, the men would grab each other. It just wasn't good. All the houses had a still, but now only a few do" (Justiniano Vásquez, villager). Juan Lara (villager) offered this testimony:

I was a drunk from the time I was fifteen years old. I was quick to take offense. Every Sunday I got drunk, every Sunday the same stupid thing. It was the only day I didn't work. I started to reflect on what the *delegados* were saying--I quit drinking and got married in 1980. It was an improvement in my life.

Finally, several people mentioned a correlation between the rise in the Palabra de Dios movement and an increase in the social organization of the village. First, the Sunday morning worship services were the primary regular meetings of a large percentage of the population. In addition to the *delegados*' teaching about topics such as brotherly love and cooperation, the participants also began to use the time after worship to make announcements, discuss proposals and vote on village business. In addition, the first outside organizers and campesino organizations to work in the region were associated with the church. The following section will discuss some of those early efforts.

⁷While no one in San Francisco voiced these concerns, many outsiders are lamenting the loss of the *compostura* for various reasons including: 1) it is at least partially the result of coercion by the church 2) it implies the loss of another piece of Lenca culture 3) the social aspect of the *compostura* encourages the sharing of labor and resources and 4) the *compostura* nourishes a respect and reverence for the Earth.

The effect of the *Palabra de Dios* on the framing of the pilgrimage was subtle. The increase in respect for neighbors, acceptance of social organization, attendance at Sunday worship and the decrease in alcohol consumption all made mobilizing a large percentage of the population easier. Also the increase in respect for and power of the *delegados* made the support of ADRO, priests and even framing the event as a pilgrimage powerful factors in influencing *delegados*' and their village's decisions. Opponents, including their parish priest at that time, attempted to dissuade *delegados* and parishioners by framing the event as anti-church and communist.⁸

Kevin and Belinda

Kevin and Belinda Gagher⁹ arrived in 1977 from Great Britain as volunteers with the Catholic church. They lived in La Esperanza and were sent by the parish priest to try to increase agricultural production in the San Francisco de Opalaca. Other than the priest and the teachers, they were the first foreigners (Honduran or otherwise) to work in the region. Kevin organized interested men in each village into groups to train them in new agricultural practices including soil conservation techniques, vegetable production and the use of fertilizers. He also sold agricultural supplies such as hoes, seeds, sprayers and small amounts of fertilizer at subsidized prices. Several people stressed that Kevin "taught us by working *with* us in our fields." Belinda organized women's groups which planted gardens, constructed improved stoves and ovens and learned to bake breads and other non-traditional foods. The support of the church and the *delegados* was crucial to their acceptance and success.

⁸Although this priest is no longer responsible for San Francisco de Opalaca he did dismiss one *delegado* in his current parish who helped organize the pilgrimage.

⁹I was given several versions of this surname. Everyone in the area refers to them only as Kevin and Belinda.

Their work did not go uncriticized. They offered workshops which treated agricultural, social, organizational and spiritual issues. These workshops and their efforts to organize groups in each village led to accusations that they were communists and the novelty of foreigners also fed rumors that they would steal children to take to Great Britain. However, after working in the region for three years, many of the farmers had ceased burning their plots and were using other soil conservation techniques and "there were times you couldn't even sell a cabbage [because vegetable production was so high]" (Maximino López, villager).

Kevin and Belinda's effect on the mobilization for the pilgrimage was indirect. Many residents argued that the Gagher's efforts helped Opalacans to understand for the first time, how to organize, to accept its importance and to understand their potential if united. Each of these factors made mobilization for the pilgrimage more likely. However, a diminishing number of residents and the parish priest continued to call this sort of activity unbiblical and anti-church.

Political Promises

In addition to feeling mistreated and lied to by authorities in Yamaranguila, residents also cited the long series of presidential candidates' broken promises when they explained their decision to take part in the pilgrimage.¹⁰ The region received many visits and promises by presidential candidates, beginning in the 1960s with Villeda Morales who promised a new municipality and road but was ousted in a military coup. The country then entered into an eighteen-year period of military rule,

¹⁰Residents discussed broken political promises under two themes; under the history of mistreatment by Yamaranguila and under a separate theme they called broken political promises. They included stories about broken promises by local authorities under both themes. However, I chose to include the complaints about local authorities in the section on Yamaranguila and in this section will focus on promises made by presidential candidates.

which ended with the election of a liberal candidate, Suazo Cordoba, in 1981. Suazo Cordoba, also promised the region a new municipality and road and "with his promises a lot of people got hopeful, but nothing happened" (Macario Gómez, villager). Although he did not keep his promises, Suazo Córdoba is remembered favorably since it was during his term that schools were built in the region (with USAID monies). In 1989, Leonardo Callejas, the nationalist candidate, visited the region by helicopter. Before the visit the regional board (patronato sectorial) was resuscitated and presented a request for the road and a new municipality but was disappointed once again. "I don't even think they read the note" (Eucevio Gómez, villager). However, Callejas "promised schools, the road, health centers, houses and vouchers for single mothers" (Macario Gómez, villager). Because of Callejas' promises, many Liberals in the region broke tradition and voted for the nationalist, Callejas. However, he did no better than his predecessors in keeping his promises to the region. Despite this failure to initiate either the road or the new municipality, Callejas is remembered favorably by residents for his approval of their petition for land titles.

In 1994, a helicopter visited the region again with the Liberal candidate, Carlos Roberto Reina. "He promised he would get us the road, the new municipality and that he would give us tools, hoes, machetes and assistance for the elderly" (Macario Gómez, villager). These promises were received once again with both hope and cynicism. Many residents voted enthusiastically for Reina and he won, however those same supporters had begun to realize that waiting passively for the government to fulfill its promises was an unlikely way to get what they wanted. "We kept our end of the bargain--our vote. Now we had a right to expect them to keep their end" (Fabián López Pérez, villager).

Organizers of the pilgrimage framed this series of broken promises together with the Opalacans' fulfillment of their responsibility such as military service, taxes and voting, into powerful arguments for seeking change more forcefully. The opposition did not contest this element of the frame although individual politicians did deny personal responsibility. Even Reina did not deny promising San Francisco de Opalaca a road and a new municipality, but only asked how he could fulfill all his promises to the poor of Honduras, a question which must have conveniently escaped him during his campaign.

ADRO and Land Titling

The first development organization to work in the region was ADRO (*Asociación para el Desarrollo de la Region Occidental*) founded in 1989 by *delegados* with the support of a few priests in the region. ADRO's goals were to assist village groups with training and credit.

Those first years we gave workshops in: The National Reality [*Realidad Nacional*], Faith and Politics, and Human Rights and Organization (Miguel Zelaya, ADRO organizer). In the workshop on Human Rights we learned about our rights and our duties. Before we had not understood about our rights, only our duties. We learned we had a right to land, health and education (Julián Lémuz, villager).

This first attempt to organize local affiliates was met with criticism from within and without the region. The parish priest, who held land in the region, was suspicious of the ADRO workers and used his radio program to label them communists and to complain that the *delegados* were more concerned with material than spiritual matters. Local residents, uninitiated in the language of NGOs, were also wary of the acronym, ADRO, and wondered what they were joining. Eventually, however, the training program, the support of the *delegados* and initiation of a credit program greatly broadened ADRO's support.

The first staff person assigned to the region was David Euceda, an agronomist who very quickly became interested in the issue of land tenure. David was one of the people most often referred to by villagers as trustworthy and without outside agendas. His presence in the village and hard work on the land tenure issue has made him well-loved although he no longer works in the region.

In San Francisco de Opalaca, only a few outsiders had bought relatively small plots. The rest of the land was used by the villagers but untitled. "David showed up in each community and asked about our land tenure. Are things all right the way they are? Some said yes and others said no" (Entimo Vásquez, villager). David, attempted to help the villagers understand the importance of titling their land by recounting the story of the region where he had just worked.

About one hundred years ago, the people of La Florida, sold all the land they had, their mules, cows and corn...in order to buy a piece of state land. But their title was worthless. A rich man got one of his employees elected mayor and he took over ownership of everything. Now the people own only the land their house sits on and they work as day-laborers earning five lempiras [fifty cents] a day. You say this land is yours but where are the papers...the land is the government's and it is only loaned to you (David Euceda, ADRO organizer).

David then explained that an agrarian reform act had been passed in Honduras and that as a result the villagers had a right to their land. Entimo Vásquez, of Monteverde, told me of how his group responded to David's explanation.

Things are not good here. We live here and we say that we have land but we don't. Any time, with the road and free lands, someone else could take over our land and we'll be working for them.

However, the group did have several questions: What about the titles in Yamaranguila? Didn't they have to ask permission from the mayor? Were they now going to have limits on where they could farm? But the most urgent question they

asked was, How much was this going to cost?¹¹ David promised to help them investigate all of these issues.

This period of questioning in 1991 became the impetus for a two-year struggle led by local leaders and ADRO staff involving training and strategizing sessions, meetings with government authorities and villages and visits to the capital. The group discovered that titling just for the group in Santa Cruz would cost four hundred thousand lempiras [eighty thousand dollars] but then discovered article 346 in the constitution which stated that the government had the duty to protect ethnic groups and their territories. Citing article 346, communal titling could be granted free of cost.¹²

After discovering this new option, the leaders decided to present their request as Lenca communities. While some were uneasy or even opposed to using this new term which labeled them as Indians, others stated that "as the Lenca Indians that we are, we have the right to have our land titled, because we are the direct inheritors of this land and there is no reason we should pay for it" (Maximino López, villager).

On October 30, 1991 representatives went to the INA (National Agrarian Institute) offices in Tegucigalpa and presented their requests. They met with the INA director "and he took all of our documentation and said 'no problem. It's done'" (Julián Lémuz, villager). The representatives returned to their villages and the news quickly spread of their apparent success. People from the eight villages in the region

¹¹David stated that "people always say they want the road. I said that the road would come and with it people who wanted to buy land. You have to title [your land] first."

¹²The construction of this petition is worth noting. While Opalacans are Lenca Indians they did not recognize that fact. In addition article 346 protects the lands which indigenous people have "traditionally inhabited." Opalacans colonized this region in the 1930-50s. As a result, organizers of the land titling initiative needed to construct (or reconstruct) the indigenous nature of Opalacans and then argue that they had a "traditional" claim to their land.

which had not been involved in the land titling initiative now decided that they did not want to be left out. The ADRO leaders reflected and decided that:

It didn't seem right to us either, they were our friends, our neighbors.
But this meant we would have to do more promoting, more training.
It was twice as much work for ADRO. But we did it (Julián Lémuz,
villager).

As the process progressed and especially after some of the initial favorable meetings with INA, regional authorities greatly increased their efforts to derail the process. The mayor of Yamaranguila logically feared losing control of the land and resources of the region. In an effort to dissuade the villagers from continuing their efforts, the mayor spread rumors through nationalist adherents that any new title would be worthless because Yamaranguila had held the title since 1873 and that any effort to annul these titles would cost millions. He also targeted David because of his efforts, labeling him a communist and ordering his auxiliaries to "tie him up and bring him to me" (David Euceda, ADRO organizer).

The parish priest also used radio programs to continue his attack on ADRO. The *delegados* and a local colonel who owned 120 acres in the region sent soldiers to shoot in the air and state that "what ADRO is doing is illegal and we are going to take action" (David Euceda, ADRO organizer). The impact of these tactics was minimal. Although some were frightened, ADRO was bearing most of the costs and the risks of continuing to seek land titles were relatively low compared to the perceived value of the titles. As a result, most villagers' response to the threats was simply anger and further distrust of those behind them.

On February 3, 1993 President Leonardo Callejas presented communal titles to representatives of the twenty-one villages in the region. The titles covered over 24,000 hectares and the provision allowed compensation for the few non-resident

owners who lost land. On March 19, 1993 ADRO hosted a huge celebration in San Francisco de Opalaca and, in response to the mayor's claims that the titles were worthless, the INA director stated that, "Whoever thinks this title is not valid could better find a rope and hang himself (Entimo Vásquez, villager).

To ensure the provisions of the title were followed each village set up a supervisory committee responsible to ensure no one sold land outright, although the sale of improvements to the land was permitted. Although land titling has had very little effect on productive activities, it greatly affected the residents' sense of power and security:

Before, no one could say "no, stay off this land, this is mine" since no one had personal or communal titles. How could you say, "no, don't walk here, you are not from here and you can't take whatever you want." Anyone could move in here. Now with titles it's different. The community gets together and says, "no, we are the owners here." That is a huge change (Maximino López, villager).

Land titling was probably the single most powerful event in the framing of the pilgrimage. The pilgrimage organizers argued that the land titling process demonstrated both the power of the region when residents cooperated and the government's willingness to assist indigenous groups. National authorities had granted their request despite the best efforts of the mayor, priest and military officials. Both of these points were essential in mobilizing large numbers of people. The communal titles also made it much less risky to anger the Yamaranguila authorities because they no longer had control of the Opalacans' land.

The mayor and his allies continued to frame the communal titles as worthless pieces of paper and to claim that only he had the original and valid titles. At the time, this was more than just posturing for without the political power San Francisco de

Opalaca gained as a result of the pilgrimage, the mayor may well have been able to use his power and resources to nullify the communal titles.

The "Famine"¹³

After carrying out a needs assessment in several regions, a European NGO, SNV (Dutch Cooperation), decided Yamaranguila Norte was the neediest and least served of the regions studied and in 1993 they organized several existing NGOs and popular organizations¹⁴ under the acronym CIPRYN to coordinate all the development projects in the region. CIPRYN initiated its work in the region by organizing committees in each village made up of one representative from each of the five strongest internal organizations. CIPRYN is credited with working through "a participative process. People defined their most felt needs. People really participated. Everyone wanted the road. Everyone was hopeful" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

While carrying out the participative investigations, David Euceda, now on loan to CIPRYN, noticed in a number of villages what he believed was an above average number of deaths, especially among young children. He asked five village committees to make a list of those who had died recently and found that during the first two weeks of July, nineteen people had died. David, capitalizing on the fact that President Callejas was visiting La Esperanza at the end of the month for the local Potato

¹³I have chosen to put famine in quotes here because, as will come clear below, there is significant debate whether there actually was a famine. However, for ease of reading I will not continue to use this device.

¹⁴The organization included: ADRO (*Asociación para el Desarrollo de la Región Occidental*), ONILH (*Organización Nacional de Indígenas Lenca en Honduras*), OCH (*Organización de Campesinos Hondureños*), CCD (*Comisión Cristiana de Desarrollo*), CTN (*Cooperación Técnica Nacional*) y APROCAFE (*Asociación de Productores de Cafe*).

Festival, wrote the president and the press a letter claiming that the region was suffering a famine and that people were dying of starvation.

This was an election year and the opposing party, the liberals, as well as the press quickly made this a front-page story. Dozens of politicians and journalists, both national and international visited the region and were shocked by the poverty they saw. In an interview for radio news, a young man from the tiny village of Guansaúces, who was later reported to have been very nervous, apparently stated that people ate ants when they had nothing else. The print journalists, in an attempt to liven up the story, also mentioned that people were reduced to consuming toads, and even went so far as to explain how they were prepared (see *El Herald*, August 21, 1993:18-9). A liberal congresswoman from the region, Austra Berta Flores, brought Euceda's letter to the Congress and demanded that the government respond to the terrible crisis which she attributed to the government's drastic structural adjustment efforts. These claims:

caused a certain degree of anger in the government and the military because people were dying of hunger when everything was supposedly all right. The government said it wasn't true, that the people were just lazy (Julio López, CTN director).

One nationalist congressman, trying to minimize the problem but obviously not very schooled in health terminology, claimed that "it was all a lie, some people had died, but of malnutrition not of hunger" (Felix Rodriguez, villager; see also *La Tribuna*, *El Tiempo* and *El Herald*, August 20, 1993).

The national and international press attention resulted in a flood of offers of aid from within and without Honduras. CIPRYN in an attempt to coordinate relief efforts, abandoned its participative approach and any ideas of getting the road built. Two CIPRYN member organizations, CTN and CCD, soon received millions of Lempiras from European sources to provide famine relief. The relief money quickly

began to cause resentment among the other members of CIPRYN who claimed that CTN and CCD were unduly benefitting from CIPRYN's work and the resulting jealousy and hard feelings led to the ultimate disintegration of CIPRYN.

Residents of the region remain doubtful of both CCD and CTN's management of the famine monies:

CCD received 30 million florins for this sector. They came to do an investigation but it was just noise, they didn't do anything. CTN received one and a half million lempiras. They had enough for three rounds of provisions but only round arrived. Nothing came to San Francisco de Opalaca, but the organizations got theirs (anonymous, villager).

The government also responded to the crisis but its efforts are viewed with even greater disenchantment and anger:

In just one day, three truckloads of corn were delivered to the government offices [in La Esperanza]. They unloaded everything. Two hours later they were saying that the governor was selling the corn below market price. He said it had been donated to sell in Intibuca. Up until last year, they said that the famine was only to fill the warehouses to sell back to us. One warehouse in the Way [a sector of La Esperanza] was almost full of used clothing but the mayors of Yamaranguila, Otoro y the border [of El Salvador] filled up cars and sold it or used it for political gain (anonymous, villager; see also *El Heraldo*, August 21, 1993:20).

When I interviewed villagers about the famine over two years later, they still became impassioned regarding the perceived misuse of funds as well as the news story which had instigated the relief effort:

Sure, there was a shortage of grain, but it was the same as other years. If there is no corn, there's fruit, malangas, yucca... The women here work hard in order to keep their children from suffering (Santana Gómez, villager). Later in La Esperanza they would say, "here come the anteaters, here come the toadeaters" (Expectación Rodríguez, villager). They have always acted like we were lazy, that we ate insects. People were angry... Not one of us makes our living off of anyone there, its more like we serve as a ladder up for them. We are

always making the rich richer in one way or another (Basflico Lara, villager).

The famine experience was a powerful element in discouraging potential participants in the pilgrimage. For opponents (and even some proponents) it demonstrated again how their poverty and needs were twisted by others to appear as begging and dependency. The famine was also framed locally as another example of politicians, development organizations, the wealthy and the media using Opalacans' poverty to increase their power, wealth and make sensational headlines. According to this group Opalacans should stay home and help themselves.

Despite the overwhelmingly negative framing of the famine, some villagers did recognize a few redeeming features. Many allowed that the corn donated was desperately needed in the time of shortage and that "some people were made aware of the people here and our great need" (Eulecteria Gómez, villager). Indeed, the overwhelming response of the international and national media to the famine gave notice to COPIN and villagers that the region's issues were capable of commanding international attention especially when the population was portrayed as indigenous rather than simply campesino, a lesson COPIN put to good use later when organizing the pilgrimage. Perhaps most importantly for the villagers:

People started to talk again about unity and the need for the road. The village leaders started to meet together to solicit aid. Sometimes they handed out provisions in the afternoon and people would leave walking with fifty to sixty pounds of corn on their backs. We recognized the need for the road. It wasn't the famine that "woke us up" [for the pilgrimage] but carrying that corn on our back (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

Birth of COPIN

Just as the motivations of the residents of San Francisco de Opalaca to participate in the pilgrimage were complex and historical, so was the formation of

COPIN and the motivations of its members. "In La Esperanza, there had always been people with a desire to do something to protest against injustice...COPIN started with the employees of other NGOs, unions and farmer organizations" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

In March, 1993 all of the popular organization in the region were invited to a meeting of the Environmental Committee of Yamaranguila where they were asked to organize their affiliates to take part in a march to expel the local lumber mill. The march was impressive with over 1,500 people participating from seven organizations.¹⁵ After tense negotiations the protesters succeeded in effecting a ban on logging in certain limited areas. They did not succeed in expelling the mill because Apoligeno Bejarano, the president of the committee claimed that lawyers representing the mill owner convinced him that it was private property and they had no legal basis to expel it. Other leaders claim that Bejarano, now mayor of Yamaranguila was bribed.

First [Bejarano] headed up the fight, he was adamant that he would not quit fighting until they left,... and then all the sudden he's got a whole list of explanations, some people said they saw that he got a pickup in San Pedro Sula, others said that the mill owners financed his campaign (Ramón Reyes, COPIN organizer).

After tasting the possibilities of coordinating efforts, but being frustrated in achieving their goals, several people began to work to form a coalition of popular organizations. All of the original organizers are from La Esperanza and were employed or involved with popular organizations. Most of them have a history of being involved in "leftist" organizations which in Honduras means unions, human rights and *campesino*

¹⁵The seven organization were: 1) *Comité de Medio Ambiente de Yamaranguila*, 2) ADRO, 3) OCH, 4) ONILH, 5) CTN, 6) CODEH (*Comisión de Derechos Humanos*) and 7) ACER (*Acción Cultural y Ecológica de Rescate*).

organizations. Some of them and their families have been in trouble with the military for these connections. All of them are in their twenties and thirties and half are women.¹⁶

On March 27, 1993 fifteen organizations met to form COPIN (*Comité de Organizaciones Populares de Intibucá*).¹⁷ The new committee outlined its four goals: 1) stop all lumbering in the region 2) procure a water and sewer system for La Esperanza 3) achieve the paving of the principal roads in La Esperanza and 4) secure price controls on basic food products. COPIN's first coordinator was the director of the campesino organization, OCH. The Environmental Committee of Yamaranguila also passed over to COPIN, radio time funded by World Vision, to promote their efforts. Their first event took place on May 1, Labor Day when six hundred people, many affiliates of member organizations, marched into La Esperanza with those demands.

In July, 1993 COPIN organized a celebration of the *Día de Lempira* (Lempira Day) which several hundred people attended and coordinated a plebiscite against forced military service. In the spirit of the day they presented dramas, traditional music and dances and gave speeches "demanding sovereignty and national identity."

In September 1993, COPIN organized another march to protest the mining of a hill at the entrance to La Esperanza and to reinforce four other demands. Their

¹⁶I do not have any strong explanation for the important role of women in COPIN. Several of them were involved in similar activities for years. A few became involved because they were employees of popular organizations--a fact which is explainable by the growing emphasis in development to promote women's issues and the fact that women are often willing to work for lower wages.

¹⁷The fifteen members were: OCH, ACAN, CNTC, *Comité de Medio Ambiente de Yamaranguila*, CODEH, COAAL, ACER, ADRO, *Delegados de la Palabra*, UNC, SITRAMEDHYS, CTN, *Patronato del Barrio Las Delicias* and *Comité de Medio Ambiente de San Juan*, Intibuca.

protest stemmed from the fact that the government was constructing the road with fill dirt taken from what had been a picturesque pine-covered hill right at the entrance of the town. About thirty adults participated in the march but their numbers swelled when two hundred students recruited from the nearby high school joined the marchers.

Although the march was successful and the company began taking their fill dirt from another less conspicuous area, COPIN was disappointed:

It's sad to always see the same two or three people involved in everything. How is it possible that the people here won't get involved? We said to the people of Bella Vista [located right next to the hill], "since you didn't go out to protest we promise to mark your grave" [when the hill falls on them] (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

COPIN members explain the decreasing support for their events in a variety of ways:

There are jealousies between the directors, everyone wants to be well-known and not be under COPIN. There is a general crisis in popular organizations and people start thinking that belonging to COPIN only means going out to march and scream and no one sees results because the same lumber trucks keep driving away (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

The celebration of the Dia de Lempira and the small march in September were the last events COPIN organized for almost a year in part because many of the leaders had become involved in the year's political campaign "to guarantee Ramos Soto [the nationalist candidate] didn't win, he was like the devil for us" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer). Activity also decreased because several other organizations were changing leadership or going through internal crisis. During this year, "COPIN made

a few protests against the price of rice, etc. but it didn't do much"¹⁸ (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

The history of COPIN and its principal organizers made it easy for its opponents to label them as leftists, labels which five to ten years earlier would have been fatal to the movement. However, the support of ADRO, priests and other organizations allowed COPIN to ignore the personal attacks and emphasize the resources and contacts available through the various member organizations. More importantly, COPIN was able to mobilize participants based on the trust villagers had in these organizations and individuals.

Toma del Aserradero [Seizure of the Saw Mill]

In February of 1994, COPIN decided to organize a take-over of the saw-mill in Yamaranguila. Several factors influenced that decision. First, many leaders still felt frustrated by the first march during which they felt that there was sufficient popular support to evict the mill if the leaders had not sold out. "The Yamaranguila march left people frustrated. There were still twenty lumber trucks leaving every day--it was like

¹⁸During this period COPIN was also slightly involved in a region called Las Aguilas. In the early 1980s, Juan de la Cruz Avelar, a liberal congressman, claimed to have bought over 1,200 acres of land in Las Aguilas, which he fenced and hired supervisors to protect. Villagers claim he bought ten acres and forged the document to say 1,200. This purchase marked the beginning of a long struggle for control of the region. The villagers claim that Avelar's employees have burned their homes, killed their cattle, stole their goods and attempted to kill their leaders and poison the whole village. They joined a campesino organization, CNTC, in the late 1980s and were able to retake the majority of their land. Salvador Zúniga, then working for CNTC and later a COPIN leader counseled them to file for titles as Lencas rather than campesinos. They joined ONILH, and because Avelar questioned their indigeneity, they "brushed up on" the compostura and demonstrated that and their other cultural distinctions to a visiting commission which ruled in their favor. Understanding Las Aguilas helps to explain COPIN's demand for the destitution of Avelar during the pilgrimage and also demonstrates COPIN leaders' earlier successes manipulating indigenous themes and arguments.

permanent provocation" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer). COPIN members were also frustrated by the futility of so many meetings, communiques and denouncements resulting in so little action and results. And finally, COPIN felt that a take-over of the mill was feasible because their newly-elected coordinator, Miguel Zelaya--also the president of ADRO--had recently supported a successful movement led by *delegados* in La Iguala to evict a saw mill. Miguel had planned a demonstration to evict the saw mill in La Paz and proposed COPIN do the same in Yamaranguila.

Two other national and international level factors were considered by COPIN in making this decision. I will only briefly mention them here because I have already addressed them in the national and international context in Chapter Two. First, the political climate was favorable since President Reina had just taken office in January and had stated that he would support popular and social movements. Second, the unrest in Chiapas, Mexico had inspired some of the COPIN leaders to begin thinking about doing "something big and irreversible" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

Once the decision was made to take over the mill, the planning and mobilizing began. Early recruitment efforts were not very encouraging, however about two weeks before the event, Zelaya invited two ADRO leaders from San Francisco de Opalaca to a COPIN planning meeting. COPIN leaders asked the representatives if they felt people in San Francisco de Opalaca would support them in the take-over. "They said yes, if the road and the new municipality were included in the proposal and if COPIN visited the region to motivate people" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

The motivational meeting took place in El Naranjo a few days later. Despite the short notice and a torrential rain, nearly all of the twenty-one villages sent representatives and over one hundred people awaited the COPIN emissaries. Participants at the meeting remember three main points: 1) A discussion of their

highest priority needs--the municipality and the road and their many past attempts at realizing these:

Village leaders explained that they had made so many requests and nothing ever happened. We [COPIN representatives] said "here the authorities are used to doing things only when forced to. We are going to have to push the governor" (Cristobal González, COPIN organizer).

2) The COPIN organizers also integrated one of the villagers' complaints with their desire to evict the saw mill. "We [village leaders] said we wanted to plant corn but we couldn't because the mayor said we weren't allowed to burn any of the forest. The COPIN leaders told us that the mayor wanted them to protect and care for the forest so that he could sell the lumber to the Cuban,¹⁹ if we got rid of the saw mill we could decide what to do with our own forest (Justiniano Vásquez, villager). 3) COPIN leaders also argued that "as Hondurans we have fulfilled our duties, we have the right to demand the rights which have been promised us for so long" (Valentín Gómez, villager).

The COPIN leaders invited villagers to La Esperanza on April 4 to take part in a workshop to put together a petition to kick out the sawmill. Each representative estimated the number of people who would attend from their village. COPIN was thrilled to see that the total reached 1,200, far more than the three hundred they had anticipated. In the subsequent village meetings the local leaders repeated the three points and signed up volunteers to go the workshop. However, because one of the principal goals of the workshop was to evict the mill, many villagers expressed concern that participants would get in trouble and that those who went must be either lazy or not have enough work to do. Despite the attempts at dissuasion, on April 3

¹⁹The owner of the saw mill in Yamaranguila was a Cuban-American.

about eight hundred men from the region were waiting in Togopala for the trucks that would take them to the workshop.

It was nearly 10:00 pm by the time the group from San Francisco had joined about two hundred from other regions in the ADRO office. The COPIN leaders encouraged them to get some sleep because "tomorrow we have to make a lot of decisions" (Ignacio Gómez, villager). To the surprise of most of the men however, about 1 am the COPIN leaders woke them up and began organizing them into "platoons," giving each a name and an assignment. It soon became clear that COPIN was planning to take over the saw mill and the governor's offices. During the night "they wouldn't let anyone leave so that they couldn't tell" (Expectación Rodríguez, villager). But as soon as they had a chance, "some men left...and others wanted to go but we grabbed them and calmed them down" (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

The first protestors arrived at the lumber mill about 6 am in a bread truck. The employees and the four soldiers present thought they were getting an order of bread but were surprised and amused to see twenty to thirty protestors get out. The soldiers asked "'Would you like us to jail you now?' But we said, 'we aren't just a few, we are thousands and the rest are on their way'" (Ignacio Gómez, villager). Actually about six hundred protestors went to the saw mill.

The administrator of the mill arrived shortly in a brand new, four-wheel-drive Toyota pickup which the protestors surrounded, filled with firewood and encircled with water jugs, which they claimed convincingly were filled with gas. Over the next few days, whenever things got especially tense several protestors would approach the car with matches and say "no matter what happens, we'll blow up the car and some of you to" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer). When the governor arrived at his office that morning, the other four hundred protestors surrounded it. He angrily stated that, "no one was going to force him to do anything" (Berta Cáceres, COPIN

organizer). However the protestors explained that they "were protesting only out of dire need and that 'you go around in your trucks, your Toyotas, taxis y even airplanes but we don't even have a road...Here, is where you buried our petitions so here is where we'll stay until you solve the problem" (Valentín Gómez, villager). After a day without food and bathroom privileges the governor was much more amenable and agreed to negotiate with COPIN and national and local authorities.²⁰

The second day the COPIN negotiating commission met with the national authorities from Tegucigalpa but these were middle level bureaucrats without the power to make key decisions and they left without any real accomplishments. At the lumber mill the situation remained tense. Just inside the gate stood about forty soldiers in riot gear which included M-16 rifles, riot shields, tear-gas grenades, batons and gas masks as well as about one hundred fifty employees armed with sticks, rocks and undoubtedly many concealed firearms. Immediately on the other side of the gate were six hundred protestors with sticks, rocks, two sticks of dynamite and an estimated two hundred concealed pistols. The employees shouted insults and told the protestors to:

Find some work you lazy bums! Stop bothering us here! If you don't have anything to eat [a reference to the famine], you don't have any reason to be hanging around here bothering us (Ignacio Gómez, villager).

In response, the protest leaders intimidated the soldiers by asking,

²⁰The local colonel tried to rescue the governor but the protestors were somehow able to separate him from his bodyguards and "when he got to the door he said, 'Open up!' but the *compañero* who was guarding the door said, 'Who are you to give orders? We are in charge here.' He asked him for his papers and looked them over carefully before he let him in. He [the colonel] was furious. The funniest thing is that the *compañero* doesn't even know how to read" (Berta Cáceres, COPIN organizer). After letting the colonel in, they refused to let him leave until three bulldozers had been removed from the saw mill.

"How many of you are reservists?"²¹ And everyone would lift their hats and yell even though it was just bullshit. Some others said to a soldier that "You've got two stripes to go before you get to where I was," or they said "if you throw those bombs at us I'll grab that gas mask and rip it off." The soldiers said "The last thing we want is a confrontation" (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

At 6 am on the third day the situation heated up even more. Miguel Zelaya arrived and decided that the protestors should break the padlock and open the gate. As several protestors worked on the padlock, the soldiers moved back slightly, armed their M-16s and prepared their tear gas. At this point about forty protestors turned and ran but the majority were persuaded by the confidence of the leaders and moved in closer. In an instant the lock was broken, the gate was opened and the protestors poured into the opening until they were chest to rifle with the soldiers. No one moved.²² After a period of threats, insults and extreme tension on both sides, everyone agreed to draw an actual line in the sand that neither side would pass without suffering unnamed but dire consequences.

Spurred on in part by the deteriorating situation at the saw mill, by late afternoon COPIN, the governor and three municipalities signed an agreement which immediately ended all logging in the region, gave the mill thirty days to stop its operations and the government sixty days to begin the road to Yamaranguila Norte. The protestors celebrated all night with *cohetes*, music and dancing.

²¹Anyone who has served in the Honduran military is considered to be in the Reserves. The leaders asked this question hoping to convince the soldiers that nearly all of the protestors had been in the army and as a result had received military training and would be difficult to frighten or defeat if violence began.

²²A leader from San Francisco, Ignacio Gómez told me, "This experience showed us how the military take care of *negociantes* [business people]. They should take care of us, not the *negociantes*."

Authorities in the region were not so elated. The mayor of Yamaranguila immediately declared the agreement null and void because he claimed he had been coerced into signing. His anger was understandable--the eviction of the saw mill meant the loss of the largest tax payer and job source in the municipality. In addition, the owner of the saw mill demanded that the municipality pay the workers' severance pay and the soon-to-be laid-off workers demanded jobs. The parish priest who owned lumberable land, used his weekly radio program to call the COPIN protestors communists and lazy job-stealers. He predicted revolution and blood-baths in every area with lumber mills and proclaimed that this was a sign of the biblical end times. The majority of the population of the department seemed to agree that the protestors had gone too far--that they were leftists and troublemakers who had taken away an important source of jobs and lumber for the region.

Despite the ongoing public debate, the mill did withdraw its operations by the deadline. However, when six hundred people from San Francisco de Opalaca arrived on the ninetieth day (COPIN had given the governor a thirty day extension) to assure that the highway machinery had arrived in Togopala as promised, they found that once again their principal demand, the construction of the road, had been left unfulfilled. The leaders of COPIN and San Francisco de Opalaca made several speeches highlighting their achievements, the government's broken promises and the continuing mistreatment by Yamaranguila. Before returning home, all of those present committed themselves to somehow take their demands to Tegucigalpa and the pilgrimage was born.

Summary

This chapter recounts how Opalacans cited themes such as their mistreatment by Yamaranguila and events such as land titling to explain their own mobilization. These historical explanations demonstrate that their participation in the pilgrimage was

deeply tied to their constructions of the past. While these themes and events were important factors in explaining their mobilization, the use of the same event such as land titling to both oppose and promote participation demonstrates that on their own they do not provide a sufficient explanation for this mobilization. This chapter and the last have demonstrated that while historical and contextual factors do not provide a sufficient explanation of the mobilization for the pilgrimage, many of these factors were clearly influenced the process. Chapter 5 will integrate these powerful local explanations into a mobilization model.

The themes and events in these two chapters were also included as a part of the "thick description" which facilitates judgement regarding transferability. I believe they demonstrate that while the mobilization for the pilgrimage took place in a unique historical and contextual setting, this setting shares many common threads with the history and context of other poor and marginal groups. Ultimately however, it is the reader and not the author who must judge the transferability of the findings.

CHAPTER 4: THE PILGRIMAGE FOR LIFE, JUSTICE AND LIBERTY

**"We said, OK, with or without money we're going..."
(Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).n**

Introduction

The Pilgrimage for Life, Justice and Liberty is the focal point of this study. This chapter will recount the story of the eight day event. The following chapters will analyze the mobilization process which preceded and followed it. The story of the pilgrimage will underscore the costs, risks and potential benefits involved and will also support my assertion in the introduction that mobilization is not once-and-for-all but rather a continuing process. The story of the pilgrimage will also begin to highlight the importance of themes developed in chapters 5 through 7 which include: frames, networks, participation, relationships, spirituality and coercion. This chapter cites predominately interviews with COPIN organizers which were triangulated with interviews with villagers and secondary data.

The Story of the Pilgrimage

While some in COPIN, the organizing group of the First Pilgrimage for Life, Justice and Liberty (see Chapter 3), hoped for a massive turnout, realistically they planned for five to six hundred participants. They had calculated that they would need about £250,000 (\$30,000) for transportation, food, promotions and necessary supplies for an extended stay in Tegucigalpa, the Honduran capital. Because few organizations had been willing to give them money for such an uncertain event, by late June they had raised only £36,000 (and that, thanks in large part to one donation of £16,000 from the Quakers). However, in a meeting in late June they determined that with money or without, they were going to Tegucigalpa.

On Saturday morning, July 8, 1994 COPIN realized the funds they had collected would not begin to cover the expenses of the throngs of people arriving for

the pilgrimage. Trucks began to arrive from Togopala, Intibucá Norte, La Frontera and Yamaranguila, each full and carrying word of others waiting to be picked up. It was clear that the mobilization effort carried out by COPIN and its members had been successful far beyond their expectations. By the end of the day the organizers and student volunteers had registered approximately 1,700 Lencas in La Esperanza alone, with many more indigenous people waiting in Jesús de Otoro, Siguatepeque, Comayagua and Tegucigalpa. By the time the pilgrimage arrived in Tegucigalpa, newspaper accounts estimated it numbered approximately four thousand indigenous people. Finances were no longer COPIN's chief concern, its members knew they had a potentially historic event in the making.

Day 1: Saturday, July 8

El Molino

Each truck dropped off its cargo of one hundred to one hundred fifty Lencas in El Molino, a Catholic training center in La Esperanza. As people climbed down from the trucks, the organizers registered them and tied a strip of green cloth to their arm. Many pilgrims carried articles such as an extra shirt, a little money⁸⁰, a piece of plastic to sleep on or cover themselves with if it rained and food items such as tortillas, beans, bananas, oranges, ground coffee and chunks of sugar cane.

By the end of the day, the atmosphere in El Molino had become increasingly festive. Several groups played guitars, fiddles and bongo-type drums while others sang religious and popular songs. Others listened to *rancheras* on the radio or talked with friends and family whom they had not seen for months or years. A nervous excitement

⁸⁰ A few wealthier participants took £50.00 to £75.00 (\$6.00 to \$10.00) and spent it all. While some were not able to bring any cash, the average participant probably took £5.00 to £10.00, and spent most of it. I heard from several people about one participant who took £5.00 (about 75 cents) for himself and his daughter and returned home without having spent a cent.

built as the participants also began to recognize the significance of their growing numbers. While the expanding multitude increased the likelihood that the government would seriously consider their demands it also increased the danger that they would be seen as a threat by either the government or the military.

That evening the group began to prepare for mass. Nearly ninety percent of the pilgrims in El Molino lived in one of two parishes, but neither of their priests were present. In fact, those priests were strongly opposed to the pilgrimage and had condemned the participants as lazy beggars, communists and anti-Christians. The participants were not without spiritual leadership, however. Padre Martín and Padre Celso, a Lenca himself, led nearby parishes and were board members of CTN (*Cooperación Técnica Nacional*), an NGO which worked extensively in the region. The COPIN coordinators were very pleased to have the support of the priests, primarily because "that way the people are also spiritually strengthened" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer) and secondly because the promise of the priests' involvement had been a powerful factor in mobilizing villagers to participate and would help to reassure anyone with cold feet.

After the mass, the organizers began orientation. They explained that they would be traveling by truck to Comayagua to spend the night and then travel on to Tegucigalpa. They reviewed the major demands that would be presented to the President and the Congress: a thirty-year ban on all forestry in the region, a road connecting the twenty-three villages of Northern Yamaranguila with La Esperanza, a new indigenous municipality, a score of new schools and clinics, the dismissal of a vice-president and the region's governor for abuses of power, and other lesser demands. They also emphasized that everyone should be willing to stay in Tegucigalpa until the government met their demands even if that meant withstanding hunger and persecution.

The organizers also warned the participants (many of whom had never left their villages let alone traveled to Tegucigalpa) about the importance of staying with the group, being extremely careful with their children, their possessions and in and around vehicles. These warnings were probably not necessary since in nearly every village these same admonitions had been repeated by those hoping to discourage people from participating.

After the orientation, organizers divided the participants by village into groups of fifty to one hundred. Each group set up committees responsible for discipline, food, transportation and health. The discipline committee was given red armbands and was responsible for protecting and policing the participants. The food committee was responsible for procuring, preparing and distributing the food for their group. The transportation committee was to keep the group together on the trucks and guard their safety during travel. The health committee was responsible for observing and reporting any health problems. The formation of these committees was one of the most important means organizers used to maintain discipline and communication between themselves and the four thousand people who participated in the pilgrimage.

After this orientation the former president of ADRO called all of its members to a separate meeting in its office. In that meeting the ADRO directors gave further orientation, food and some mattresses to its members. While the COPIN members had agreed that because of the limited finances each organization would be responsible for taking care of its own members, some of the organizers saw this separate meeting as sectarian and a sign of coming problems. "When I saw there was a meeting going on at the same time in ADRO, I said, 'they're upset about something'" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

Meanwhile, the party was just getting started in El Molino. Few people found time to sleep as they listened to music, danced or conversed with friends.

Day 2: Sunday, July 9

Inauguration

The inauguration of the pilgrimage began about 8:00 am, and included prayers, the singing of the national anthem and Catholic social action songs, the *danza del garrobo* (a traditional Lenca dance), music from some of the invited groups, short speeches to motivate the participants and lots of *cohetes*.⁸¹ A little before 9:00 am the whole group, except the ADRO members who had not yet shown up, marched from El Molino to the city's central park and somewhat challengingly stood in front of the military barracks shouting *consignas*⁸², singing with the band and shooting off more *cohetes*. They then marched about two miles, to the military post just on the outskirts of town and began climbing into waiting trucks.

The COPIN organizers were beginning to worry because the ADRO group had not shown up for the inauguration or the march. While they were loading the trucks they watched the road behind them for ADRO members.

We were watching when suddenly this huge banner appeared that says ADRO and everyone had on their ADRO T-shirts and posters that had been leftover from the ADRO annual meeting. So a real discontent started among the other organizations that had accepted going under COPIN (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

In addition, behind the ADRO group came a pickup plastered with ADRO posters, which carried a sound system in the back that ADRO quickly made clear was for its

⁸¹*Cohetes* are similar to bottle rockets and are an integral part of Lenca traditional celebrations. Religiously they are explained as being shot into the sky to get God's and the angels' attention as well as representing the prayers of the people rising to heaven. Socially, they call other potential participants to the start of an event.

⁸²The chants most commonly used were *El Pueblo Unido, Jamás será vencido* (The people united can never be defeated), *Si Lempira viviera, aquí estuviera* (If Lempira were alive, he would be here) and *Vive* (Long live)_____ (Lempira, Lencas, Yamaranguila Norte...)

members' use only. With the arrival of the large ADRO contingent it became obvious that seven trucks, each of which could hold 125 to 150 people, were not going to suffice. Xiomara, one of the COPIN organizers, was asked to contract seven more. She responded:

"Just tell me if there is money, if there isn't I'm not going." "Sure, there's money, go get them," Chevo said. [here she laughs because there really was not enough money] So I went and got them. And the drivers said, "But you will pay us, right Mariaita? You aren't going to trick us like the Nationalist party, are you?" "No," I said, "we'll pay" [she laughs again] (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

The pilgrimage finally left La Esperanza about 11:00 am led by a pickup carrying the sound system. Fourteen trucks and the ADRO pickup followed. The caravan stopped about fifteen miles down the road in Jesús de Otoro just long enough for three more trucks of Lencas, mostly members of CNTC, to load up and join the line.

Siguatopeque

About 2:00 pm they stopped in a small *barrio* just outside Siguatopeque to let six hundred Tolupan and two hundred Pech Indians join the pilgrimage.⁸³ The new group was relieved to see the caravan arrive after having waited by the road since early morning. The Lencas climbed down from their trucks about 800 meters from the waiting group and created an aisle through which danced the *guancasco*⁸⁴ to greet the Tolupanes and Pech. The parish and village leaders and the priest from the nearby

⁸³The Tolupanes were unable to raise money to pay for their own transportation. As a result they offered the local lumber mill a larger contract in return for the use of their trucks to take them to Tegucigalpa. It seems the lumber mill did not know that one of the major demands of the pilgrimage was a ban on lumbering.

⁸⁴The *guancasco* is a traditional Lenca dance used to celebrate the peace and union of two warring groups and more recently for any celebration between two villages or groups.

town of Taulabé were also waiting for the pilgrims with water and one of the families opened their home for anyone who needed to rest.

Padre Tito, the priest from Taulabé held a short service to ask for blessings on the pilgrimage. He led the group in prayer, songs, read a communique of solidarity signed by twenty-five priests and gave COPIN a check for £1,000 from the parish. A number of women and children suffering from headaches and diarrhea visited a small mobile health clinic set up by COHAPAZ.⁸⁵

Comayagua

The caravan arrived at the military post just outside Comayagua about 6:00 pm to find military officials waiting for them. "The *chaferotes* [derogatory slang for soldiers] already knew who we were...because their communication channels work fast" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

The officials asked the COPIN organizers who they were and where they were going. "We told them we were a religious pilgrimage and that we were going only as far as Comayagua. They knew that wasn't true" (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer). The soldiers also asked the truck drivers for their licenses and papers. Several did not have any because they had never before left La Esperanza. The organizers told the officials "if you detain these trucks, you're going to detain all of us, we're not moving" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer). During this time the tension in the trucks was building, especially because in the villages there had been rumors that the military would imprison all of the pilgrims in Comayagua.

The tension was broken by Miguel Zelaya on the ADRO sound system chanting "*¡El Pueblo Unido, jamás será vencido!*"⁸⁶ and other chants. Following his

⁸⁵*Comité Hondureña para la Paz* (Honduran Committee for Peace).

⁸⁶"The people united, can never be defeated."

cue, the trucks erupted in noise: the drivers began honking their horns and passengers shouted, whistled and banged on the sides of the trucks. The noise from twenty truckloads of people was electrifying.

After that the tone changed (although some of the COPIN organizers doubt that it was the result of the uproar but rather that the officials had just wanted to frighten them before letting them pass). The officials reassured them:

"...don't worry, we knew you were coming, we have orders not to let anything happen to you...we just wanted to give a little orientation to the drivers, we never thought to detain you." Then they were so agreeable because they wanted us to make trouble for the government (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer).

One half mile down the road the trucks parked and the pilgrims walked to the Catholic high school gym where another two hundred Lencas had arrived from La Paz. As soon as everyone had settled in, six priests held what participants called a beautiful mass.

Comayagua Meeting

While the majority were sleeping or at least settling in, the pilgrimage organizers were meeting in a separate room. Approximately twenty people met that night including representatives from COPIN, ADRO, CNTC, Yamaranguila Norte, the Pech, Tolupanes and Garifunas. The president of COPIN, Salvador Zúniga, presided over the meeting.

Analysis of Opportunity (*Coyuntura*)

The first item on the agenda was an analysis of opportunity intended to inform and explain how the organizers had analyzed the current political and social opportunity and developed an appropriate methodology for the pilgrimage. Those who had not participated in the planning stage were given the opportunity to ask questions and make suggestions. First, they discussed the likelihood of a military coup. Nearly

every day the newspapers and radios reported rumors of strikes and SITRATERCO, the Honduran banana workers' union had been on strike for over a month, blocking highways and burning tires and vehicles which had led to several shootings. A teachers' union and Canaan, a militant urban squatters' camp, had also recently announced strikes and political action. COPIN worried that the government:

would think it was a conspiracy to back a coup. But the military officials were intrigued. If the military took care of us it was because they supported what we were doing (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

The group reached consensus on three points. First, the leaders were going to be very clear that:

we were not going to throw Reina out, but take advantage of the situation to get the most benefit... [Second,] we agreed to be wary of the military, we weren't going to do anything radical like take over the highways or the streets...[because this would only strengthen the military's hand. Finally, the other organizations] recognized that COPIN was in charge--despite their sectarianism, they accepted it (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

Organizational Propaganda⁸⁷

Salvador then asked what other issues should be discussed:

So the UTC members come out with "We just got here and saw the car full of ADRO posters and banners." And the CODINCA people...said "if we are going as separate organizations, we'll get out our banner..." CNTC and UTC said they had their banners along too, but they had kept them folded up. So someone said, "let's decide here and now if

⁸⁷The following three sections are reconstructions/compilations of interviews with several COPIN organizers, Miguel Zelaya and participants from San Francisco de Opalaca. Each of the three agenda items was discussed for over an hour, so obviously their treatment here is summarized and neither the interviews nor the reconstruction can fully capture the anger, tension and stress caused by these discussions.

we are going to break our agreement." And that's how the conflict broke open (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer).

Salvador then restated the original decision: "We had said, what's important here isn't the saint it's the miracle. Let's sit down as members of COPIN so we don't have...any of this foolishness" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

Miguel Zelaya⁸⁸ stated that ADRO did not know of the agreement and that his members had brought the promotional materials, not him. "But if you are going to keep questioning us, we'll leave...We are one of COPIN's organizations...we were the first ones in COPIN" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

Salvador responded with an impersonal threat, "The agreement is that we respect the indigenous groups and that COPIN heads this movement and if there are some who want to leave, let them leave" (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer). Miguel began to respond but stopped to allow a *compañero* Lenca to speak. He humbly stated:

"Look, out there the people don't know anything about this mess. The problem is with the leaders of ADRO and not the people. If you leaders want to leave, then go. We, the people, are staying" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

Miguel again attempted to make a stronger threat, "Let's just go outside and ask the people..." (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer). But Salvador interrupts:

"*Compañero* Miguel, you have to be flexible, you have to respect the agreements. It isn't a good idea to go as popular organizations, because the popular organizations are in crisis and no one has any confidence in them anymore. Let's go as indigenous groups, that's how we'll

⁸⁸All of the COPIN leaders wanted to make clear their appreciation of Miguel, despite their disagreements. "We have to thank Miguel. Sometimes he is very partisan and radical but he is very decisive, he pressured for the protest against the sawmill and the pilgrimage. He gets more agitated, we are more patient, more cautious. He is impulsive and sometimes that is worth a lot" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

make an impact--as indigenous groups and a pilgrimage with horns, with the saint, that's something different" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

Finally, Miguel concedes, "'We'll take down the banner and the posters'" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

The Unified Proposal (*Planteamiento Unico*)⁸⁹

The next point they decided to address was the *planteamiento único*. ADRO was angry because the *planteamiento* they had worked on was not included in the proposal on the table at this meeting. COPIN leaders responded that ADRO had not attended any of the meetings in which they had worked on the proposal.

It was clear that the conflict between ADRO and COPIN leaders was growing:

Everyone said it was unfair that due to sectarianism or one or two people, the whole movement that had cost the communities so much was going to fall apart (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

The group continued reading and analyzing the proposal, resolving several more minor disputes in the process. "We started including more and more things" (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer). The final proposal had a total of sixty-two points. After they had finished analyzing and noting each of the points in the unified proposal the group was ready to decide by whom the proposal would be presented and signed:

CONPAH had already said there was no reason to mention COPIN or indigenous groups. Because the indigenous groups had their representative which was CONPAH--*Confederación de Pueblos Autótonas de Honduras* (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

The representatives of the Tolupanes and Pech agreed that CONPAH should represent them all. COPIN was reluctant to accept this since CONPAH had not been involved in the planning process. Other representatives questioned CONPAH's motives:

⁸⁹See Appendix 5: *Planteamiento Unico*.

We questioned what was motivating them. Because you can be motivated by two things. One, because they have a conscience, or two, because they want to benefit from the effort of others. They were an elite group, they had never spent time thinking about the problems of the indigenous groups, they just wasted time in little trips and stupid things (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

Finally, the document was signed: *LOS PUEBLOS INDIGENAS Y GARIFUNAS DE HONDURAS Y EL COMITE DE ORGANIZACIONES POPULARES DE INTIBUCA (COPIN)*.⁹⁰

Financial Report

It was after 1:00 am when Xiomara began to give the financial report. She reported that all the money previously collected had been spent and the pilgrimage was already in debt. As a result the group decided to collect funds by stopping traffic just outside of Tegucigalpa and imposing a toll on anyone who wanted to go through. They had made wooden boxes to ask for donations in Tegucigalpa and so it was decided to use these to collect the tolls. They hoped to collect between £30,000 to £50,000.

Negotiating Commission

The final item on the agenda was noting the members who would make up the negotiating commission. This should have been a quick point since the group had previously agreed that each organization or ethnic group would be allowed one representative. However, once again ADRO initiated a conflict when it insisted on including two representatives, Juan Martínez, the president and Miguel Zelaya.

The group immediately protested that only Juan Martínez should be included but Miguel was insistent that he go as well. After heated discussion the group

⁹⁰Indigenous and Garífuna Groups of Honduras and the Committee of Intibuca Popular Organizations (COPIN).

overruled Miguel and added only the name of Juan Martínez. After the meeting, the group reacted:

It was a horrible meeting. People were pounding the table, standing up, jumping up and down, turning red, I felt horrible in there. We knew that outside that room the people were tired, the accommodations weren't adequate, people were hungry and hot, and we were fighting (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

Day 3: Monday, July 10

Breakfast

Things continued to go wrong. At breakfast the following morning, the dried tamales (*tecucos*) organizers had hoped to offer pilgrims for breakfast were unwrapped and found to be rotten. A few of the braver and hungrier pilgrims ate the ones which seemed the least spoiled but thousands were dumped while many people went without food. Those with food made small fires in the park to heat tortillas and make coffee. The pilgrims left Comayagua about eight am.

Highway Toll

About 9:00 am the trucks stopped in Flores, about thirty miles outside of Tegucigalpa. The organizers quickly arranged people into several rows to stop traffic and begin collecting the highway toll. The toll was not completely voluntary given that men armed with sticks and machetes accompanied the toll-takers in order to encourage cooperation. Organizers admit "it was a not so voluntary, voluntary contribution. If people tried to give only a peso, we didn't accept it, that was too cheap" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

In order to ease some of the tension from the earlier confrontation, ADRO promoters were named as toll collectors along with a few people from Yamaranguila Norte and a few students. They started using the wooden boxes but soon discovered that the slots were too small for anything but coins, so they began to use woven bags.

This led to several problems: there were several accusations of money slipping out of the bag and into people's pockets, one bag was lost with contradictory accusations about who was responsible and the woven bags stuffed with bills led to wild guesses about the amount of money that had been collected. COPIN stated that only £5,000 had been collected, but many doubted this figure.⁹¹

After about an hour, the organizers bought two truckloads of bananas and watermelons which served as breakfast, lunch and supper for many of the participants. About 1:00 pm things began to heat up literally and figuratively when some of the toll takers broke the windshield of a car with International Mission (MI) license plates.⁹²

It was the driver's fault, he was going to drive right over them. The buses were cooperative, they stopped, opened the doors--even the executive buses. The trucks stopped, contributed and moved on. But this MI didn't want to stop. He was such a hot head. When they broke the windshield, we said "Stop! Let's go!" Imagine the consequences of instigating a conflict there--we hadn't even gotten to Tegucigalpa! (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

Just after this incident the Transit Police arrived with several members of military intelligence to warn the toll takers that they were intimidating people. One of the COPIN organizers recognized the officer in charge who has been accused of human rights abuses in the 1980s and refused to shake hands with him. Instead he

⁹¹By my calculations £5,000 seems fairly realistic. By all accounts the toll lasted about three hours and the average donation per car was about £10.00 £5,000 would result from about five hundred cars or one hundred fifty cars an hour which seems fairly accurate for the two lane highway on a Monday morning. The £30,000-£50,000 that others claim was collected would have required about three thousand to five thousand cars or about sixteen to twenty-five cars per minute, an amount that seems unrealistic. Some point out that all bus occupants donated, but they were allowed to give as little as £1.00 or £2.00 each and some did not give at all.

⁹²Most international mission licensed cars belong to embassies or international development organizations. They are often referred to as MI.

began questioning him about Moises Landaverde for whose disappearance he had been accused. "The officer began to back away saying 'I'm innocent, I'm innocent and I'm glad you remember me. We're Hondurans, we're friends and I'm innocent'" (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer).

The incident of the shattered windshield and the military visit, coupled with the heat, hunger and tension the participants were feeling, led the organizers to start moving again soon after 1:00 pm.

Zambrano

The principal organizers of the pilgrimage had left the caravan briefly during the toll-taking to go to Tegucigalpa. They rejoined the group in Zambrano and were not happy with what they saw. Two COPIN organizers were riding in the cab of a truck behind the ADRO pickup and saw "That the ADRO promotors [who were riding in the back of the pickup] were standing up and holding their posters and laughing, just trying to provoke us" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer). As a result, the organizers had a meeting in Zambrano while the people waited on the trucks.

The negotiating committee met and said [to ADRO] that if they didn't take down the posters and the banner than they had to go back. They couldn't put in danger the whole movement after it had cost so much, so much suffering, and that due to one or two people's attitude everything was lost" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

Miguel finally agreed to remove the banner and posters for the arrival of the caravan in Tegucigalpa.

Arrival in Tegucigalpa

The trucks dropped off the pilgrims in Colonia Centroamérica about 3:00 pm. The Franciscan priests were waiting near the highway with a temporary stage decorated with flowers and crepe paper. A children's choir greeted the pilgrims and they were received with water and food. The priests then held a mass for the pilgrims

and supporters from nearby high schools and neighborhoods. With this beautiful reception in Tegucigalpa, the participants finally felt that "finally everything wasn't awful" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

The pilgrims and hundreds of their supporters then walked several miles to the Congress Building occupying just one lane so as not to anger people on their way home from work whose support they might need in the future. The organizers were also realizing that the Lencas did not feel comfortable shouting protest slogans but instead preferred to march through the streets shooting off cohetes, singing songs from the Catholic social action tradition as they carried a huge painting of Lempira with them which said "*Lempira vive y viene con nosotros al final del los olvidos.*"⁹³

While the pilgrims walked through the streets, taking in the size and features of their capital and its people, the citizens of Tegucigalpa were also watching and coming away impressed with their previously unknown compatriots (a title quickly given and adopted by all the media). Popular manifestations in Honduras traditionally seek to make as much noise and disruption as possible, so those who saw this march were impressed by the quiet manner of the people, their poverty and their cultural traditions such as the way the women carried their children on their backs, dressed in bright colors with scarves over their heads and the way the men used conch shells for horns and carried bows and arrows.

⁹³The quote is based in part on a line from a poem by Roberto Soza and is a play on words signifying both the fact the indigenous groups had come from forgotten places and would be forgotten no more. Lempira was a Lenca Indian chief who led the largest Indian rebellion against the Spanish in Honduran history (see Chapter 2). The Honduran currency is also named after him. The eight feet by four feet painting was created by Salvador Zúniga's brother.

Arrival at *El Congress*

The Tegucigalpa solidarity committee had promised to have thousands of plates of food ready when they arrived, but the committee "didn't work, they had no food ready" (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer). This was due in part to the fact that the Mennonite Central Committee was the only organization which had donated food before the event started. With the arrival of the several thousand pilgrims, the committee used some of the money from the toll to buy cement blocks, firewood, huge pans, corn flour and coffee to give something to the hungry group. Women quickly began to prepare the corn and beans however, after starting the fires, boiling water, and preparing the food and coffee it was nearly midnight before most people had eaten.

Long before the food was ready, many were already trying to sleep. They arrived "incredibly tired, but the media wouldn't let them sleep, they just had to keep looking into those stupid cameras. I even insulted one and told him not to be so rude" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer). The other problem was that "there weren't enough bathrooms in central park, there were long lines of people" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer). COHAPAZ had also set up a small medical clinic to take care of the pilgrim's medical needs with natural and modern medicines and massages.

While the majority were trying to sleep or waiting in line to eat or use the bathrooms; the leaders were doing their best to satisfy the media's insatiable desire for interviews. They handed out the unified proposal and restated their demands: first, an end to all lumbering in the departments of Intibuca, La Paz and Lempira; second, eighty kilometers of road connecting Yamaranguila Norte to the rest of the country and third, a new indigenous municipality for the Lencas living in Yamaranguila Norte. Another lesser demand also received media attention--the immediate dismissal of one the vice-presidents, Juan de la Cruz Avelar, accused in the document of human right's

abuses, illegal operation of a lumber mill and illegal seizure of indigenous land and timber. The leaders also repeatedly stated that they were not going to leave until their demands had been met. After the reporters left to write their stories, COPIN leaders waited anxiously to see how the movement would be presented in the media.

Day 4: Tuesday, July 12

Early Morning

Each morning in Tegucigalpa began with prayers.

Father Victor Cortes got us up every morning at 5:00 a.m. to recite the rosary. It was hard, I tell you, with so little sleep, doing the rosary every single day, but spiritually I think it was probably the one thing that helped keep things peaceful amidst so many people. Yes, sometimes we said, 'how is it that so few bad things happened?' So many different people who had never seen each other before, who don't know what the others' intentions are (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

After prayers though, COPIN had no food to offer the pilgrims. A few purchased food and others still had a little left of what they had brought from their homes. However, ADRO had bought its leaders supper and was buying them breakfast as well. Despite the agreement that each organization would take care of its own, several people were offended that ADRO's leaders had food while the rest of the people went hungry:

...they brought food for all the leaders and promoters and the rest of the people went hungry...They had cheese, chicken, hamburgers and a car full of money... (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

But because of the agreement, no one said anything.

As soon as the morning papers came out, the pilgrimage organizers found that five of the six papers treated the pilgrimage with neutral to positive language, using terms like: indigenous, pilgrims, church and priest involvement and emphasizing the fact that it was the first time indigenous people had carried out such a march. The sixth paper had what they classified as "a horrible report" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN

organizer). It called the "pilgrimage" (a word used in quotes) an invasion of the capital, headed by worn-out leftists, that the "pilgrims" were packed into trucks like cattle, and that the toll had been like a forced tax. The article was illustrated with a picture of some of the leaders parked at a restaurant eating lunch. While COPIN organizers were disturbed by this report, it was obvious from the other five and the radio reports that the overall coverage was highly favorable.

President's Residence

At approximately 7:00 am all of the women and children marched to the President's residence to ask for an audience:

We surrounded the house. Some jokers [members of the president's security] came out saying, "The president was waiting for you at the presidential palace. Where were you?" Another security guard said to me "This woman must be Salvadoran," [implying that she must be a leftist and an agitator of the movement]. Another women said, "Eat shit, son of a bitch, What do you know? You'll soon get what's coming to you" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

There were several women with megaphones and they began to take turns speaking to the president. One speech that several people remember was given by a woman in her sixties, Doña Pascuala (villager):

"Mr. President, don't be afraid of us women, what can we do to you? You don't need these soldiers, we aren't planning to kill you or kidnap you. The only thing we want is for you to send a commission to talk with us. We haven't come to beg you for food or money, that's not why we are here. The only thing we want is for you to keep your promise. We have come only to demand our rights. Hunger is part of life for us and we have always been marginalized, no one has ever paid us any attention. Today, the time has come to talk" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

One of the women present heard a riot police say:

"It's true, What can these women do to us?" "Excuse us," they said to the women, "but since they order us..." We knew Reina was there when we arrived, but they snuck him out of the house. When we

realized it, we left. The media said the Reina was afraid of the women, because there had only been women and children there (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

Human Rights Commissioner

The Human Rights Commissioner visited the pilgrims on Tuesday morning and asked for a meeting with their representatives. It was unclear whether he was on a personal mission or had been sent by the president but after talking with the representatives he stated that he was in agreement with their request and would do what he could to convince the president to meet with the negotiating committee

First Meeting with the President

Reina did invite the commission to meet with him at 2:00 p.m. but their reception was cold:

The old man was furious, he was out of control, furious. At that time, it looked like there might be a coup. The situation was awful. According to him [Reina] we were working toward a government coup, we were going to boycott his government (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

Reina listed several reservations regarding the pilgrimage and their demands. He asked the commission if the rumors he had heard were true--that thirty nationalists (the opposition party) were financing and supporting the pilgrimage. He argued that it was not his responsibility to solve the problems brought about by five hundred years of abandonment and that there were many needy areas in Honduras and even in Tegucigalpa. He asked if the pilgrims were conspiring with the SITRATERCO union. Finally, he asked why the pilgrims had come to Tegucigalpa now, when there was such a high level of unrest in the country, was their goal to destabilize his government.

Salvador Zuniga responded to the president by stating that the rumor that there were thirty nationalists behind this pilgrimage was as true as the rumor that there were

thirty Maoists behind the president (an allusion to his reportedly strong leftist tendencies and friends). He argued that while Reina was not responsible for all the problems caused by the last five hundred years of abandonment, in his campaign he had promised a moral revolution, a human face on economic change, a power based on people power and sustainable development. Salvador emphasized that the pilgrims had come to Tegucigalpa not to beg him to meet their needs, but to demand that he keep his promises. He reminded Reina of his campaign visit to Yamaranguila Norte and his promise to build a road and approve a new municipality. Finally, he stated that the pilgrimage was not a conspiracy with any other group; not an attempt to destabilize civil government but to strengthen it by demonstrating how change could take place without violence.

Reina seemed to have been sufficiently impressed by this exchange that after briefly reviewing their proposal he named two commissions: the emergency commission, charged with overseeing and integrating the negotiations which consisted of five ministers and a congressional representative and a follow-up commission headed by the president himself and including twelve ministers or directors, each charged with negotiating one component of the agreement. The COPIN negotiating commission left the meeting wary but optimistic.

Miguel Zelaya

Despite the fact that he was not a member of the negotiating committee, Miguel Zelaya had tagged along to the meeting with Reina:

We got there, and all of the sudden Miguel Zelaya butts in, he was not a member of the commission. Everyone just stared at him, but I said, "don't say anything." When Miriam arrived, she said, "We aren't playing here...we appointed so and so and so and so to the commission. Those are the appointed ones and only they will go." And humph, he gets mad and starts to say that we are thieves and he takes

an attitude of really wanting to destabilize things (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

Ministry of Health

Tuesday afternoon the Minister of Health also asked for a meeting with the COPIN health commission:

They wanted to see how they could support us, they were afraid that cholera might break out at the Congress building. They also wanted to see our health commission and observe our internal organization. We told them about the health needs in the region, it was like a chat, because they already were going to analyze the health situation with the negotiating commission. But they helped us out with outhouses and buckets and they got the fire department to bring us drinking water, mops and bleach and donated medicines for the little clinic COHAPAZ had set up (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

Donations

The government also apparently asked other ministries to support the pilgrimage. From Tuesday afternoon on, the Sanitation and Water Commission (SANAA) kept a tanker truck of chlorinated water next to the Congress for drinking and cooking as well as fifty gallon drums for washing. They also took charge of cleaning the bathrooms⁹⁴. "Imagine, four thousand people and the bathrooms stayed clean" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

On Monday, the media had begun making appeals to Tegucigalpa's residents for donations of food, clothing and blankets. By Tuesday afternoon the donations were pouring in especially from labor unions and NGOs:

⁹⁴When the pilgrims arrived on Monday the person in charge was about to close the bathrooms for the night but instead he sought out one of the COPIN leaders and said "I support you, the only thing I ask is that you keep things good and clean, here are the keys, tell them you took over the bathrooms not that I gave them to you (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

A lot of people didn't want to help when we sent out inquiries, they didn't believe it would happen. But when they saw everything going on and the impact it had in the media, no one wanted to be left out. The majority gave between five hundred and one thousand lempiras (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

While some COPIN members reacted cynically to this belated support Suyapa believed that the organizations "were probably right--so many people asking and you don't know where it will end" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

Many high schools and departments in the universities also took up collections of money, food and clothing. COPIN members were very surprised by the number of wealthy donors, especially Honduran Palestinians who donated food and money, often anonymously despite that fact that "they had never identified themselves with a movement like this before" (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer). Agua Pura (a water-bottling company) donated thousands of bags of spring water. Pilgrimage organizers even recognized several military officials who came to donate dressed as civilians. What most impressed all of the participants, however; was the number of poor people from marginal communities around the city who came with small bags of rice or a few items of clothing. Those visits "actually embarrassed us. No one went hungry after Tuesday afternoon" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

Day's Results

In the evening the negotiating commission gave a short summary of its activities. They reviewed their meeting with Reina and explained that the Congress had drafted a proposal for the new municipality but that they had not been able to discuss it (the power went out due to electricity rationing at that time). They also explained that they had scheduled meetings with the presidential commission and several ministries for Wednesday. While their report led to some relief and excitement, everyone was very tired and there was very little late-night festivities or

even conversation. Nearly everyone tried to rest while the discipline committee kept watch.

Day 5: Wednesday, July 13

Morning

The pilgrim's restless sleep was cut short again at 5:00 am by Padre Victor calling them to morning prayers. Now that they had plenty of food, as soon as prayers were finished the women restarted the fire and began making tortillas and boiling water for coffee and beans. From Tuesday evening on, nearly all of the women participants in the pilgrimage spent about sixteen hours a day on food preparation, serving or clean-up (a few men did help with a few limited tasks). They maintained thirteen fires and prepared thousands of tortillas and hundreds of gallons of coffee for each meal. Each participant would receive a ticket (so no one could eat twice) from their village representative on the discipline committee and then would stand in line and wait for the women of their village to serve them.

The radio news and a review of the Wednesday papers confirmed what the COPIN leadership already hoped. All six of the papers now treated the pilgrimage in positive terms. The newspapers outlined the meetings between the government and the negotiating committee and several mentioned Reina's original accusation that "antidemocratic sectors" were behind the pilgrimage, but all gave much more space to his solidarity with the indigenous people who had always been "tricked and exploited." El Periódico, which published the very critical piece on Tuesday, published a veiled apology and dedicated nearly four pages (including half of the front page) to document the plight of the indigenous groups and the legitimacy of the various platforms. COPIN organizers also heard that the author of the first article was fired. El Periódico even gave out several hundred free copies of the paper to the pilgrims and published pictures of them reading it.

Clean-up

Wednesday morning the health committee led efforts to clean up their living area. Many of the Indians, unaccustomed to toilets, afraid to leave the security of the group at night and sick of the long lines had relieved themselves in the flower boxes and on the floor around the Congress building. Everyone participated in washing the whole floor and dumping garbage. About fifty people at a time went to shower at the offices of nearby NGOS. The health committee set up temporary showers with plastic, rope and the barrels of water and the Congress responded by opening several bathrooms to maintain sanitation and save the pilgrims the two block walk through unfamiliar settings.

Cultural Expressions

The pilgrims' remaining days in Tegucigalpa were filled with many cultural events. At least once a day a group of Lencas from La Campa would demonstrate the Danza del Garrobo and the Lenca band from Rio Grande would play, sing and lead others in singing throughout the day. A group from Yamaranguila had also come with the pilgrims to perform the Guancasco, the most famous of Lenca traditional dances, but "we threw them out because they were always drunk" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer). The other indigenous groups also demonstrated dances, songs, instruments and tools of their traditions. Many grade schools and high schools visited, some with donations and others with questionnaires regarding what each group ate and how they dressed. Two universities put on cultural programs and invited representatives of the different indigenous groups to speak on their campuses. The Department of Anthropology also prepared an exposition of Lenca, Tolupan, Xicaque and Misquito crafts.

Indigenous Municipality

The pilgrimage's first major success came on Wednesday afternoon. Lenca representatives were invited into the Congressional chamber and Cristobal Gonzalez, a Lenca and a COPIN organizer, was invited to speak. He began by outlining the pilgrims' principal demands, underscoring the importance of the new municipality. (Given the new municipal laws, an indigenous municipality would have a large degree of control over land use, timbering, local taxes, the appointment of local judges and subsequently, local conflict resolution.) Cristobal then listed five general recommendations which served as a critique of current political practices:

1. That politicians stop making promises they don't intend to keep.
2. That politicians carry out public works first to gain credibility instead of lying.
3. That no more "paquetazos"⁹⁵ be approved--the people don't need them.
4. That prices be reduced for farm inputs and tools for small farmers.
5. That the proposal be approved and implemented in its entirety--if not, they'll deal with us again (Cristobal Gonzalez, COPIN organizer).

Evening Events

That evening participants, feeling better rested and more comfortable in Tegucigalpa threw a party as a celebration of the approval of the new municipality:

There were improvised parties that night. The band played and students from the teachers' school came to dance with the men. Everyone was happy, the men were drenched in sweat (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer).

The band played until dawn when the priest arrived for morning mass. But the pilgrims' sleep was interrupted not only by the celebrators but also by the discipline committee.

Every night they started rumors to keep the discipline committee alert. Two times they said soldiers were going to kick us out and that

⁹⁵A derogatory term which refers to the World Bank's structural adjustment plan for Honduras.

everyone should get up and be ready to move. Another night they said some thieves had gotten in. Another night they said a participant had been kidnapped and was going to be killed (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

Once the rumor had spread it was difficult to sleep until it had been proven false because "things got so crazy" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

Day 6: Thursday, July 14

Morning

The Thursday papers were even more positive about the pilgrimage. All highlighted Cristobal Gonzalez's speech before the Congress and the approval of the new municipality. Politicians were now proudly claiming that "I represent the Lencas" and that "I have always identified profoundly with them [the Lencas] and for good reason, my own wife is originally from Intibucá" (La Tribuna, July 14). It was clear to the organizers that the media spin was strongly in their favor.

Stress

However, the situation at the Congress building was deteriorating. The stress of the pilgrimage was beginning to affect the participants and by early Thursday afternoon:

some participants began to see visions and to hear things, two went crazy and wanted to throw themselves from the Congress building. The people from COHAPAZ got them under control, they gave them shots and massages and brought them to an office to rest (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

The participants have several explanations for these stress-related problems. First of all, the uncertainty of their situation made many of the pilgrims anxious. They were unsure how long they were going to need to stay in Tegucigalpa, whether they were going to be successful or if any unknown dangers still awaited them. In addition, a constant stream of media, students, politicians and passerbys stared and asked

questions. "People look at us as if we were aliens from another planet, they expected to see us nude and they asked so many questions" (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer).

It is difficult to imagine the stress it must have caused these people to leave their small villages which were miles from the nearest road, without electricity, running water or even latrines to arrive in a city of nearly a million people filled with vehicles, noise and smoke. Most of the pilgrims had also heard stories of Tegucigalpa criminals who would torture them and steal their money or their children if they were not careful. The strain of meetings, lack of sleep and poor nutrition were taking an understandable toll on the participants.

Mass in the Metropolitan Cathedral

Thursday afternoon, the vicar, Father Pedro Drowin, officiated a mass in the Metropolitan Cathedral. According to newspaper reports "the indigenous groups filled the cathedral to listen to the priest's message, because according to them, this service signified a historical event" (El Heraldo, July 15).

In the past, "the Indian was not allowed to enter church, because they were idolaters, due to their pagan rituals" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer). Understanding this history makes it clearer why when the highest officials in the Catholic church in Honduras open the most important churches for the Lencas and officiate a special mass for the Lencas "the people who went into church felt that it was an accomplishment that they couldn't explain, like a spiritual achievement" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer) or as a newspaper hails it, a "historical event."

Evening

Thursday night the negotiating commission did report to the group. Although they still had many details to work out with the government and still worried about political maneuvering--the commission believed that it was all almost resolved. They

hoped that the pilgrims would be on the road home on Saturday. Cheers of relief and joy went up from the crowd. This report and the subsequent reduction in stress resulted in the most enthusiastic partying since the pilgrims had left La Esperanza.

Day 7: Friday, July 15

Morning Routine

On Friday morning the routine was much the same but the atmosphere was notably different. All the participants were confident that this would be their last day in Tegucigalpa.

After breakfast the negotiating commission left to work out what they hoped would be the final details of the government agreements. While they were working, the rest of the pilgrims were more relaxed. Many of the young men organized mini soccer matches and an NGO arrived to paint with the smaller children although many mothers needed repeated assurances from the COPIN organizers that their children would not be kidnapped if allowed to participate.

In the afternoon, participants grew more relaxed. Several beauty schools sent their students to give free haircuts to any interested pilgrim and as a result many young men went back to the village with fashionable "skater" and "mushroom" cuts. All of these events were entertainment for the pilgrims, the media and its audience.

Signing the Agreement

Late Friday afternoon the pilgrims heard, via radio, that the president and the negotiating commission had signed the "Action Plan of the Presidential Emergency Commission." Since the new municipality had already been approved, the forty-two point plan outlined the government's strategy to meet the vast majority of the rest of the pilgrims' demands. SECOPT (Ministry of Communications, Public Works and Transportation) outlined their plan to immediately begin a study for road construction and repair in six indigenous regions. They also stated their intention to begin

construction of the road in San Francisco de Opalaca by September 15. COHDEFOR (The Honduran Corporation for Forestry Development) declared a state of emergency in the departments of Intibuca, La Paz and Lempira which imposed a temporary ban on all lumbering activities. They also promised that by August 30 they would rule on the thirty-year ban on lumbering, investigate four major lumber mill owners (one of whom was the previously mentioned vice-president to Reina), and begin creating a regional plan for reforestation and social forestry. Other projects included several health centers, new schools, a radio-telephone as well as water systems and latrines. The government also promised to create investigative commissions to inquire into the murder and disappearance of twenty-one Tolupan leaders and the accusations of corruption against the Governor of Intibucá as well as commissions to promote the titling of indigenous lands and the protection of Misquito lobster divers (See appendix 6 for the complete plan).

Reina also agreed to supply transportation to take all of the pilgrims back to their villages. And in a decision that magnified the pilgrims' powerful sense of both the spiritual and social significance of their pilgrimage--both the Catholic church and the president invited all of the indigenous groups to a Thanksgiving Mass in Honduras' holiest church, the Basílica which houses the Virgin of Suyapa.

Celebration

As soon as the pilgrims heard the radio reports of the signing, they began celebrating and when the negotiating commission arrived an hour later to read the agreement, the music, dancing and celebrating began in earnest.

ADRO Incident

Yet another conflict with ADRO later in the evening slightly marred the festivities for the COPIN organizers. By Friday evening,

There were so many donations, they had piled up. It was a pile bigger than the IHDER office [about 15 ft. by 30 ft.]. We decided that the coordinator of each committee would take some and pass things out in his community. Miguel and a young woman interrupted and said, "Well, if this belongs to the people, we have to give it to them." And they started to throw things around like candy and the people went crazy, it was really horrible. How embarrassing--fighting for old clothes like they were desperate! Some people took more, some less, The media and their cameras were right there. Thank God they didn't report anything about what happened. Miriam Miranda got angry and went to him [Miguel]. The commission made it clear to him that he had to stop. Miguel said COPIN was going to steal it...that Bertita y Suyapa were selling clothes and shoes (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

The COPIN organizers admit that they were not planning on distributing all of the clothing before they left:

We wanted to put it in storage so we could hand it out equally to everyone and use it in the future in workshops and training. What was left was in CODINCA for about a month. There were blankets, food and mattresses. Now it's in Monteverde (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

Despite this incident, or perhaps in part because of it since everyone now had some new clothes, Friday evening's celebration was the biggest and the best of the pilgrimage. Everyone was celebrating their success: the negotiating commission, the pilgrims, the media and many visitors including politicians, students, the curious and reportedly even several prostitutes. The music, singing and dancing lasted all night.

Day 8: Saturday, July 16

Morning

Those who had slept rose excitedly for morning prayers and then began packing their belongings. The transportation that the president had arranged was to pick them up from the Basílica, so they needed to carry all of their belongings with them. Everyone was returning with a few new possessions--donated clothing, food,

newspapers, shoes and perhaps a small item purchased for those who stayed behind. They carefully packed all of these treasures into woven bags or flour sacks and watched over them carefully in all the commotion.

Mass in the Basilica de Suyapa

After breakfast, everyone⁹⁶ began the three mile walk to the Basflica. They walked as they had when they arrived; singing, chanting occasionally and otherwise silently observing both the wonders and the unpleasantness of the capital and its population. They marched slowly so that everyone, including the women with children could keep up. The president was just entering from the side door when the last of the pilgrims were filing in singing "we come in singing to the Lord...when suddenly panic broke loose. The pilgrims, in a panic, started to run and exit the church so they would not be caught" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer) A Xicaque pilgrim had taken out his machete and begun to attack people left and right with his machete:

The injured were falling bleeding to the floor inside the cathedral. Their screams for help and the cries of their family members upon discovering their relatives lying on the floor became the song of entrance to the mass (El Heraldo, July 18).

Seven people were seriously injured before several other pilgrims managed to subdue the attacker.⁹⁷ Several participants are convinced that the assailant was hired by

⁹⁶A few members of the discipline commission did stay behind to guard the food, pans, mattresses etc... that had been bought or donated for COPIN. This led to the last conflict with ADRO, whose members waited until the COPIN organizers had left and then filled up their pickup with corn, sugar, mattresses and pans. The members of the discipline committee did not stop them because the ADRO representatives said they had bought those items and had the receipts to prove it.

⁹⁷The seven people who were seriously injured were: 1. Domingo López Pérez of San Fransisco de Opalaca. His cranium was fractured. He was in a coma for several days and was hospitalized for twenty-two days. 2. Jesús Manueles Rodriguez of San Fransisco de Opalaca. He was also wounded in the head, had a collapsed lung and was in the hospital for twenty days. 3. Israel Méndez Dominguez of San Francisco

landed interests to disrupt the pilgrimage, while others believe that he was suffering from stress and possibly alcohol or drugs:

The mass quickly resumed.

The priests handled it very well, as if nothing had happened. They had the blood cleaned up while they gave the mass and calmed people down. If they had started to mourn along with the people it would have been worse. Seeing their strength, as representatives of the church, helped people a lot (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer).

Padre Ovidio Rodriguez:

classified the indigenous people as inheritors of the past and heroes of the present, of a present marked by profound crisis which is the inheritance of past governments. It's noteworthy that the doors to two powers of the State have opened to walk along side the indigenous people, and they should do the right thing so that the generations of the twentieth century do not condemn them because this pilgrimage is a historic gesture, to the extent that they have left everything behind to come to claim that which belongs to them. Their presence here is not to pressure but to sensitize the Honduran people (El Heraldo, July 18).

President Reina, after the mass apologized publicly for his initial doubts about the pilgrimage. He stated:

You did not come in opposition to the government, but to claim your rights and the government will uphold those rights (El Heraldo, July 18).

"We no longer have to speak of cold wars, the left, communism--the pilgrimage was none of these things, it was an authentic, pure movement. No other sector has motivated it. It was their own initiative and we must respect it. Everyone has the right to mobilize" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer).

de Opalaca was cut in the arm, leg and neck (almost severing his jugular). 4. Sergio Bautista from San Marcos de la Sierra was hit in the foot and leg while protecting a woman and a child. 5. María Estefana González from Azacualpa, Intibucá had her mouth split open. 6. Doroteo Gómez of Azacualpa, Intibuca had her ear severed but very calmly stated, "I already know I'm wounded, I can see my blood'" (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer). They were alive because God willed.

"As the saying goes: 'there is no path, it is made by walking' and they have come to show us what our obligations are and I have sincerely accepted their teaching as someone receiving the eucharist. We Indians are men of honor. I learned from my elders to keep my word, I have never lied to my people, be assured that what I have promised will be law." The president promised to go with his wife to inaugurate the road in the north of Yamaranguila and he congratulated the people for the intelligent, peaceful and Christian manner in which they had come to the capital, demonstrating their humility and he wished them a happy return with God to their homes (El Heraldo, July 18)

After the mass, Reina broke through his ring of security guards and shook hands with hundreds of the pilgrims. This act particularly impressed the pilgrims after the violence which had just taken place and after later hearing that *Radio America*, a popular radio station, had received an anonymous call during the mass threatening more violence against the pilgrims and the president. The mass marked both the highest and lowest point of the pilgrimage for many of the participants.

Transportation

After the mass, the vehicles President Reina had arranged to bring the pilgrims home began to arrive. The first vehicles to arrive were dump trucks and the Tolupanes said "we're going first" and they climbed aboard the trucks for an uncomfortable ride. However the Lencas had the last laugh, since as the Tolupanes were leaving a series of luxury buses pulled up. In all President Reina had arranged fifty-five governmental vehicles, including twenty-two buses to return the pilgrims to their homes.

Summary

The story of the pilgrimage has demonstrated some of the costs and risks involved in participating in the pilgrimage which included the risk of violent confrontation, the costs of leaving family and fields for indefinite period to fears of going without food or not being able to find a bathroom. This story also highlighted

the achievements of the pilgrimage, which were far from certain when the participants left their homes. The running conflict with ADRO and other organizations also substantiate that the mobilization process, even for an eight day event, is a continual process. Finally, this chapter has begun to illustrate the importance of concepts such as **framing** of the event, the centrality and power of spirituality to the pilgrimage, and COPIN's use of coercion against the government and ADRO. These concepts, their role in the mobilization for the pilgrimage and their implications will be further developed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 5: MOBILIZATION FOR THE PILGRIMAGE

How were over four thousand indigenous people mobilized for a pilgrimage which could promise at best uncertain benefits and at worst the more certain costs of leaving families, fields and homes, the risks of wasting precious time, violence or even death? And what insights does this case give to the more general question of how villagers are mobilized to participate in risky and costly but potentially beneficial activities.

Those seeking to mobilize participants for the pilgrimage needed to overcome several obstacles. They had to downplay the perceived risks and costs while making the benefits appear as attractive and certain as possible. In addition, because the principal goals of the pilgrimage were communal, that is they would be shared by all independent of their participation, the organizers had to address the free-rider problem. Mancur Olson, in *The Logic of Collective Action*, argues that:

unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests* (p.2, italics in original).

Olayo Gómez (villager) stated the free-rider problem like this: "The problem was that many people wanted to see the road built, at no cost to themselves."

Two models of the mobilization process currently dominate the development literature. The "rationality model" stresses the importance of taking into account the villagers' calculations of factors such as costs, benefits and risks which often differ significantly from those of the project's designers. If villagers fail to participate, this model argues that the designers failed to factor in some crucial aspect of villagers' rationality. The "participation model" argues that villagers' involvement translates into more appropriate and appealing project goals and methods as well as a sense of ownership and efficacy which fosters continuing involvement. If villagers fail to

participate, this model argues that it is because they did not have sufficient participation/control in the process.

Through my examination of the pilgrimage, the events which followed and the development literature, I recognized several shortcomings of the two dominant mobilization models. The rationality model is overly cognitive, failing to recognize the role of factors such as social relationships and emotions in mobilizing villagers despite the free-rider phenomena. It also fails to take into account that cognitive considerations such as costs, benefits and risks are socially constructed and not absolute. The participation model treats the mobilization process largely as a black box, failing to explore **how** villagers are mobilized and the role of participation in the mobilization process. The participation model also promotes a more-is-better approach, failing to explore whether participation may have a threshold level after which increasing participation may decrease mobilization. Finally, given the fact that the participation model argues that increasing local participation in the design and implementation of the project is the means to increasing involvement, external knowledge and experience are often marginalized.

In this chapter, I will present a model which both contradicts and improves on the two dominant models. I believe that the villagers' participation in the pilgrimage and subsequent events is best explained by a "mobilization model" which incorporates the strengths of the previous two models as well as recent social movement research. The mobilization model claims that villagers were mobilized for the pilgrimage and subsequent events in the context of social networks and on the basis of relationships and frames. The framing of these events needed to gain the sympathies of potential participants, which was most likely to occur if the frame was constructed with local participation and took into account factors such as local rationality, history, economics and spirituality. The strength of the relationships between villagers and organizers also

influenced the amount of costs and risks villagers were willing to tolerate for uncertain benefits. The strength of these relationships was also influenced by villagers' participation in the planning process as well as historical, economic and spiritual factors. Finally, socially constructed networks overcame the free-rider phenomena by providing the context within which members constructed, discussed and evaluated frames, applied and received incentives and ultimately made their individual but highly influenced decision about whether or not to participate (or continue participating). If the networks failed to mobilize potential participants, this mobilization model argues that they were not sympathetic with the framing of the event and/or did not have sufficiently strong relationship of trust and respect with the organizers.

In addition to incorporating the strengths of the other two models, this model attempts to overcome their shortcomings. The mobilization model recognizes both the rationality of villagers as well as the influence of factors such as social relationships. This model also specifies the role of participation and external knowledge in the decision-making process: to strengthen frames and relationships. A participation threshold would exist if increasing participation weakened frames and/or relationships. Finally, this mobilization model also recognizes the social construction of both the project, its costs, risks, benefits as well as village factors such as history, economics and spirituality.

Before beginning the analysis I will briefly explain the structure of these last three chapters. This chapter focuses principally on answering the question of how individuals were mobilized for the pilgrimage. I will begin by citing and discussing several local explanations and then develop the mobilization model. Chapter 6 will outline the eighteen month period that followed the pilgrimage and demonstrate the continuing relevance of the mobilization model to the more "everyday" mobilizations

which followed the pilgrimage. Chapter 7 will use the mobilization model to both question and expand current development theory and practice.

Village Variation

As I stated in Chapter 1, I originally intended to explain the mobilization for the pilgrimage by comparing San Francisco de Opalaca, where the vast majority of the participants lived, to one of the neighboring regions which had low participation. However, I soon discovered that there was great variation in participation within San Francisco de Opalaca. In some villages nearly every household was represented while in other villages no one participated. Given the commonalities between neighboring villages and the nearly universal desire for a road and their own municipality, what could explain the different levels of participation? I believed exploring this question would give insight into the question: how were over four thousand indigenous people mobilized for a pilgrimage which could promise at best uncertain benefits and at worst the more certain costs of leaving families, fields and homes, the risks of wasting precious time, violence or even death?

I began by asking the villagers how *they* explained the differences between the village's level of participation in the pilgrimage. Their initial explanations and a summary of our discussions and conclusions regarding the explanatory power of each follow below in order of the frequency with which they were mentioned.

Initial Local Explanations

1. **Food shortage and sickness:** *People from San Gonzalo⁹⁸ did not participate*

⁹⁸Note: I have chosen to create two composite villages. One, which I will call San Bernardo, will describe the ten villages in the region which had high levels of participation (averaging .51 participants per household) and the other, San Gonzalo will describe the ten villages with low levels of participation (averaging .19 participants per household). I have chosen to do this for two reasons. First, the reader will not have to juggle the names of twenty-one villages and their level of

in the pilgrimage because they did not have enough food or because many of them were sick.

While everyone I talked with agreed that these two excuses were valid in a few individual cases, no one in San Gonzalo or San Bernardo believed that there was any significant variation in corn supply or sickness between the villages. Most also agreed that those who really wanted to go had made arrangements such as leaving a son home to earn enough to feed the family or asking a neighbor to watch a sick child. These two explanations seem to have been primarily face-saving devices for those who did not participate in a costly and risky activity from which they were now benefitting:

There was a lack of grain in the whole area because of the dry summer--the corn stayed small. But it was the same all over, that's not why some villages stayed behind (Ilario Garcia, villager). That a whole village stayed behind because they were sick is unbelievable. There is no village where everyone is sick (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

2. **Emotional states or personal character:** *People from San Gonzalo did not participate in the pilgrimage because they were lazy, complacent and fearful.* Villagers in San Bernardo often leveled this criticism when I inquired about the lack of participation in San Gonzalo. However, before the pilgrimage it had been those in San Gonzalo who criticized those planning on participating for being lazy beggars who must have time and money to waste if they could afford to go to Tegucigalpa. No one, when pressed, was willing to label a village in the region as either lazier or more hard-working than another (although they would nearly always mention individuals or groups within a village that had such a reputation). "Almost every village is the same. There isn't one harder working or lazier than another. Within every village there are hard workers and lazy people" (Bernardo Bejarano, villager). The fear-provoking

participation and second, it also saves the villages from being forever remembered (in print at least) as low or high participation villages.

rumors about the risks and costs of the pilgrimage were prevalent throughout the region. It seems that in each village there existed fear, complacency and even laziness but it is unclear why this "spirit" seems to have won the day in some villages, or groups within villages, and not in others.

3. **Distance and Information:** *People from San Gonzalo did not participate in the pilgrimage because it was too far or they did not know enough details about the pilgrimage.*

This explanation was given by leaders of two of the most distant villages which did not participate and is supported by the data. The ten villages closest to Togopala (the closest village accessible by road and the point from which pilgrims were loaded onto trucks) averaged .50 participants per household and the ten most distant villages averaged .21 participants per village (see Table 5.1). However, the question remains as to why did the more distant villages have lower participation? The problem does not seem to be a lack of information. Leaders in all of the villages admit that they knew the basic information about the pilgrimage--they all received invitations to meetings and the pilgrimage and nearly all of them heard the daily COPIN radio program. Neither does the difficulty of the trip offer a sufficient explanation of the variation. For while the distance may have impeded the elderly and women with children, nearly all of the men regularly walked this distance or further to find salaried labor, to buy and sell products or to carry out business in Yamaranguila. Also contradicting this explanation, two of the most distant villages (El Pinal and Santa Maria) had high levels of participation and a two of the closest villages (Lajitas and La Unión) had low levels. This relationship between distance and participation will be further discussed in the mobilization model which follows.

4. **Wealth:** *People from San Gonzalo did not participate because they are too poor.* This explanation is mentioned often in the mobilization literature as a key

Table 5.1: Summary of Survey Data--20 Villages in San Francisco de Opalaca

	# Houses	# People	Type of House		Political Party		# of Participants in		Attend Church		
			Adobe	Mud Sticks	National Liberal	Toma Pilgrimage	Pilgrims/ Household				
Regional Totals	1124	5599	6%	35%	57%	40%	58%	296	419	39%	85%
Hi Participation Villages	640	3159	4%	32%	61%	43%	54%	226	329	51%	86%
Lo Participation Villages	484	2440	8%	37%	53%	36%	62%	70	90	19%	82%
Lo Distance Villages	633	3185	6%	33%	59%	50%	48%	236	316	50%	86%
Hi Distance Villages	491	2414	6%	36%	55%	28%	71%	60	103	21%	82%
Households with Participants	326	1700	10%	39%	48%	34%	63%	220	419	130%	96%
Households w/o Participants	798	3899	4%	33%	61%	43%	55%	71	0	0%	79%

Table 5.1: (Continued)

Practice	% Literate	Land Cultivated per hshld	Land Uncultivated per hshld	coffee/hshld	Large Animals per hshld	Months of Day Labor per hshld
<i>Compostura</i>						
38%	53%	1 (mz)	5.2 (msz)	0.46 (mzs)	0.52	3.4
36%	51%	1.1	5.4	0.33	0.43	3.2
39%	56%	1	4.3	0.63	0.65	3.6
37%	50%	1.1	5.8	0.31	0.5	3.2
38%	58%	0.95	3.8	0.65	0.56	3.6
30%	61%	1.2	6.2	0.46	0.72	2.3
40%	50%	1	4.4	0.44	0.43	3.9

factor in participation, however, it was never mentioned by villagers and although I brought it up often, no villagers could see any correlation between a village's wealth and its participation. Within each village there is a positive relationship between wealth and participation. participant households had on average better housing, higher literacy rates, more cows and pack animals, worked less as day laborers and had slightly more cultivated land and land dedicated to coffee production. However, at the village level this relationship breaks down. Coffee plantations are the most common measure of wealth and the plantations of high participation villages averaged half the size (.33 mzs⁹⁹/household) of those of low participation villages (.63 mzs/household). High participation villages also averaged fewer cows and pack animals (.43 per household) than low participation villages (.65 per household). These two measures seem to demonstrate a correlation between a village's wealth and non-participation. However, high participation villages averaged slightly more land in cultivation (1.1 mzs/household) and less time working as day laborers (3.3 months/household) than low participation villages (.99 acres/household and 3.5 months/household). As a result, neither villagers nor the data can demonstrate any clear correlation between a village's wealth and their participation in the pilgrimage (see Table 5.1). This seems to demonstrate that within each village those with slightly more resources were more likely to participate, but the village's overall wealth is a poor predictor of the variation in village participation.

The Mobilization Model

Given the relative weakness of these initial local explanations of the mobilization for the pilgrimage, I began to search for other factors. In the following

⁹⁹Opalacans' primary unit of land measure is the *manzana* which is roughly equivalent to two acres.

section I will develop and demonstrate the power of the mobilization model which resulted from that search. The mobilization model claims that villagers were mobilized for the pilgrimage and the subsequent events in the context of social networks and on the basis of relationships and frames.

At its most basic level, this model argues that potential participants were mobilized through their social networks if: 1) the framing of the event gained their sympathy and 2) their social network, and especially the network leaders, supported participation. The network leaders participated if: 1) the framing of the event had gained their sympathy and 2) they had a sufficiently strong relationship with the pilgrimage organizers. As mentioned above, each of these factors was influenced by local participation, rationality, history, economics and spirituality. I will now develop the four principal elements of the model: frames, networks, participation and relationships.

Frames

The concept of frames is used in similar manner in various disciplines and in everyday language. It is based on the assumption that "social reality is complex enough to allow for completely different interpretations of what is going on..." (Klandermans, 1988:175). Below, the authors who first applied the concept of frames to social movements, Snow and Benford, give their definition of the term as well as a short history of the concept.

[Framing] has not only found its way into sociology, primarily through the work of Goffman (1974), but has also been used in psychiatry (Bateson, 1972), the humanities (Cone, 1968), and cognitive psychology (Minsky, 1975; Piaget, 1954)...Throughout these works the basic referent for the concept of frame is essentially the same: it refers to an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the "world out there" by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one's present or

past environment...they also function simultaneously as modes of attribution and articulation (1992:136-137).

Social movement organizers attempt to construct a collective action frame which will punctuate, encode, attribute and articulate in a manner which will mobilize people to participate in their movement.

I will highlight three characteristics of the concept of frames found in the social movement literature. First, frames are constructions, and as constructions, or ways of organizing thinking, "one should not ask whether they are true or false...but about their usefulness in increasing understanding and their economy and inclusiveness in providing a coherent explanation of a diverse set of facts" (Gamson 1992:71).

Secondly, as constructions, frames are both given and made, reflecting ideology and agency, society and the individual. There is a tension between the passive and structured on the one hand, and the active and structuring on the other. Experiences are framed but I frame my experience. However, it is important to underscore the importance of human agency in constructing both frames and for that matter ideology. "Movement organizations and actors actively engage in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists and bystanders" (Snow and Benford, 1992:136).

Finally, frames are contested. Competing frames, and their proponents continually seek to demonstrate their superiority and thus win a group's minds and hearts. "Beliefs are contested, refuted, reformulated and defended within as well as between groups" (Klandermans, 1992:84). This contestation results in frames which are dynamic, ever-changing to respond to both new data, new attacks and new opportunities.

The challenge for social movement organizers is to replace the dominant frame which supports non-mobilization, with a mobilization frame which will demonstrate

the need to participate in the movement. Several authors have also outlined the necessary components of such a mobilization frame (Snow and Benford, 1988). Many authors agree (Klandermans, 1988; Mc Adam et al, 1992; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Gamson, 1992) that the frame must clearly identify some injustice. "Activists employ collective action frames to punctuate or single out some existing social condition or aspect of life and define it as unjust, intolerable, and deserving of corrective action" (Snow and Benford, 1992:137).

The frame must also assign blame for the injustice, convincingly "identifying culpable agents, be they individuals or collective processes or structures" (Snow and Benford, 1992:137). Piven and Cloward highlight how difficult it may be for "large numbers of men and women who ordinarily accept the authority of their rulers and the legitimacy of institutional arrangements [to] come to believe in some measure that these rulers and these arrangements are unjust and wrong" (1977:3).

Thirdly, the frame must provide both the hope that the injustice can be righted as well as outlining a plan of action. Piven and Cloward also underscore the difficulty for "people who are normally fatalistic,...[to] begin to assert "rights" which imply demands for change, ...[and] people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless to come to believe that they have some capacity to alter their lot" (1977:4). In addition to giving people hope and a sense of efficacy, the frame must convince the potential participants that the plan is their best possible option, that it can potentially succeed, that the benefits outweigh the costs, and that their participation is necessary (an important element in overcoming the free-rider phenomena).

Finally, all of these components must be put together in a form which resonates with the potential participants. The organizers must "articulate and align a vast array of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and meaningful fashion" (Snow and Benford, 1992:137-8).

Several other social movement theorists have focused attention on organizers who are able to develop and disseminate collective action frames. Tarrow (1991) calls them "people who dare" while Olson (1971) and Popkin (1979) call them "political entrepreneurs." These entrepreneurs are extremely insightful innovators who can read the social and political environment and then define the injustice, assign blame and give hope in a way which resonates with potential participants. In addition, as Tarrow's term suggests, they are willing to challenge authority in manners which others would not or could not imagine. While none of the authors are promoting a "great-man" theory of history (and it is worth noting that they seldom work alone), they do recognize the mobilization power of creative, innovative, credible and capable "people who dare." According to Popkin, "When a peasant makes his [or her] personal cost-benefit calculations about the expected returns on his own inputs, he is making subjective estimates of the credibility and capability of the organizer[s], 'the political entrepreneur[s],' to deliver" (1979:259).

The Role of Frames in the Pilgrimage

The frames promoting participation in the pilgrimage built on the mobilization frames from the Toma del Aserradero. The mobilization frames for the Toma del Aserradero were relatively simple because participants thought they were going to a workshop for which there were few perceived costs/risks. The arguments in favor of participation were economic (the value of the road), environmental (ending all logging in the region and gaining permission to cut down the trees they needed) and historical (the broken political promises). The arguments against participation were economic and emotional (participation was a waste of time, the participant could better stay home and work).

The pilgrimage's mobilization frame began to take shape during the COPIN meetings and under the guidance of Salvador Zúniga, COPIN's principal political

entrepreneur. With each decision regarding problems, goals, methods and logistics; the leaders would discuss advantages and disadvantages. Arguments and decisions were often made by citing local history, spirituality or economics, telling jokes or mocking counter-arguments. After the meeting, it was the leaders' responsibility to explain the decision to their villages, answer questions and defend against attacks--often repeating and adding onto the frames developed in the meeting. One of the village leaders, Felix Rodriguez, told me that "God inspired us because sometimes we hadn't even thought of a certain argument or story but the words were there." COPIN's daily radio program also supported the leaders by giving them new elements of the frame and helping to win the sympathy of other listeners. Through the COPIN and village meetings and the COPIN radio program a mixture of problems, goals, methods, stories, jokes and even mockery came to make up the frames supporting the pilgrimage.

The challenges to those framing the pilgrimage are outlined above in the literature review--to construct a frame which defined an injustice, assigned blame, minimized the costs and risks while maximizing the appeal and the perceived chances of success of the pilgrimage's goals. COPIN took on the first two tasks before the Toma del Aserradero, and the region's history and present conditions provided excellent raw material. Since the time of the *Primeros Luchadores* the region was clear about its most pressing problems: the road and the need for their own municipality. While residents of the region had always considered their approaches to politicians as requests, COPIN argued that given the many broken political promises and their poverty, the people of the region had a *right* to a road and their own municipality. And while in the past the government with its political agents was viewed as the only agent capable of granting their requests, COPIN targeted politicians with the blame for the region not having received the services that were its

right. This framing was bound to anger local authorities and was as a result, politically dangerous. COPIN also argued that after waiting for so many years, their best option was to take their demands directly to Tegucigalpa.

The following are the many themes the organizers used to create a frame which they hoped would displace the dominant frame and motivate listeners to participate in the pilgrimage. Given the participation of village leaders and COPIN organizers, the perceived costs and risks, the free-rider danger, as well as the increasingly vocal opposition, it is understandable that the frame in favor of participation became increasingly sophisticated. The number of arguments rallied to support the pilgrimage and the degree of enthusiasm in any one village, depended on the leaders' sympathy with the frame and their relationships with COPIN.¹⁰⁰

Pro-mobilization Frame

The first four themes are in what I believe is their order of importance, based on how often they were mentioned and my own observations. The last four seem of relatively equal importance.

- 1) **Economic:** Village leaders argued that the road guaranteed an increase in the speed and a decrease in the costs of moving people and products in and out of the region. With the road it would be easier and cheaper to buy fertilizer, seed, food and clothing and villagers could produce and sell at a better price potatoes, coffee, *dulce* and other cash crops. A separate municipality would

¹⁰⁰I have opted to group the arguments to demonstrate the breadth of themes used to promote participation and their counter-arguments. But in doing so I realize that I have lost some of the emotion and energy from quoting at length from one or two leaders who demonstrate how they constructed and defended their frame while attacking others. I hope that the reader will consider the emotion and skill involved in constructing these arguments. It is also important to note that what follows is the **internal** mobilization frame. Very different frames were developed to mobilize support from external agents such as the media and the general public.

also decrease the many costs of soliciting and handling official paperwork as well as increase the governmental support to region. "We asked, What do you prefer, to spend fifteen days at the Congress building, or spend another fifty years hauling corn on your back? (Entimo Vásquez, villager).

- 2) **Spiritual:** By naming the event a pilgrimage, the leaders were tapping into the strong faith and spirituality of the people, implying that participation was a spiritual responsibility and would entail spiritual benefits. Leaders, especially those who were *delegados*, argued that God did not want them to remain poor and that they must demand their rights. They quoted passages such as James 4:27 "faith without works is dead," and argued that "Christians can't spend all their time in church praying, they have to be tending to the needs of others" (Felix Rodriguez, villager). The promised participation of many priests and nuns was very important to mobilizing many. "Some people said, 'if the priests are going, we won't be killed, that would be too much trouble.' Others said, 'if the priests go, we're going too'" (Entimo Vásquez, villager). "People believed that it was like having the Word of God leading. So, if God was leading, things would get solved" (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).
- 3) **Resources¹⁰¹:** During some of my interviews I asked how many people they believed would have participated if certain resources were absent. All agreed that nearly no one would have gone if they had not had the support of an outside organization which they believed had sufficient contacts, was capable

¹⁰¹Following McCarthy and Zald (1988) many social movement theorists limit resources to money and labor. However, it is clear that the residents of San Francisco de Opalaca were equally concerned about the availability of other resources such as leadership abilities, information and political connections.

of negotiating with the government and in whom they believed they could trust:

A lot of people had doubts, they asked, "Who are we going with? Who are the directors..." We said that COPIN had ways of raising money...and that they were already in Tegucigalpa setting up meetings in Congress and with the President. (Some of these things we made up in order to encourage people) (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

The support of ADRO, other well known organizations and several priests was extremely helpful in establishing the confidence (transfer of trust) that COPIN had the necessary resources. The spiritual framing of the event, especially the support and participation of priests, as well as the availability of transportation were also seen as essential resources to mobilizing the region. Food, lodging and the support of other ethnic groups were seen as less than essential.

- 4) History¹⁰²: Leaders contended that the unfulfilled political promises showed the futility of waiting for politicians to resolve their problems, the injustice in the current situation and the right of the people to demand the fulfillment of the promises. The land titling process and the Toma del Aserradero were also cited as demonstrating that "together we can do anything. Because during the Toma we humiliated the police and knocked down the gate. We showed that in unity there is strength." (Felix Rodriguez, villager).
- 5) Potential Participants as Moral Leaders: Leaders characterized potential participants as having paid their dues to society (taxes, military service and voting) but not yet having received their corresponding rights. The pilgrims were self-sacrificing individuals who would travel to Tegucigalpa, suffer

¹⁰²See Chapter 2 for a fuller treatment of Lenca history and its influence on the pilgrimage.

whatever cost, to right this injustice. "By doing our duty, we had the right to expect them to keep their promises and we went to Tegucigalpa to get what was due us" (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

- 6) **Adventure:** The leader sought to entice those on the fence by claiming that everyone should visit Tegucigalpa at least once in their life and that they should take advantage of the free transportation, food and lodging. To the young and adventurous they also stressed the excitement of both the pilgrimage and Tegucigalpa. Those who had been present in the Toma del Aserradero had also experienced the power and excitement of disrupting the authority structure.
- 7) **Environment:** The leaders asserted that the pilgrimage would bring an end to all logging in the region and allow them to control their own forest resources.

We said the pilgrimage was to kick out the sawmill, that people should look at the disaster in Ojo de Agua where there aren't even any birds left and still we got nothing when they sold that land. We cared for the forests and in Yamaranguila the mayor gets all the money and we don't even get a thank-you (Medardo Gómez Sánchez, villager).

- 8) **Social Arguments:** Leaders cited the pain involved in carrying out a sick loved one for many hours in a hammock only to have them die before reaching the hospital. They also stated (and often exaggerated) the large number of people, including women and children, who were participating from other villages, other regions and other ethnic groups. They then asked "Why should others go and not us?" (Santana Gómez, villager). Men, women and children all needed to participate because leaders argued,

We adults aren't good examples with our arms at our sides...the children should go representing the poverty we live in and the women to demand their rights, not just men are important...The

government will take us more seriously if the women and children go (Eulecteria Gómez, villager).

Anti-mobilization Frame

The pilgrimage was framed differently by those opposed to it or those who supported free-riding. The opposition seldom attacked the problems identified (the road and the municipality) or contested the assignment of blame--it would appear that those points were more difficult to refute. Rather, they focused almost solely on the likelihood of the pilgrimage's failure and its risks, both physical and political. These developing arguments also demonstrate the dynamic nature of even the dominant frame as it defends itself against attack. In the following section I present the key arguments of the oppositional frame. Again I have attempted to put the themes in order of importance.

- 1) **Risks:** In addition to risking the wrath of their mayor and local politicians, rumors shot across the region (many supposedly originating with these same local politicians) that the pilgrims would be jailed in Comayagua or bombed, poisoned or shot in Tegucigalpa:

In the village, people said "what are you going for? You're only going to lose your lives" (Angel Cantarero, villager). People were afraid to go to Tegucigalpa because they had never gone. They said that if they went to Tegucigalpa, they wouldn't come back--there were so many thieves, they would just die there (Valentín Gómez, villager). It wasn't worth losing their life, they could better leave things the way they are (Justiniano Vásquez, villager).¹⁰³

¹⁰³Many people I interviewed now say they would have gone on the pilgrimage if they had not been sick or had a little more corn. Others however, are unrepentant of staying behind. They most often speak of the dangers the pilgrims faced. KVB: Are you sorry now that you didn't go? MGS: Sorry? No! Shocked! So many people hurt [in the Basílica] and so many people who came back sick and exhausted....This pilgrimage was definitely dangerous (Medardo Gómez Sánchez, villager).

- 2) **Economic:** Critics of the pilgrimage often asked "What are you going for? You won't accomplish anything" (Santiago Gómez, villager). They argued that participants were only going to waste their time because the resources (political, financial, leadership, etc...) were insufficient and therefore they were all better off at home. Others, objected to COPIN's request for money and food from the region "The hosts should pay" (Felix Rodriguez, villager). They claimed that they did not have any food or money and that "if you've got money, go ahead and go" (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).
- 3) **Potential Participants:** opponents argued that given the fact that they would never achieve their goals, the participants were just lazy and looking for a way to get out of work and travel. "They're lazy, they are going because they don't want to work" (Olayo Gómez, villager).
- 4) **Spiritual:** The parish priest and the *delegados* who remained faithful to him (a minority) argued that these mobilizations were "against the church and the State...organized by marxists, leftists and delinquents," that they were a sign of the end of the world and that they would surely end in a bloodbath (Felix Rodriguez, villager). Villagers also questioned the motives of the *delegados* who were promoting the pilgrimage "the *delegados*, they talk a lot but they don't do anything. Could it be they are paid [by COPIN]?" (Barbara Gutierrez, villager). It was clear that the participants would be severely out of favor with the parish priest--no small risk given the importance of baptism, mass and the role of the *delegado*, all of which are under the priest's control.
- 5) **History:** Others stated that given the history of broken promises why would COPIN be any different. "Some said 'the ones who will benefit are the leaders, they are only going to get things for themselves'" (Santana Gómez, villager). The "famine" only reinforced an image of them as lazy beggars and

the *Toma del Aserradero* had been extremely dangerous and had not yet benefitted the region in any way. "The parish priest was also telling villagers that: 'the land titles are void and anyone who believed otherwise could lose their life sticking their nose where it didn't belong'" (Hector Alvaro Hernández, villager).

The sites where the frames are discussed also give insights into their relative strength. A relatively simple frame was developed in the COPIN meetings. The COPIN organizers repeated and began to refine its themes on their daily radio program. This pro-mobilization frame was sufficiently powerful to dominate public discourse in arenas such as church, village meetings, campesino groups, soccer teams and even in villages which did not participate. Leaders in every village stated that they were going (even those who ultimately stayed behind) and few questions were raised. "People always said they were in agreement in the meetings--it was outside that they talked" (Santana Gómez, villager). In private discourse in homes, fields, while washing or on paths individuals often questioned, debated and expressed their concerns, reservations or antagonism about the planned pilgrimage. "The thing is, people wanted the leaders to go, so they could see if it was true what they were going to do. They wanted to get the road without any cost to themselves" (Basílico Lara, villager).

Summary

The task of the pilgrimage organizers was to construct a mobilization frame which would gain the potential participants sympathies. The frame outlined above attempted to define an injustice, assign blame, downplay the pilgrimage's costs and risks while maximizing its appeal and its perceived chances of success. The organizers and local leaders drew on local rationality, history, spirituality and economics to build a powerful mobilization frame. However, opponents to the pilgrimage attempted to

draw on these same factors to dissuade villagers from participating. While it would now be impossible to judge the number of people who were sympathetic with the mobilization frame, the large number of participants confirm its influence. However, as I will demonstrate in the next section, it was not the frames but social networks which ultimately mobilized villagers.

Expanding Social Movement Theory¹⁰⁴

The pilgrimage suggest several additions, variations and contradictions to current theory regarding mobilization frames.

1. **Multiple and Dynamic Frames:** not one but many pro-mobilization frames emerged as each village leader developed the frame which best fit himself and his village. Those seeking to maintain the frame supporting the status quo (opposing the pilgrimage) needed to be light on their feet in their attempts to discredit the frames developing out of the daily radio programs and village meetings. Leaders also were skillful in adapting their frames depending on their listeners, emphasizing different benefits depending on factors such as economic level, gender or age:

If I talked to a poor person, I said that he didn't need to take much money, in fact, it was better not to, because it would only be stolen. I said that ADRO would help with food...When I talked with women I said that we were going to watch over them, in fact, many women were going with us (Julián Lémuz, villager).

2. **History:** It is worth noting the role history played in creating the context for the changes Piven and Cloward (1977) discuss above: blaming authority structures, creating hope and a sense of effectiveness. The historical events and themes outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, including the *Primeros Luchadores*, land titling, the "famine"

¹⁰⁴Chapter 7 will consider the implications of the mobilization model for development theory. As a result, the discussion in this section will be limited to the implications of this study for social movement theory.

and the *toma del aserradero* each powerfully contributed to the region's sense of hope and effectiveness and contributed in the construction of a very convincing mobilization frame (which was necessary because of the risk and uncertainty of the benefits).

3. Frames win the battle not the war: Few villagers would have participated in the pilgrimage if the frame had not won their sympathies (ie convinced them that the goals were important, that COPIN had the necessary resources). This was no easy task given the fact that the leaders were advocating a potentially very risky and costly activity in the face of attacks by the region's mayor, priest and some local leaders. But given the skill of COPIN, the participation of local leaders and the factors listed above--they were able to construct a frame which won the sympathies of a large number of potential participants. However, very few would have participated solely on the basis of their sympathies with the frame. While frames created sympathies among the potential participants, it was social networks which got them out of their houses and into the trucks. Therefore, frames alone do not explain the variation in participation.

4. How does one frame gain sympathy over another?: The answer to this question seems fairly complex. Snow and Benford believe that one frame is judged superior to another based on empirical credibility, experimental commensurability and narrative fidelity (1988: 208). All three of these tests focus on the ability of the frame-holder to "test" the competing frames against and within a scientific reality. Some testing certainly takes place. But I would argue that it is against a constructed experience and for the most part is within the context of social networks. I would also add two other factors which are potentially even more powerful: 1) Favorability: the listener perceives the frame to be more beneficial to their interests (personal, communal or preferably both) and more pleasing to their self-perception (ie., its reflection on them is more positive or it appears to better help them to achieve their goals); and

2) **Credibility:** the frame is believed and promoted by those I trust and respect, for example the frame "sounds good" *and* a trusted friend states that s/he has studied the issue and is convinced by the frame. I believe that a significantly powerful frame is one which resonates with the listener's construction of his or her experience, is believed and promoted by those s/he trust and respect, and is perceived to be more favorable to his or her interests. It is the issue of who is promoting a frame which will be addressed in the next sections of this chapter.

Networks

Social networks are defined as "a collection of individuals who know and interact with a particular target individual" (Milardo, 1988:20). Social networks can be classified by degree of attachment, from intimate to acquaintances or by type of relation such as familial, friendship, affinity or formal membership.

Social movement research has shown that social networks are the building blocks of social movements (see della Porta, 1988; Gamson, 1992; McAdam, 1988; McAdam et al, 1988; Tarrow, 1991; and Klandermans, 1988). McAdam, who studied the civil rights movement argues that "[i]f there is anything approximating a consistent finding in the empirical literature, it is that movement participants are recruited along established lines of interaction." In particular, "friendship networks have been known to furnish the crucial context for micro-mobilization" (1988:715 and 710). Diani and Lodi (1988) studied the ecology movement in Milan and found that seventy-eight percent of members joined the movement through personal contacts and among the more militant the percentages were even higher. Kriesi (1988) found that the principal difference between those merely sympathetic to the Dutch Peace Movement and those mobilized was whether or not they were embedded in mobilization networks.

This perspective argues that the participants in any given social movement were recruited neither individually nor en masse, but within the context of a

sympathetic social network. As a result, the movement itself is not a homogenous whole but rather a temporary coalition of tens, hundreds or even thousands of often interrelated social networks.

The problem remains to explain *how* social networks are able to overcome Olson's free-rider problem and mobilize their members. First of all, social networks provide the context in which framing, or what Klandermans calls "consensus formation" takes place:

Much of what goes on within social networks concerns the formation of consensus. People tend to validate information by comparing and discussing their interpretations with significant others (Festinger, 1954), especially when complex social information is involved.... Processes of social comparison produce collective definitions of a situation. Consequently, within these networks, consensus is formed and maintained.... Although individuals are part of networks and subcultures that often become engaged en bloc in collective action, it is still the individual who must make up his or her mind whether to join in collective action (1988:175).

It is primarily through interaction with other members of one's networks that individuals accept or reject, construct and refine frames and their elements. And it is on the basis of those frames and again in the context of discussions within one's networks that the individual decides whether or not to participate in collective action.

However, the influence of the network goes beyond the framing ability of its members. Networks are able to use selective incentives to encourage individual members to think, or at least act, as they wish. Selective incentives may be positive inducements or negative sanctions and are generally divided into the economic and the social. Selective economic incentives include the granting or withholding of money, jobs, goods and/or services such as the ability to trade or barter. Selective social incentives include the granting or withholding of prestige, respect, friendship and other social and psychological objectives. The "politics of reputation" is the battlefield

of social incentives, where compliments, gifts and flattery as well as rumors, gossip and slander are everyday weapons (see Scott, 1985; and Bailey, 1971).

Networks are powerful, often more so than "scientific" information. People, as Lohmann (a mathematician) found, "often tend to overgeneralize... [and] are insufficiently attentive to biases in samples. For example, people might form what they consider to be a general opinion about an issue based on the opinions of their friends or acquaintances, failing to take into account that the people they interact with on a daily basis are not a random sample of the population" (1992:33).

Network theory would argue that people may form an opinion based on their friend's, even *after* reading contradictory data *from* a random sample. For, "refusing to respond to the call of network partners mean the potential loss of all benefits provided by that tie," (McAdam 1988:161) and responding favorably means the potential strengthening of all aspects of that relationship. As a result, network incentives provide a powerful counter-balance for the free-rider tendency.

Village Networks¹⁰⁵

Village networks are arranged around many relationship including family, friends, godparents, campesino organizations, soccer teams, church groups and political parties. One individual is a member of several networks. The leaders of these networks tend to be males (with the obvious exception of women's networks) and older, wealthier, better educated, more "traveled" and more verbal than the average member. When I asked villagers how these network leaders gained or lost their informal positions they told me four things: 1) they are trustworthy with money 2) they are self-sacrificing 3) they carry out projects for the village's benefit and 4) they

¹⁰⁵I will give a brief sketch of village networks here, but for a more complete treatment, including examples, see Chapter 3.

consult the village rather than making unilateral decisions. Villagers claimed that the leader's wealth, age, education, etc... helped to gain them a leadership position but if they failed in one of these four items they would lose the respect and trust of the village. In every village a number of networks and leaders vie, more or less amiably, for dominance and power.

The village networks use incentives, both social and economic, to encourage their members (both leaders and non-leaders) to act as they wish. The high degree of interdependence in village life makes social networks very important. Each day households depend on their networks for bartering for food items, loaning money, trading labor, loaning animals and seeking health and midwife services. Social incentives used to mobilize villagers for the pilgrimage were similar to those described in the social movements literature: prestige, respect and friendship. While the network leaders have more power (and often ability) to construct frames and promote action, non-leaders can also use incentives to pressure a leader to participate in an action which is not in his or her individual interest.

Given the multiple networks and the competition between them and their leaders, each individual's decision is difficult to predict, dependent on factors such as the type of decision, the current relationship and amount of contact with each member. However, the decisions made by the leaders of these networks are powerful predictors of the actions of others in that network.

The Role of Networks in the Pilgrimage

Networks are a component of this dissertation which I had not considered as part of my proposal. However, about half way through my field research a resident of San Gonzalo told me that while only five people from his village had participated in the pilgrimage, they were all *delegados* and nearly all of them were kin. That

interview prompted me to begin asking questions about social ties and networks and their role in the mobilization for the pilgrimage.

A few days after that interview I talked with Santos Méndez, of San Gonzalo.

Below are the highlights of our conversation:

SM "If I would have gone, if I would have said, 'let's go' [on the pilgrimage], some people would have gone with me. But since I wasn't excited about going... Several people said to me, 'if you go, I'll go. And if you don't go I won't go'. And I told them, 'I'm not going, but if you feel like it, go ahead.'"

KVB *"Why did people have so much confidence in you?"*

SM "... who knows why...maybe they saw what kind of person I was..."

KVB *"And why weren't you interested in going?"*

SM "Because I was sick then, that's why I didn't go."

KVB *"But if other leaders would have gone, more people would have gone, too?"*

SM "Yes, a few more would have gone...And, if Cleotilde would have gone, well, then I would have gone too" [he laughs and appears slightly embarrassed).

KVB *"Why is that?"*

SM "Maybe because of the confidence one feels around him... If he would have gone, well then we would have gone, too."

KVB *"Even though you were sick?"*

SM "Well, then I would have made the effort."

KVB *"And why didn't Cleotilde go?"*

SM "For the same reason. He was as sick as I was."

KVB *"And if you two would have gone, more people would have gone?"*

SM "Sure, then they would have gone."

After that interview I began asking everyone I talked to about networks within the villages and their influence on the pilgrimage. Everyone I interviewed emphasized the power of networks in mobilizing others in their village and a pattern began to emerge in the interviews.

I began the interview by asking who were the most respected people in the village and after creating a list I would ask which of these had participated in the pilgrimage. Slightly later in the interview I would ask them first why others and then why they had participated (if they had) in the pilgrimage. Nearly everyone answered that "we went to get the road and the new municipality."

I then asked how many people would have participated if the leaders had been against the pilgrimage or vice versa. Again, nearly everyone answered that without the support of the respected leaders of the village, no one or next to no one would have participated. "If the *delegados* would have been against it, no one would have gone" (Entimo Vásquez, villager). "People went to Tegucigalpa to support the ones who were motivating people (Zacarías Gómez, villager).

I would then ask them about the apparent contradiction since the goals were still the same, wouldn't they and others have still wanted to achieve the goals despite the opposition of the leaders? They often began by discussing their decision. "I didn't go to just because a given leader said 'Let's go.' I don't know if he's going to take me to some god-forsaken place, or where in the world he'll take me. I have to make my own decision. 'I'm going'" (Julián Vásquez, villager). "I went and I think the majority of the people went for the projects: the road, the municipality..." (Felix Rodriguez, villager).

However, when I asked them again, how many would have gone if the leaders had been opposed they answered in common. "No, no one would have gone. Everything would have fallen apart. People are messed up that way. They depend on their leader, 'he's going to talk, not me, but I'll support him'" (Felix Rodriguez, villager).

A resident in one of the villages from which no one participated in the pilgrimage told me that "if Benjamín, José Mercedes and Hector would have gone, thirty more people would have gone. Even I would have gone, even though I hardly had any grain and I was sick, too" (Circuncisión Manueles, villager).

A leader from a village of fifty-six houses where thirty-eight people participated told me that "of the thirty-eight, almost all of them were from three families. Pretty much just the three families participated. The Pérez family--they all

stayed. If Don Leonardo would have been for it, his whole family would have gone--some fifteen more people. But he was against it because he was coordinating the school project with the mayor of Yamaranguila" (Julián Vásquez, villager).

Finally in still another village, the majority of the leader did not participate in the pilgrimage; however, eight of the twelve members of the village's soccer team did participate, despite the fears and opposition of their parents and other village leaders.¹⁰⁶

Summary

While the mobilization frame had to gain the potential participants' sympathies, it was the networks which mobilized them. From the interviews cited above it is clear that despite being sympathetic with the pilgrimage, few villagers would have participated without the support of their social networks. The networks provided the context for constructing and evaluating frames including the perceptions of the risks, costs, benefits, appeal and certainty of the pilgrimage's goals. The network members were also able to use social and economic incentives in order to overcome the free-rider problem. The next section on participation and relationships will explore how networks came to support or oppose the pilgrimage.

Expanding Social Movement Theory¹⁰⁷

The pilgrimage suggest several additions, variations and contradictions to current theory regarding networks.

¹⁰⁶It seems that the captain of the soccer team went to the Toma del Aserradero and returned enthusiastic about COPIN and the movement's goals (probably also due to the power and excitement). As a result he motivated other team members to participate in the pilgrimage (with the added excitement of seeing Tegucigalpa).

¹⁰⁷Chapter 7 will consider the implications of the mobilization model for development theory. As a result, this section will consider only the implications of this study for social movement theory.

1. **Incentives in Rural Villages:** The economic incentives controlled by networks in rural villages are even more important than in Western, urban social movement networks. The high degree of interdependence in village life, greatly increases the importance of social networks. Each day households depend on their networks for bartering for food items, loaning money, trading labor, loaning animals and seeking health and midwife services. While the costs of angering one's network in an urban setting may be high: losing a job or friends, in a small village of few secrets and many overlapping obligations, the costs can be devastating.

Social incentives used to mobilize villagers for the pilgrimage were similar to those described in the social movement literature: prestige, respect and friendship. While the literature tends to focus on the pressure applied by the leader and the group on a recalcitrant individual, during this mobilization the group also carefully observed the leaders, pressured them to take a stand ("are you going?") and even baited them ("if you go, I'll go") Since the pilgrimage was so successful, those leaders who went and encouraged others gained prestige, respect and power, while those who stayed behind lost. This mobilization process demonstrated the complex pressures and exchanges between leaders and followers as both stand to gain or lose valuable economic and social incentives.

2. **Leaders:** This analysis has demonstrated the power of networks but also the importance of leaders within those networks (often without any formal role or title). The actions of the most respected local leaders were the most powerful predictive factor regarding the amount of mobilization in the village as a whole. This confirms McAdam's (1988) findings that networks provide the rudiments of organization. Individuals become respected leaders through a mixture of self-sacrifice, organizational ability, a focus on communal good, intelligence, personal wealth and even trickery. Village leaders are seen as understanding or knowing more about

problems and handling new situations. However, it is also important to note that the leaders power is checked and balanced by their networks and other leaders. Their position is in large part limited and dictated by their networks and there are always other village leaders willing to lead dissenters or to point out self-serving positions or "wrong" decisions.

3. Networks in the rural "developing world:" Nearly all of the social movement literature on networks focuses on urban settings in the "west." This mobilization demonstrates the existence and power of networks within the rural villages of San Francisco de Opalaca. It also contradicts studies of rural life which seek to homogenize and classify villages. Anderson classifies villages as quiescent or rebellious and states that because of the peasants extreme economic vulnerability, the "individual and community [village] interests blend and become one and the same" (1994:3). Recognizing the multiple and often oppositional networks within villages demonstrates the dangers of homogenizing villages and the importance of recognizing the diversity and complexity within the village.

4. Networks mobilize non-leaders: non-leaders were most likely to be mobilized if they were sympathetic with the framing of the pilgrimage and if their network leaders participated. Networks influenced both the construction of the frames and the sympathy for it. It is clear then the influence networks have on their members as well as the influence the leader has on the network. The following section will explore how network leaders are mobilized.

Participation and Relationship

Participation is defined in various ways in the development literature. Uphoff and Cohen contend that participation "should be broadly understood as the active involvement of people in the decision-making process in so far as it affects them" (1979:5). The World Health organization argues that participation "means that people,

who have both the right and the duty to participate in solving their own problems, have greater responsibilities in assessing the health needs, mobilizing local resources and suggesting new solutions, as well as creating and maintaining local organizations" (1982:8). Donnelly-Roark defines it as "a process whose objective is to enable people to initiate action for self-reliant development and acquire the ability to influence and manage change within their society" (1993:3).

Due in part to the various definitions and interpretations of participation, authors have attempted to differentiate types of participation. Uphoff and Cohen (1979) distinguish the stages of a development project in which "people" may participate, including needs assessments, planning, implementation and evaluation. Oakley and Marsden (1984) divided participation into four levels, which could be considered the depth of participation, which vary according to the level of control given to the "beneficiaries." At one end of the continuum the "beneficiaries" "participate" by endorsing and collaborating in projects designed by others while at the other end they are "empowered" to control their development process. Later Oakley and Marsden label the endorsing and collaborating end of the continuum as "manipulatory" participation, the middle range as "token" and the empowerment end as "real" participation. In addition to the stages and depth of participation is the issue of breadth of participation, or the number of people who are participating. Implicit in the above definitions above is that all "people" should participate in the development process. The goal for authors such as Oakley and Marsden (1984), Burkey (1993), Korten (1983) and Donnelly-Roark (1993) is to increase the breadth and depth of participation in all stages of the development process.

These authors promote participation because of its values to both the development project and the beneficiaries. Donnelly-Roark (1993) divides those values into two groups: effectiveness and social justice values. Proponents of participation

claim that increasing participation (breadth, depth and stages) improves the effectiveness of programs. F. Korten (1983) argues that increasing participation will increase the reach, improve the sustainability, increase the adaptability and decrease the dependency on external groups. Bryant and White (1982) in their classic development text contend that "beneficiaries'" participation creates a source of information which improves project design and implementation. The beneficiaries can also be called upon to participate with resources which will increase the likelihood that the project will be sustained. Other quantitative studies have found that participation is the best predictor of project success.¹⁰⁸

In terms of social justice, participation is also promoted as "an essential part of human growth, that is the development of self-confidence, pride, initiative, creativity, responsibility and cooperation" (Burkey, 1993:56). Increasing the breadth and depth of participation in all stages of the process involves issues of power and its redistribution to the "people." The following quotes makes these issues explicit:

Power is the central theme of participation and...participatory social action entails widely shared, collective power by those who are considered beneficiaries. The people become agents of social action and the power differentials between those who control and needs resources is reduced through participation (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:26).

There will be individuals and groups, within the community as well as outside, with considerable power over others. Attempts to transform these power relationships to the advantage of the poor will be met with attempts to obstruct such changes. But unless changes occur, the poor will remain excluded from development (Burkey, 1993:208).

For many development theoreticians, participation is a means of redistributing power and it is for this reason that authors such as Oakley and Marsden (1984) and Burkey (1993) use empowerment and participation almost interchangeably. Increasing

¹⁰⁸For a review of these studies see Bryant and White (1982:208).

the breadth and depth of participation is equivalent to empowering people and without that development is impossible or becomes synonymous with participation. Oakley and Marsden (1984) and Burkey (1993) believe that participation is an end in itself, and is the unavoidable consequence and cause of the process of empowering and liberation.

The other concept that I will treat in this section is **relationship**, which I will define as an affinity between individuals or groups characterized by trust and respect which is perceived as yielding mutual and relatively equal benefits.¹⁰⁹

Uphoff claims that "the program in Gal Oya derived its greatest thrust from friendship, that personalistic, idiosyncratic, phenomenon we find everywhere 'making the world go round'" (1992:365). He also calls friendship "probably one of the most under-reported factors in successful development work" (1992:365). Uphoff also traces the roots of the systematic discussion of friendship back to Aristotle and laments the fact that "friendship is seldom taken seriously in social science," despite "how ubiquitous we all know friendships to be as a social force" (1992:366). While I believe that what developed between COPIN and local leaders was slightly more opportunistic than what I would call a true friendship, its reliance on trust and respect gave the relationship many of the characteristics found in friendships.

¹⁰⁹I considered replacing the term relationship which may appear somewhat nebulous with one of the parts of the definition. However, even if the benefits had appeared mutual and relatively equal, if the villagers had not trusted COPIN they would not have participated. Respect without trust or mutual benefits would equally inhibit mobilization. Trust comes closest to my idea, but even if they trusted COPIN in a limited manner to neither sell them out nor cause them harm, a lack of respect or unequal benefits would have still been very detrimental. I also considered referring to this concept as a network between COPIN and local leaders. However, while it captures the element of mutual benefits, it does not stress the importance of trust and respect. As a result I have opted to use a broader term "relationships" with a specific definition.

Armonia, addresses the importance of "personal-bonds" and "relationship-based networks" in development work in the Philippines. He argues that "development-oriented institutions have too often overlooked friendships and patronage ties..." (1995:237) and that these organizations should institutionalize "the personal bond between field staff and the people" (1995:241).

Role of Participation and Relationships in the Pilgrimage

COPIN argued that the mobilization of thousands of people from San Francisco de Opalaca was the result of "real" participation, as defined by Oakley and Marsden (1984) above. In my first interview with Salvador Zúniga (COPIN organizer) he explained the movements success like this:

We began working based on what they asked for and not on what we said and people began coming up with so many ideas...they said "if the soldiers want to mix it up with us, we aren't going to scream..." and "we need to plan some decisive actions"...and as a result of their participation people began to develop this incredible motivation.

This claim seemed consistent with the participation literature cited above, that "real" participation would reward the organizers with great increases in both effectiveness and social justice. It was also what I had hoped to find.

However, as I heard more details from both COPIN and the region and reflected on them, the participation by people from San Francisco de Opalaca often seemed more "manipulatory" or "token" than "real" in both breadth and depth. Residents had little control over the process except their ability to withdraw their support. And while two of the principal goals (the road and the municipality) originated in San Francisco de Opalaca, this does little to explain the variation in participation between villages. I will briefly review the three principal forums for residents' participation and their level of participation in each.

The village meeting (often after Sunday worship) was the forum in which local leaders had the highest degree of control. The village leaders who were attending the COPIN meetings would regularly inform the villagers of the latest plans for the pilgrimage and motivate them to participate. However, if COPIN organizers were present in these meetings, they would plan and moderate the meeting:

As *delegados* we thought about it a lot, and the day after the church service I said, "its better that we suffer fifteen days in Tegucigalpa instead of fifty years hauling corn on our back." In this way, people started analyzing. We decided it was something good for everyone (Entimo Vásquez, villager).

As the quote relates, the leaders would inform and motivate and then ask those present either for suggestions or for their support. The local leaders were responsible for recruiting participants and setting up village committees for areas such as transportation, health, discipline and food. These committees gave roles and titles to a large second level of leaders who then assisted in recruiting and organizing.

The regional assemblies held by COPIN (two during the planning process) followed a similar format but COPIN planned and moderated each. Everyone in the region was invited to one of the assemblies by notes and radio, but only a small percentage of the residents attended. The COPIN organizers informed the villagers of current plans and motivated them to participate. Issues were discussed such as how to feed the participants and individuals were chosen to accompany COPIN organizers to solicit support from NGOs and unions or to help prepare food. Near the end of the assembly those present were asked to either raise their hands or sign a document that they were committed to participate.

When people went to the assemblies... COPIN members said, "What is your decision? Are you going to go or not? What do you think, are you going to go hungry, without money? What is your decision?" So that's when people decided (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

COPIN planning meetings offered local leaders an opportunity to influence the plans for the pilgrimage. Those present were not a broad representation of the region but rather "a few volunteers, a few named by their villages and others selected by COPIN" (Berta Cáceres, COPIN organizer). COPIN organizers also set the agenda and moderated the meetings but villagers were encouraged to participate. However, COPIN made many decisions and took action outside of the meetings, such as contacting and negotiating with other ethnic groups, religious leaders and the news media; during the meetings both COPIN and local leaders discussed goals and strategies:

The idea to create a new municipality and the road came from us [villagers] but that of kicking out the sawmill and caring for the forest--those ideas came from COPIN (Isaías Vásquez, villager). The idea of taking women along was partly COPIN's idea and partly the people's idea. The *delegados* said the women should go with all their kids...when the government saw all these malnourished women, the sad-looking kids, when they saw our needs, our way of life, so run-down, then the government felt more obligated to approve the projects we were asking for. (Entimo Vásquez, villager). Salvador [Zúniga] came up with the idea of taking conch shells and bows so that people would believe that we were true Lencas. Some people were embarrassed by it but it was Salvador's idea (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

It is clear from the section above that both the villages and the local leaders participated in the planning of the pilgrimage. It is also clear that the local leader's participation was limited in depth and especially in breadth. However, I would argue that even if they had "real" participation in both depth and breadth during the planning process, if the leaders had lacked trust in COPIN they would not have entrusted them with the lives of their loved ones. I will also show in Chapter 6 the destructive potential of increasing the breadth of participation.

Was Participation Necessary?

If the residents were not controlling the process (Oakley and Marsden's definition of "real" participation), was their participation unnecessary? I believe their limited participation in the planning process was essential to their subsequent participation in the pilgrimage and to its success. First of all, the planning process demonstrated the effectiveness claims of the participation literature. Local leaders and village participation, as evidenced by the quotes above, gave the COPIN organizers suggestions and information which improved the pilgrimage's design and implementation. Their participation also increased the sustainability, adaptability of the "project" while decreasing its dependency on external groups.

The participation of the majority of the residents of the region although limited was also essential. Being informed and consulted about the plans for the pilgrimage meant that they could make an informed decision rather than having activities imposed on them. Such imposition is unacceptable, even by their own leaders (see Chapter 2). Therefore being informed and consulted, although not deeply involved in the process models their experience and was essential to gaining their sympathy.

The moderate level of participation by local leaders who attended COPIN meetings was also essential. They, as leaders, had higher expectations about being informed and consulted about the plans, and would have reacted negatively had they begun to feel that COPIN was taking advantage of them (see Chapter 6). In addition, their role as information-channels and chief recruiters in the village gave them status and other social incentives.

Finally, and most importantly, the leaders' participation allowed them to build a relationship with COPIN organizers. COPIN, a group relatively unknown to many of the participants, was proposing a costly and risky activity which they could easily use to its own benefit. Therefore, more important than the effectiveness benefits of

participation was the fact that the village leaders' participation provided a means to establish a relationship based on a degree of trust, respect and mutual and proportional benefits. "Through the planning meetings, people gained confidence in COPIN, not really a friendship but enough" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

COPIN used several means to strengthen this relationship. First, they capitalized on what Klandermans (1988) describes as the diversion of credibility¹¹⁰ or what I will call the transfer of trust. Residents had participated in the *Toma del Aserradero*, which they thought was a training workshop in the ADRO offices, based in large part on their trust in ADRO, which had been built up through training and the land titling process. COPIN also courted religious leaders' support and participation in the pilgrimage to increase the residents' trust in COPIN. COPIN's actions in the *Toma del Aserradero* also gave participants reason to trust the COPIN leadership (except for the fact that they had been tricked into participating, a detail which they seemed to forgive after achieving success in evicting the aserradero).

In addition to the transfer of trust from COPIN's member organizations and the participant's observations of COPIN in the *Toma del Aserradero*, the planning meetings allowed local leaders to observe and evaluate the level of trust, respect and mutual benefits in their relationship. Any one of the leaders or the group has a whole could have decided at any point that they no longer had sufficient trust in COPIN, were not being respected or that COPIN was seeking benefits disproportional to their efforts and subsequently withdrawn their support. Obviously, COPIN also had that option. However, based on their relationship of trust and respect, COPIN was allowed

¹¹⁰Credible is defined as "believable or worthy of belief," while trust is defined as "a firm belief in the reliability or truth or strength of a person or thing" (Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary, 1991). Both the definition and connotations of trust seem to more accurately describe the commitment the leaders were making to COPIN.

and even expected to seek some benefits for themselves and make some decisions without regional participation.

After the Toma del Aserradero and in all the meetings, people believed that COPIN wasn't just looking out for itself. Also, since the negotiating committee was a mixed group, people believed that it would be impossible that the people from here would sell us out (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

There are two other values of participation which are not mentioned in the participation literature. First, the local leaders who participated in the planning process helped construct, evaluate and became proficient in their ability to frame the pilgrimage. During planning meetings, COPIN and village leaders regularly discussed and evaluated the merits of certain goals and methods. The arguments presented began to "frame" the pilgrimage in a way impossible for outsiders, weaving in historical, spiritual and economic arguments from the region. The leaders knew best *how* to convince each other as well as their fellow villagers. In addition to continually evaluating the COPIN leaders, the village leaders were also regularly evaluating the developing frame and their continuing participation and support for the pilgrimage.

Through participating in these discussions the village leaders also became increasingly proficient in the use of the "frame," to convince others, to answer questions and to defend against criticisms. One leader explained how when the objectives of the pilgrimage were discussed:

One person explained that "these and these are the objectives. Over there, someone else would jump up, "what you say is true!" What one person said, someone else would repeat. Over there, someone would repeat it again, changing one or two words but saying the same thing...sometimes it's to make people more aware, so people say "if all these people agree, lets join them, let's go!"...Sometimes it's so that people remember it better...because all the sudden they might have to go to a commission or something (Bernardo Bejarano, villager).

I have often been annoyed in meetings with villagers who repeat, often with only slight variations, the arguments others have just stated. I had always thought that it was just a way of showing agreement or desiring to show off. However, while both of these factors may play a role, this repetition also seems to be a technique for convincing others and learning and becoming comfortable with an argument or frame the leader may soon be required to repeat and defend back in his village.

Secondly, the participation of local leaders also facilitated the identification of leaders in each village whose support was key to mobilizing the villages' internal networks. While COPIN leaders would have been mostly limited to courting those with formal positions, village leaders knew who the truly powerful leaders were, formal and informal. In many cases the village leaders also knew the best manner by which to gain the support of those key leaders. The village leaders knew both WHOM they needed to convince (networks) and HOW to convince them (frames):

If you can convince the leader, the rest will follow. When we were putting together the plans, we thought, "Who is the leader in El Naranjo?"...because some presidents of the *patronatos* weren't working. So we would work with the secretary or the treasure and they would convince the president (Felix Rodriguez, villager).

The limited participation by villagers and local leaders was essential for the pilgrimage's mobilization. Informing and consulting them was necessary to create sympathy for the pilgrimage and its goals. Their ideas and suggestions improved both the design and implementation of the pilgrimage. But most importantly, their participation allowed them to develop a relationship which they perceived as sufficiently¹¹¹ trustworthy, respectful and mutually and proportionally beneficial. This relationship gave them confidence and allowed them to enthusiastically encourage

¹¹¹The perception about what was "sufficient" trust depended on the individual leader and how they perceived the potential risks, costs and benefits.

their spouses, children, parents and friends to participate. Even if the villages had had "real" participation in defining the strategies and plans of the pilgrimage, if, in addition, the villagers had not developed that relationship with the COPIN organizers, they would not have moved from their houses. Finally, through participation in the planning process, villagers integrated powerful local elements into the mobilization frame, became proficient with its use and facilitated the identification of key leaders.

Participation/Relationships and Village Variation

One of the principal explanations for the variation in village participation in the pilgrimage is the participation/relationship between the villages' network leaders and COPIN. If the leaders did not develop sufficient trust and respect for COPIN then they did not participate in the pilgrimage. The weaker the relationship between a leader and COPIN, the less effort that leader made to mobilize his or her networks. In the next chapter I will show the effects of the breakdown of relationship between COPIN and leaders who had trusted them.

There are several explanations for why some village leaders developed sufficient trust in COPIN and others did not. First, the costs of participating were higher for some than others, both relatively and absolutely. It was relatively more difficult for poorer leaders to leave their fields and families to attend meetings and pay the costs those involved. It is also certain the leaders had different perceptions about what level of costs were acceptable. It was also absolutely more costly in time and money for leaders from distant villages to participate; explaining the relationship between distance and participation. Many of the more distant and poorer leaders also may have chosen not to participate in the Toma del Aserradero, which resulted in less opportunity to observe and develop trust in COPIN.

Second, some leaders were dissuaded by messages from the priest, the mayor of Yamaranguila who claimed that COPIN organizers were leftist, troublemakers, and

delinquents who were probably going to get participants killed. Those closest to the priest and the mayor were obviously most influenced. Finally, several other leaders had contradictory interests which restrained them from even attempting to develop a relationship with COPIN. These included teachers, local nationalist party leaders, contractors who worked to the mayor and those close to the parish priest:

Some people discouraged other villagers because of politics, because the politicians in Yamaranguila gave them money to get out the vote. So it wasn't in their interest. Others, like the teacher, discouraged fellow villagers because his father worked in the sawmill (Angel Cantarero, villager).

All three of these reasons contributed to the fact that many leaders in the region did not have sufficient trust in COPIN to participate in the pilgrimage or to mobilize their networks.

Summary

How were over four thousand indigenous people mobilized for a pilgrimage which could promise at best uncertain benefits and at worst the more certain costs of leaving families, fields and homes, the risks of wasting precious time, violence or even death? This chapter has demonstrated that it was not the result of an extraordinary depth or breadth of participation nor the result of carefully calculations by the organizers of the cost and risk/ benefit ratio. Instead, villagers' participation is best explained by a "mobilization model" which claims that villagers were mobilized for the pilgrimage and the subsequent events in the context of social networks and on the basis of relationships and frames.

The framing of these events required gaining the sympathies of potential participants, which was most likely to occur if the frame was constructed with local participation and took into account factors such as local rationality, history, economics and spirituality. The strength of the relationships between villagers and organizers

influenced the amount of costs and risks villagers were willing to tolerate for uncertain benefits. The strength of the relationships between local leaders and COPIN was influenced by villagers' participation in the planning process as well as historical, economic and spiritual factors. Finally, it was the socially constructed networks which overcame the free-rider phenomena by providing the context within which members constructed, discussed and evaluated frames and their relationships, applied and received incentives and ultimately made their individual but highly influenced decision about whether or not to participate (or continue participating). If the networks failed to mobilize potential participants, this mobilization model argues that they were not sympathetic with the framing of the event and/or did not have sufficiently strong relationship of trust and respect with the organizers.

This model does not deny the role of participation and rationality in the mobilization process. The mobilization model recognizes both the rationality of villagers as well as the influence of factors such as social relationships. This model also specifies the role of participation and external knowledge in the decision-making process: to strengthen frames and relationships. Finally, this model recognizes the social construction of both the project, its costs, risks and benefits as well as village factors such as history, economics and spirituality.

The following chapter will outline the eighteen-month period that followed the pilgrimage and will demonstrate that the failure to utilize this model resulted in a breakdown of relationships and mobilization potential.

CHAPTER 6: "EVERYDAY" MOBILIZATIONS

Today we have the opportunity to demonstrate in the practice that it is possible to develop an alternative model from the level of the municipality. For us San Francisco de Opalaca is strategic (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN Organizer).

This chapter will explore how villagers were mobilized for the events following the pilgrimage. Specifically, it will examine whether the mobilization model used to mobilize villagers for the pilgrimage is also useful in explaining the "everyday" mobilizations which followed.¹¹²

Both COPIN and local leaders intended San Francisco de Opalaca to be a model municipality with high participation, no political parties, exceptional laws, a new development model and controlled and collaborative external interventions. While they had proven they were capable of mobilizing thousands for an extraordinary event--the first pilgrimage--they had yet to establish their ability to carry out the necessary everyday mobilizations for events such as workshops, meetings and projects in order to meet their goals for the region.

Most of the ideas for the new municipality were COPIN's and initially local leaders seemed very much in agreement. Within the first six months they had formed twelve commissions¹¹³ in each village and at the regional level involving hundreds of men and women. San Francisco de Opalaca was declared a "dry" municipality (the sale, production and consumption of alcohol is prohibited) and strict regulations were

¹¹²The pilgrimage was an extraordinary event; mobilizations such as this are extremely uncommon. However, nearly everyday villagers are mobilized for meetings, training and other events. It is these more common mobilizations that I refer to with the term "everyday" mobilizations.

¹¹³Many of the topics covered by these commissions were recommended by COPIN and included: health, infrastructure, production, education, the environment, women's rights and children's rights.

approved limiting forestry and the burning of agricultural plots. Several meetings were held with the government and NGOs who wanted to work in the region in an attempt to avoid duplication and dependency. A medical doctor and two nurses were hired, the construction of the road, several school classrooms and many houses was begun. Perhaps most extraordinary was the fact that for the first time in the history of Honduras, municipal authorities were elected without any political party affiliation.

Within eighteen months, however, ninety-five percent of the village commissions had ceased to function, municipal authorities had not enforced the "dry" law despite the demands of villagers (the mayor was broadly believed to be one of the people guilty of regularly breaking the law) and alcohol consumption was believed to be increasing. The environmental guidelines were erratically enforced and NGOs were accused of duplicating efforts and creating dependency. Rumors abounded that the government was not going to meet its commitments, political parties were active in the region, often at the invitation of local residents and reportedly even COPIN was dabbling in party politics. Perhaps most revealing, was the fact that only twelve months after organizing the pilgrimage of nearly five thousand Lencas to Tegucigalpa, turnout for COPIN events and regional meetings had sharply decreased and COPIN and the newly elected authorities increasingly were under attack.¹¹⁴

This chapter will attempt to explain this reversal and highlight any insights it gives into the everyday mobilization of villagers. I will outline the eighteen- month

¹¹⁴While support for COPIN in San Francisco de Opalaca steadily decreased throughout this period, it is worth noting that during this same period, COPIN's support was skyrocketing in other regions of the country. The success of the first two pilgrimages led leaders and villages to seek COPIN's support for everything from soccer uniforms to miles of roads and bridges. The result of all of this interest was a reduction in the amount of time and energy COPIN invested in San Francisco de Opalaca.

period following the pilgrimage as COPIN leaders and villagers attempted to transfer the energy and enthusiasm generated by the pilgrimage into a steady commitment to meeting the goals set for the new municipality. I will begin by setting the context, touching on some of the positive achievements of the pilgrimage and of the leaders' and villagers' efforts. Next, I will describe the major events which took place during that period, which include a second and third pilgrimage, municipal assemblies and elections, and demonstrate that the mobilization model used to explain the extraordinary mobilization for the pilgrimage was also essential for explaining everyday mobilizations.

First, I will demonstrate that frames, networks, participation and relationships continue to be essential components of everyday mobilizations and the failure to utilize them effectively in San Francisco de Opalaca led to decreased mobilization and even hostility from villagers. Second, the spirituality and faith of the people of San Francisco de Opalaca was a powerful mobilizer but also a potentially volatile issue which could damage relationships. Third, as the relationship between COPIN, the Municipal Corporation and local leaders broke down, COPIN and the mayor increasingly turned to coercion as a means of achieving compliance. Fourth, the attempt to increase participation does not inevitably lead to better development. In San Francisco de Opalaca, COPIN and the municipal corporation's attempts to increase the breadth of participation resulted in the breakdown of trust, respect and relationships and decreased their mobilization ability.

The Pilgrimage's Achievements

This chapter will focus on the problems encountered by COPIN, the new municipal corporation and the villagers in the first year and a half following the pilgrimage, however, I believe it is important to set these problems within a broader

context of positive achievements which reveal the success of the pilgrimage and the commitment of the leaders and villagers to improve the conditions of their region.

Road Construction: At the time of this writing about fifteen kilometers of the promised one hundred kilometers of the road had been completed and construction continued at a slow but steady pace. Although rumors regularly circulated that the government had decided to abandon the project or continue with absolute minimal costs, that appeared unlikely since the government was aware that abandonment of the project would almost certainly reunite the region in an even larger and perhaps more volatile protest than the first.

Schools: Additional classrooms were nearly finished in fifteen villages. The government subcontracted this work to engineers and budgeted money to pay villagers for their labor.

Health: The government had made good on its promise to station a doctor and nurse in the region. Construction of the health center was scheduled to begin in February, 1996. The government, with the assistance of the U.S. Air Force, also flew in several tons of food to be distributed to mothers of malnourished children.

Water: Catholic Relief Services facilitated the construction of water systems and latrines in each of the 21 villages. CRS donated the materials, cement and pipes, and provided a "barefoot water engineer," while the village donated all labor.

Housing: World Vision and the United Nations, through *Cooperación Técnica Nacional*, each facilitated the construction of twenty-five houses in two villages. The U.N. and World Vision donated materials, wood and tin roofs, and provided a mason while the owners contributed labor, mud bricks and other local materials.

Other NGOs: Dozens of other organizations had visited the region, carried out needs assessments and given small amounts of training. Many were drawn to the region by

the potential for international funding, the desire to help one of the poorest regions of Honduras or simply out of curiosity after so much media attention.

Role of Women: COPIN leaders and villagers expressed mixed opinions when interviewed as to whether the role of women had improved as a result of the pilgrimage. But I believe that the example of COPIN's female organizers, the training, by radio and in the region, given by COPIN on women's rights, including topics such as rape, physical abuse and child raising, the participation of women in the pilgrimage, and simply the fact that two women were on the municipal corporation had raised awareness of women's abilities and rights, an awareness which was translating into changing attitudes and actions.

Environment: Another direct result of the pilgrimage was the resolution passed by COHDEFOR (the Honduran Ministry of Forestry) in October of 1994, which included: 1) the closing of all saw mills and the cancellation of all cutting contracts in Intibuca, La Paz and Lempira 2) a thirty-year ban on the export of any wood from the region and 3) a reforestation project. These actions had little direct effect on San Francisco de Opalaca, which had no functioning saw mill or cutting sites, but cutting and burning had been restricted and the average resident was probably slightly more aware and committed to environmental protection as a result of the *Toma* and the pilgrimage.

Sense of Power and Hope: When comparing San Francisco de Opalaca with other neighboring regions one of the most evident differences was the Opalacans' new sense of power and hope.¹¹⁵ Many residents now believed they had a right to, not just a need for, the road, schools, teachers and health centers and were convinced the

¹¹⁵This sense of power builds not only on the pilgrimage but also on other events in their history including the land titling and the *toma del aserradero*.

government had the responsibility to provide these services. Perhaps more importantly, they had confidence that the government was likely to grant their demands. A recent example of that sense of power involved a conflict with a government contractor who was building several new schools. With COPIN's encouragement, village leaders refused to haul cement, sand, rocks and other materials unless the contractor paid them the agreed upon daily wage. The contractor initially refused, was then threatened with dismissal, and finally was forced to increase their compensation. A *patronato* president summed up the new attitude by saying "we want to see action, not so much bullshit. We aren't the fools we were before" (Avelardo Gómez, villager). This sense of power is uncommon in *campesinos* and even more so among the indigenous.

Everyday Mobilizations (October 1994- January 1996)

It is within this context of an increasing number of organizations mobilizing for a variety of projects as well as one in which villagers' were infused with a new found sense of power and hope that COPIN and the municipal corporation attempted to carry out "everyday" mobilizations for events, meetings and training in order to maintain their support and further assist the region. I have decided to relate the following section in chronological order rather than thematically so that the reader can follow COPIN's abandonment and eventual restoration of the mobilization model and its effects.

The Second Pilgrimage (October, 1994)

COPIN had two immediate motivations for organizing a second pilgrimage. First, rumors abounded that the military was planning a coup against Reina and secondly, COPIN was convinced that the military was organizing a "campaign to discredit the leaders of COPIN" (Xiomara Melgár, COPIN organizer). This campaign relied in part on José Vásquez, a self-proclaimed Lenca "chief" who, according to

COPIN, was on the military's payroll. Vásquez attempted to discredit COPIN with vague claims that they had misappropriated money from the first pilgrimage. He also disputed COPIN's assertion that the Lenca wanted less military power in the region by claiming that he could deliver 11,000 Lenca volunteers to army officials in La Esperanza. On the appointed day, several high ranking military officials, the media, as well as about 150 onlookers showed up to witness the event--but unfortunately for Vásquez, none of his volunteers made an appearance.

COPIN saw Vásquez's failed attack on its credibility as an opportunity to organize the second pilgrimage. Its purposes were framed for the media, government and general public as the demilitarization of Honduras and the maintaining of pressure on the government to fulfill its promises.

The second pilgrimage arose from a situation which demanded a response. It was a special circumstance. The military was manipulating the indigenous focus and would have destroyed the entire process (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

However, COPIN organizers realized that the demand for demilitarization would not motivate many to attend and might in fact deter many out of fear of conflict with the military.¹¹⁶ They agreed that a powerful mobilizer could be the Lenca's own spirituality and faith. The organizers arranged the donation of an image of Saint Francis of Assisi and convinced the local bishop to bring Honduras' most holy image, the Virgin of Suyapa, to La Esperanza. "We included the image of Saint Francis and the Virgin because it's something that moves people" (Gerardo Yanez, COPIN organizer). Within San Francisco de Opalaca, the event was framed as a "pilgrimage"

¹¹⁶A few days before the second pilgrimage anonymous pamphlets and radio announcements began to appear denouncing COPIN leaders as communist agitators with "exotic" ideas in an attempt to scare off potential participants. COPIN is certain that the military, acting through José Vásquez, was responsible for these attacks.

to welcome Saint Francis and the Virgin. Receiving the Virgin and Saint Francis as well as hearing the bishop was a once in a lifetime event for the villagers and by COPIN's own estimate less than half the participants would have participated without that spiritual motivation. Organizers also mentioned the importance of maintaining pressure on the government and of voluntary rather than forced military service but did not make it the focus of the pilgrimage.¹¹⁷ "Demilitarization is a national issue, the people from the region don't really understand it....the people came because of the religious element" (Suyapa Alemán, COPIN organizer).

While Opalacans' participation in the planning of the first pilgrimage was limited, their participation in the second was negligible. The motivations, goals and strategies of the pilgrimage were developed almost exclusively by COPIN. Salvador Zúniga and three other COPIN organizers wrote the second pilgrimage's *Planteamiento* (proposal) on a bus ride to Tegucigalpa and although several COPIN organizers did make a trip into the region, their principal purpose was to inform and motivate not to solicit input.

Despite the lack of participation in the development of the plan and the fact that its principal external goal was of little interest to them, Opalacans were overwhelmingly sympathetic with the internal frame and newspapers estimated that

¹¹⁷During this event COPIN again demonstrated their panache for reframing events in manners more favorable to their interests. The Virgin of Suyapa is also known as the *Capitana* (captain) or *Patrona* (patron) of the Armed Forces, COPIN gave her the title "Mother of Civil Society" (*Madre de la Sociedad Civil*) and gave San Francisco the title "The Saint of Ecology and Peace." And much to the annoyance of the local priests who were adamantly against traditional religious ceremonies, the COPIN organizers choreographed a dancing encounter between the Virgin and the Saint and referred to it as a *guancasco*.

between five and ten thousand people attended the second pilgrimage for "Peace, Development and Democracy."¹¹⁸

The second pilgrimage demonstrates the power of relationships and spiritual themes to mobilize despite minimal participation before the event. Both supporters and opponents were extremely pleased with the first pilgrimage's achievements and as a result COPIN enjoyed increased levels of trust and respect in the region. Without this relationship of trust and respect coupled with the extremely powerful spiritual frame, potential participants would have opted to stay home out of fear of military oppression and skepticism that COPIN could actually produce the Virgin and San Francisco. However, as I will demonstrate below, the continuing lack of participation by local leaders quickly weakened both COPIN's relationship with the region and its ability to construct powerful frames.

Training (November, 1994-February, 1995)

Soon after the second pilgrimage a U.N. organization approached COPIN and the municipal corporation and offered to fund training for the new municipality. Planning for the workshops quickly began however participation by villagers in the selection of topics was limited and COPIN organizers singlehandedly developed course content and facilitated each of the twenty-seven workshops.

¹¹⁸ADRO effectively withdrew from COPIN after the first pilgrimage, and nearly all of the other member organizations withdrew after the second despite the huge turnout. The withdrawal by nearly all of its members immediately after COPIN's largest event to date and one which made front-page news in every paper, demonstrated the extent of their discontent with COPIN and their pessimism about the likelihood that COPIN would change. COPIN claims that they withdrew because "they didn't get personal recognition or their organization didn't get recognized. We [COPIN] asked ourselves, 'Which do they prefer: recognition or a successful action--to do something with the community?'" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer). But the organizations explained their withdrawal in a very different way. "ADRO supported COPIN when it was still very weak...but later COPIN started marginalizing us...they wanted to manipulate us..." (Miguel Zelaya, ADRO president).

This lack of participation resulted in significant conflict when during one of the workshops on Lenca culture, COPIN sponsored a *compostura* for all of the participants and visitors. They asserted that "not a single contradiction exists between the mass and a *compostura*" (attributed to Salvador Zúniga by Entimo Vásquez, villager) and that "it should not be abandoned but continued....in public, not in hiding" (Isaias Vásquez, villager). Local leaders and especially the delegados who had not been consulted were livid. A practice which the delegados had worked to discourage for over twenty years was now being publicly practiced and promoted by COPIN. This conflict clearly illustrates the volatility of treating spiritual and religious themes without villager participation.

Elections (January-February 1995)

COPIN also played a very direct role in the election of the new municipal corporation. One of their most radical and popular proposals was to eliminate party affiliation from the elections. They designed a three stage process in which each village nominated its best candidate, then came together in groups of four or five villages to select one candidate from the nominees and finally gathered in Monteverde as an entire region to vote. The five candidates stood behind a voting box and each adult was given a slip of paper which they deposited into the box of the candidate they believed would be the best mayor. The top vote-getter was mayor, the runner-up was assistant mayor, and so on.

COPIN revealed its control of the process when, after no women were among the initial five sectorial candidates, it openly pressured two of the sectors to substitute women for their male candidates.¹¹⁹ Several villagers also complained that while no

¹¹⁹COPIN organizers, over half of whom are women and who have all been received a substantial amount of training in women's issues, were adamant women should have leadership roles in the new municipality of San Francisco de Opalaca.

politicking was permitted, at least one candidate had prearranged his nomination in the sector and promised aid and positions to villages and leaders if he won--which he did. Many also accused COPIN of subtly backing this same candidate. Salvador told me that initially "we leaned toward Entimo for mayor, but after we heard about a problem in his family, we leaned toward Eucevio who won" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer). Finally, many complained that the process designed by COPIN was undemocratic because there was no competition between two tickets or even the top two vote-getters.¹²⁰

A group of leaders, some of them potential candidates, were so angry that they went to the Ministry of Government to try to annul the elections, but ultimately desisted due to fears that the whole municipality would be cancelled in the process. COPIN's use of its influence in the election process cemented its relationship with the mayor and his networks. However, its heavy-handedness and lack of inclusion of significant leaders in the election's design and direction caused many to blame COPIN for the resulting problems and loss of trust and respect (and in a few cases open hostility) for both COPIN and the mayor.

Formation of the Municipal Corporation

The Municipal Corporation would have been the appropriate and obvious body to carry on the region's model of decision-making using village leaders and networks. However, the municipal corporation, like COPIN, failed to meaningfully involve local

"We [COPIN] believe that women must participate in the fight, women must participate, they must be protagonists, they have to plan their own lives..." (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

¹²⁰Out of about one thousand five hundred votes cast, the winner received only slightly more than five hundred and difference between the top two candidates was only seventy-eight votes. Many felt frustrated that there was not a second round of voting between the two top candidates.

leaders and their networks in the decision-making process. This was due to several factors. First, under COPIN's and the state's influence, the region set up both the state structure which consisted of a mayor and four *regidores* as well as COPIN's structure of twelve commissions both at the village and municipal level. A mayor-centered national model, a weak set of regidores and the confusion and ineffectiveness of the commissions all contributed to the municipality's problems and the villagers' criticisms.

Second, the municipal corporation was inexperienced and poorly prepared by COPIN and the state. None of the elected members had more than a third grade education and none had managed more than their own farm and village committees. Third, despite their inexperience and a lack of preparation, they were immediately responsible for hiring, training and supervising a municipal secretary, treasurer and judge; negotiating with powerful government and development officials and overseeing multi-million dollar projects. Finally, the mayor appeared unsympathetic to increasing the participation of local leaders, including the other members of the municipal corporation and often made decisions without consulting the rest of the corporation. For example, he alone chose contractors and made agreements with them, negotiated in Tegucigalpa with government officials and told the municipal judge not to enforce the liquor laws.

When the Monteverde sector was asked to evaluate the corporation in January, 1996, the first item they mentioned was that they "don't listen to the people." The villagers' dissatisfaction with the corporation has much to do with their expectations. During the last thirty years, village leaders and their networks played a central role in regional problem solving through the *Patronato Sectorial* and even through COPIN in the planning of the pilgrimage. The mayor they elected was a son of one of the founders of the *Patronato Sectorial* and had himself been very involved in both the

patronato and the mobilization for the pilgrimage. After the pilgrimage, these villagers expected that both COPIN and the municipal corporation would continue using this model. However, the complex structures, inexperience of the personnel, enormity of their task and the mayor's near monopoly of power all contributed to the lack of participation by villagers, frustrated expectations and the resulting increase in conflict and the breakdown of relationships.

Municipal Assemblies

The COPIN organizers believed in the "participatory model" of mobilization which argues that increasing the breadth and depth of villagers' participation results in greater mobilization as well as more effective and just development. They were convinced that the success of the first pilgrimage resulted from the fact that it was "based on what the people wanted and not on what we said" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN coordinator). As a result, COPIN and the municipal corporation changed their model for communicating with and mobilizing villagers. Rather than meeting regularly with local leaders who in turn communicated with their villages as they had during the first pilgrimage, COPIN and the new mayor began calling municipal assemblies which they saw as a means to increase the breadth and depth of participation. Everyone in the region was invited and those who attended had direct access to information (rather than through village leaders) as well as an opportunity to give input and vote on all decisions. An implicit sub-theme often found in arguments for increasing the breadth of participation, which was certainly present in COPIN's and the mayor's management of assemblies is a distrust of representatives and local leaders who may manipulate or distort information or interests.

COPIN and the mayor announced the date of municipal assemblies but not their agendas, presumably to limit the opposition's ability to organize but also to give villagers the opportunity to present their own agendas. To avoid manipulation by a

few leaders, COPIN would plan the agenda and then ask villagers if they had additional items to discuss and because they were more skilled facilitator, COPIN organizers would act as moderators--inevitably a position of power. While each of these actions was taken in the spirit of increasing the "people's participation," together they resulted in participants who were unprepared and often intimidated. "It's difficult to talk in front of an assembly. You almost have to prepare ahead of time...what you want to say, which issue you want to address" (Maximino López, villager).

Also in the spirit of participation, COPIN would arrive not with proposals but with questions which they hoped would spur the participants to reflect, analyze and act. However, this resulted in several hundred people reflecting on a series of questions for four or five hours under a hot sun and often going home without resolving any of them. Those present were asked to take vote on proposals, however villagers were uncomfortable taking binding votes without the opportunity to consult their networks or other villagers, especially the sparse representatives of the most distant villages.

It is clear from this description and the examples which follow that COPIN's and the municipal corporation's attempts to broaden participation, although sometimes well-intentioned, frustrated villagers, marginalized leaders and resulted in the breakdown of trust and respect.

Some villagers also criticized the fact that the municipal assemblies discussed were always planned to coincide with the visits of the parish priest. COPIN knew that the masses, baptisms and marriages would attract hundreds who might not make the long trek solely for a COPIN meeting and although that coordination itself was acceptable to most villagers, some were angered because COPIN, during its daily radio program, invariably cited the number present as a sign of their "overwhelming

popular support" in the region--just one more example of both the power and volatility of using spiritual themes to mobilize participants.

Municipal Corporation's Reckoning (April, 1995)

In April of 1995, COPIN and the mayor called a municipal assembly to be held in Monteverde. During Salvador Zúniga's opening remarks it became clear that COPIN wanted to publicly censor the municipal corporation. He raised the following questions for discussion: "Why is there not an open and participative process in the municipality? Why is there not a just distribution of benefits? Why do the commissions not function? Is the dry law being enforced? Why was a single engineer given all the school construction contracts?" [implying a deal made between the engineer and the mayor] (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer). Villagers then brought up several issues COPIN had not even mentioned: their payment and poor treatment by the engineer building the schools, high taxes, the continuing production and consumption of alcohol and the lack of visits and assistance from the mayor. Villagers hardly addressed the questions raised by Salvador presumably because some were too sensitive to be treated in public and without preparation and others were not priorities for them or were not understood due to their theoretical wording.

After about two hours of discussion, the mayor had responded to most of the issues and the assembly was adjourned. The mayor and several other leaders told me that they were frustrated with COPIN for not consulting them first about many of the points, and because of the lack of resolution of the issues raised.

World Vision's Reckoning

In June of 1995, COPIN and the mayor called a meeting of all residents and NGOs working in the municipality. During this meeting it became clear that COPIN

was adamantly opposed to World Vision's presence in the region.¹²¹ COPIN grilled the organization's representatives with extremely hostile questions, some of which they had reportedly prompted local leaders to ask about topics including: birth control, sponsoring children, religion, paying villagers and rumors that they had informed on the FMLN in the 1980s. While none of the villagers publicly objected to COPIN's questions in the meeting (several NGO representatives did), most were confused because the questions treated aspects of the organization which they had not experienced, and angry because they were afraid that COPIN would drive away a program which had been one of the few to keep its promises to build homes, start preschools and develop agriculture programs.

ONILH's Reckoning (August-September 1995)

The growing differences between COPIN's and the local leaders became very public when ONILH (National Organization of Lenca Indians in Honduras) attempted to organize villages in the region. COPIN attacked ONILH by radio accusing the group of lying about the amount of money it had been allocated for the region and of writing a letter asking the government to cancel all projects in the San Francisco de Opalaca region. The mayor of San Francisco, still a strong ally of COPIN, announced that he was considering banning ONILH from working in the region.

Many villagers believed that COPIN was both fearful and jealous because ONILH had promised to investigate COPIN's and the mayor's use of money and because ONILH might make good on its promise to facilitate a direct relationship

¹²¹COPIN claims that their opposition to World Vision's presences resulted from their reputation of carrying out dependency creating projects, as well as COPIN's antagonism to World Vision's reputed position on some of the topics referred to in the text above. Some villagers argued that COPIN's opposition was based on jealousy. World Vision had money to carry out projects, and the success of these projects was winning them supporters and diluting support for COPIN.

between the region and donor organizations. Supporters of ONILH, and many others who were fairly neutral wondered why COPIN was launching such a hostile attack on ONILH, if it had nothing to hide? A common position regarding ONILH's presence was "we aren't against anyone. Let's try it--if they work well, we'll let them stay and if they don't, we'll kick them out" (Basflico Lara, villager).

The accusations and counteraccusations were repeated in a municipal assembly in August with few results except heightened emotions between COPIN and ONILH supporters. A COPIN organizer proposed that the villages form a commission to investigate COPIN's finances. The commission was formed but Salvador Zúniga used the COPIN radio program to threaten the commission and Felix Bejarano, a village leader highly critical of COPIN and a supporter of ONILH, with charges of slander. Zúniga then had Bejarano, who was Justice of the Peace, called in by his supervisor to apologize to COPIN.

The level of discontent among village leaders was demonstrated by the fact that the investigating commission went to Tegucigalpa, despite COPIN's threat, and filed a petition with the *Fiscalía de las Etnias* (Attorney General for Indigenous Groups) asking them to investigate COPIN's finances. "We told them that COPIN wanted to bring up charges against us, but they told us not to worry because if we were appointed by an assembly they would have to charge the whole assembly" (Julian Vásquez, villager).

A second assembly was held in September, 1995 to further discuss ONILH's role in the municipality. Again little progress was made but near the end of the assembly Vicenta Gonzalez, a COPIN-employed villager, asked that Basflico Lara be removed as head of the Indigenous Council. Within days Basflico was replaced by a friend of the mayor and COPIN board member.

The mayor argued that Basflico "never met with me, never coordinated his work with me and finally I just told myself I should quit messing around with him" (Eucevio Gómez, villager). Basflico and other leaders argued that COPIN wanted him removed because of his support for ONILH and the investigative petition so they had met with Vicenta and the mayor's family before the assembly to prepare the proposal. Basflico believed that the mayor sided with COPIN because he was fearful of ONILH and wanted someone more supportive in Basflico's position.

One leader summarized what he had learned from the conflict between COPIN and ONILH, Felix and Basflico like this: "you can be intelligent, but with people like this [COPIN], you have to give in, you have to sell out. Your only option is to agree with them, because otherwise life gets too difficult" (Ignacio Gómez, villager).

These three assemblies demonstrate how COPIN's and the mayor's failure to involve local leaders resulted in the development of frames that not only failed to resonate with villagers but often openly contradicted local frames. Such contradictions caused frustration and hostility. The assembly forum, while theoretically broadening participation, was not effective in resolving conflicts and building relationships. Each of the assemblies demonstrates COPIN's and the mayor's increased willingness to rely on coercion to achieve their ends as relationships broke down. Finally, the ONILH assembly clearly demonstrates the power of networks in mobilization efforts as those aligned with COPIN and the mayor increasingly were brought into conflict with the more marginalized leaders.

Third Pilgrimage

In July of 1995, COPIN organized a third pilgrimage based on demands from other regions for roads, bridges and health services. The planning for the event was done by COPIN and the leaders of the other regions. The people of San Francisco were invited to attend by radio and Salvador Zúniga made one visit to the region and

spoke for a few minutes after a mass, inviting people from the region to "support the other regions which supported you."¹²²

While this event was successful in achieving the vast majority of its demands, it was not successful in mobilizing the networks in San Francisco de Opalaca. Of the 600 people who participated, less than 50 were from San Francisco de Opalaca, and of those 50, the vast majority were part of the networks of the mayor and two or three other leaders still very close to COPIN. One village leader explained that:

Several people asked me what was going to happen. I told them that I was not going to go, that it was just to support people from other municipalities. It's possible that if I had gone, a whole bunch of people would have gone too (Felix Rodriguez, villager).

The third pilgrimage demonstrated the power of participation, frames, networks and relationships in two contradictory manners. First, the lack of participation, the broken relationships and the extremely weak frame explains why only fifty people participated compared to the thousands mobilized for the first and second pilgrimages. However, the fact that fifty people paid costs and risked participating also demonstrates the power of the relationship between these three or four leaders and COPIN as well as the abilities of their networks to mobilize participants in spite of a weak frame and lack of participation.

COPIN's Reckoning and Reflection

Following the conflict with ONILH and the third pilgrimage, COPIN's support in the region was at an all time low. Local leaders argued that COPIN did not respect

¹²²Interestingly, despite the "support for other regions" frame with which COPIN promoted the event, San Francisco de Opalaca actually received many concrete benefits from the pilgrimage including a shipment of food by helicopter and promises to move quickly on the construction of a health center and the road. However, these demands were developed by COPIN and village leaders once they arrived in Tegucigalpa. Had COPIN met earlier with village leaders to analyze local demands, it would have been able to develop a much more powerful mobilization frame.

them and tried to impose its will regardless of their opinion. "In the [radio] program they say 'These things were achieved because of COPIN. I start to think, 'So where do the people come in to all this?'" (Maximino López, villager). Another person stated his perception of COPIN's disrespect in terms of slave and master:

At one point COPIN was a support...it helped us to open our eyes. Then, when it had partially done this, COPIN wanted to take advantage of its opportunities by using us. It started thinking it was better than us...and it wanted us practically to live in slavery under COPIN (Isaías Vásquez, villager).¹²³

Villagers were afraid that COPIN could no longer be trusted. This distrust was most obvious in accusations of corruption. "For COPIN these mobilizations were good business, they kept all the best for themselves." (Valentin Gómez, villager). Because COPIN staff often stated publicly that they received no outside funding or salaries, many questioned how they were able to rent an office, pay for the radio program and pay their expenses:

A little while ago COPIN announced that there was no money for a [radio] program. I thought, 'its all over'. But now they say its going to be an hour long. They never tell the truth but if you question them, they don't like it (Maximino López, villager).

Villagers also lost respect and trust in COPIN's leadership when they became aware that their faith and its symbols were being used for COPIN's ends. "Salvador talks a lot about spiritual things, but sometimes its just a strategy to attract people" (Maximino López, villager). Another villager mentioned COPIN's lack of gratitude to God for their success. "Salvador just says 'I did it.' He doesn't mention God's help" (Santana Gómez, villager). Finally a *delegado* stated that "The Catholic thing

¹²³While listening to these leader's complaints, I was struck by how similar they sounded to the reasons ADRO and other popular organizations gave for pulling out of COPIN. I will analyze the reasons behind this in the section on coercion near the end of this chapter.

is just strategy for Salvador, pure strategy. In Tegucigalpa, they never got close to a mass or here either, they are always off somewhere talking" (Entimo Vásquez, villager).

While COPIN's initial response to the villagers' complaints was anger and threats, it now agrees with its critics that it has at times attempted to impose its ideas on the region--specifically with respect to World Vision and ONILH. Salvador blames this on what he calls "vanguardism" and explains that:

Common sense should have told us that someone who is getting eaten by bugs every night is not going to reject a house with a tin roof even if they do blackmail them with their children [a reference to World Vision's child sponsorship program]. But we wanted the people to be tough and say "To hell with World Vision, let the bugs eat me up." Even we wouldn't be capable of doing that (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

COPIN agrees that they were not always respectful of local faith and spirituality:

We respected local culture. We didn't believe in the saints or the images but if the people believe, [we thought] "why not strengthen and respect their beliefs"...But sometimes we were hypocritical, telling jokes and eating during mass...you think no one is watching... but it's true, it did bother them (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

While COPIN organizers do not specifically mention their shift in focus regarding participation and relationships in those terms, but they do admit that "our biggest weakness is that we don't visit the communities enough" (Salvador Zúniga, COPIN organizer).

Finally, COPIN denies that there is any reason to distrust their management of finances by pointing to their practice of publishing financial reports and summaries of each event which are distributed in the villages. They blame these accusations first of all on the common suspicion of corruption leveled at all popular organizations and

secondly on the misinformation campaign the powerful elites initiated to discredit them. They argue that if any of these organizations had proof of corruption, they would not waste time in publicly discrediting COPIN and in prosecuting its leadership.

The villagers' criticisms and COPIN's subsequent reflection highlight their mutual recognition of the importance of trust, respect and relationships to their mobilization efforts.

Plan de Barrios

During this reflective period, COPIN entered into a new relationship in San Francisco de Opalaca. In September, 1995, leaders from Plan de Barrios (a village in the region) visited COPIN and asked for help in dismissing a teacher accused of molesting young girls. COPIN visited the village, was received by over 100 residents and a relationship was born. COPIN and village leaders exchanged visits, held meetings, planned and carried out actions not only to dismiss but to incarcerate the teacher.

The sector of Plan de Barrios became COPIN's "new" partner¹²⁴ in the region, while COPIN avoided and ignored other sectors including the municipal seat of Monteverde and its leaders. In October, COPIN planned a mobilization to Tegucigalpa to 1) protest French nuclear testing 2) protest the celebration of Columbus day 3) protest a recent massacre of Guatemala Indians and 4) maintain pressure on the government to keep its promises. While leaders from Monteverde region were not involved and sent no participants, leaders of Plan de Barrios helped plan the mobilization and sent over half of the several hundred participants. It was during that protest that village leaders and COPIN publicly denounced the teacher

¹²⁴The sector of Plan de Barrios had been involved in the Toma and the Second Pilgrimage, but their leaders did not play a central role.

from Plan de Barrios. The story made front page news and the same day the minister of education called COPIN to inform them that the teacher had been dismissed and an investigation would begin immediately.

In November, COPIN planned a manifestation in La Esperanza seeking to 1) gain the respect of local political leaders 2) pressure the government to follow up on its promises and 3) present new needs. Salvador Zúniga visited six villages in two days, all of them in the Plan de Barrios sector.¹²⁵ Again, several hundred people participated from Plan de Barrios, none from the Monteverde region.

COPIN blames the lack of participation of the Monteverde sector on its leaders whom they believe are ungrateful, negative, worn-out and overly influenced by negative propaganda. The Monteverde leaders¹²⁶ claim that COPIN is untrustworthy and disrespectful and attribute the participation of the Plan de Barrios sector to leaders who are "easily fooled" (anonymous, villager) and "bought off" (anonymous, villager).¹²⁷ They argue that the Plan de Barrios sector will soon learn for themselves.

I believe that the mobilization of a high percentage of the households in the Plan de Barrios sector is not foolishness but the result of COPIN's return to the use

¹²⁵Visiting six villages in two days is a herculean feat when one remembers that the hike to Plan de Barrios alone is four hours one way, the distance between villages is about two hours and October is one of the rainiest months, making the trails muddy and slick.

¹²⁶In January, 1996 I interviewed villagers from nearly all of the sectors and found that the criticisms of COPIN were generalized to all sectors except Plan de Barrios, although they were held most strongly in Monteverde. Monteverde leaders believe they are most critical of COPIN because they have had the most contact with them.

¹²⁷During the Third Pilgrimage all of the women received £100 from an anonymous donor and all of the participants received used clothing. These donations resulted in rumors that COPIN was paying people to participate in their events.

of the mobilization model of the first pilgrimage. COPIN and local leaders have been meeting to discuss issues and strategies and in the process have developed powerful mobilization frames. During the meetings leaders have become convinced and proficient in using the mobilization frame and have developed relationships with COPIN. Leaders efforts to mobilize their networks have been reinforced by visits from COPIN organizers. With each event and the continuing use of this model, relationships have been strengthened.¹²⁸ I believe the reason COPIN has returned to this model includes 1) their reflection on their errors, 2) the experience and habits developed during the first pilgrimage and 3) their work with principally one village which resulted in a focus on more practical goals (ie. incarcerate the teacher and mobilize a large number of people) rather than the more lofty goals they set for the new municipality. COPIN's success in Plan de Barrios can also be explained by its return to the activity at which it excelled so well initially in the entire region--mobilizing villagers against a common outside enemy. While its increasing role in the politics and everyday management of the region's affairs led to internal skirmishes from which it emerged battered and strongly questioned, in Plan de Barrios it could once again return to the leadership role of organizing people against their common enemy.

I doubt I could have invented a more illustrative ending for this section than that of COPIN's relationship with Plan de Barrios. It demonstrates the continuing power of participation, frames, networks and relationships in everyday mobilizations. COPIN's experience and shift back to this model gives reason to hope that COPIN

¹²⁸The strength of Plan de Barrios' trust and relationship with COPIN is highlighted by an event in November to which 150 women and children, all from Plan de Barrios sector, traveled without male accompaniment to Tegucigalpa.

and the villages can learn from their mistakes and adapt more effective models for mobilization.

The Mobilization Model in Everyday Mobilizations

This chapter has demonstrated that the mobilization model used for the extraordinary mobilization for the first pilgrimage was also dominant in the subsequent "everyday" mobilizations through which COPIN, local leaders and other organizations attempted to sustain support and further the region's goals. First, nearly every event cited in this chapter highlights the conflict and resulting decrease in mobilization resulting from COPIN's failure to develop frames which resonated with potential participants. Examples include COPIN's framing of the *compostura*, World Vision and ONILH, each of which not only failed to mobilize support but also created hostilities. Comparing the minimal mobilization for the third pilgrimage to the strong support for the first and second, also illustrates the effect of a weak general mobilization frame and a locally powerful one.

Second, the conflict between COPIN and ONILH portrayed organizations and leaders using networks in their everyday efforts to mobilize support and make changes. The third pilgrimage demonstrated that while the vast majority of networks did not mobilize in the absence of an effective frame and network support, the participation and motivation of a few leaders was sufficient to mobilize almost fifty members of their networks despite an extremely weak frame.

Third, while the first pilgrimage and the case of Plan de Barrios demonstrate the power of limited participation by local leaders, the other mobilizations following the pilgrimage demonstrate both the dangers of increasing the breadth and depth of participation and marginalizing local leaders. Without the active support and participation of local leaders frames were weakened and at times contradicted local interests, relationships disintegrated and networks were not mobilized.

Finally, most of the events following the pilgrimage demonstrate the effects of broken relationships on mobilization efforts as the breakdown of trust and respect for COPIN and the municipal corporation led to decreased support and participation by village leaders and their networks. However, the second and third pilgrimages as well as COPIN's shift to Plan de Barrios demonstrate the continuing relevance of relationships for everyday mobilizations. Within the context of strong relationships, the residents of the region demonstrated repeatedly their willingness to ignore their lack of participation, the lack of effective frames and the risks involved in confronting the military and even sending women and children unaccompanied by men to Tegucigalpa. When those relationships broke down, little could move the people.

Engaging Issues of Spirituality

Several events following the first pilgrimage illustrate both the power and the volatility of using people's faith and spirituality as a mobilization factor. The second pilgrimage mobilized between five and ten thousand participants, due largely to its use of spiritual symbols and themes. COPIN and the municipal corporation continued to mobilize participants to their assemblies by scheduling them to coincide with the visits of the priest. However, the anger and breakdown of relationships resulting from COPIN's uncritical endorsement of the *compostura* and the growing perception that COPIN was using villagers' faith toward its own ends demonstrates the risk of incorporating these themes into mobilization efforts.

The Shift from Relationship to Coercion

Over the last year and a half COPIN's power base has shifted from being principally relational-based to authority/coercion-based. Before the first pilgrimage, COPIN had few if any sources of coercive power and therefore needed to rely on relationships and a powerful framing of events to mobilize leaders and their networks. However, after the success of the first and second pilgrimage, COPIN was able to

coerce government officials and other organizations by threatening (explicitly or implicitly) mass mobilizations and damaging media attention. This power over the government, COPIN's increased recognition through the radio program, and the ability to call and direct municipal assemblies also gave COPIN coercive power over people in the region. The past has clearly demonstrated that COPIN is not hesitant to use overtly coercive measures with the government (i.e. the Toma del Aserradero and the Pilgrimages) with development organizations (i.e. World Vision and ONILH) and with villagers (i.e. Felix and Basflico) However, this power base is fragile because it relies on the perception that COPIN is able to mobilize masses and utilize the press. A breakdown in that perception would logically lead to a breakdown of their coercive power.

COPIN is also aware, at least to some extent, of this transition in their power base. Salvador Zúniga (COPIN organizer) confided to me:

Sometimes I feel like a government official. Some days fifty people show up in my office. Five teachers want a placement. A girl who has been raped wants me to help her. The next day the father of the alleged rapist shows up asking that I help his son...I need to really reflect on my role.

Perhaps the most powerful indicator of this transformation is the fact that two Monteverde leaders who have been extremely critical of COPIN recently asked Salvador for political favors. One asked Salvador to be a godparent for his daughter and another for COPIN's support in getting the job as the operator of the telephone that is "soon-to-be" installed in the new municipality.

These cases make it clear that COPIN has, at least temporarily, become a replacement for the former coercive power in San Francisco de Opalaca--politicians and political parties. Before the pilgrimage, anyone in the region who needed a

political favor went to the local government officials of their party (mayors and congressmen), now they go to COPIN.

The explanations behind the breakdown of relationships and COPIN's shift to coercive power are interrelated and include: 1. COPIN's decreased presence in the region as organizers focus on organizing other areas 2. COPIN's commitment to principle over relationship--COPIN leadership has proven relatively unconcerned about damaging relationships with the government, NGOS, villagers or even other COPIN organizers in their quest to clarify questionable actions or attitudes, 3. COPIN leadership's preference for and apparent enjoyment of public rather than private exposure of conflict.

The reaction of Opalacans to this shift from relational to coercive power has been both fear and anger. Fear of jail time and other intimidations but also anger that COPIN had taken on the role of their superior, especially given COPIN's rhetoric condemning past authorities for their oppression of the Lencas and San Francisco de Opalaca. One leader's public criticism, demonstrated by his filing a complaint in Tegucigalpa, illustrates a willingness to challenge a powerful force like COPIN and while some leaders and networks may comply with COPIN's coercion, COPIN and other outsiders would be mistaken to interpret this compliance as support. More likely, the relationship will be characterized by "everyday forms of resistance" (see Scott, 1985) in which villagers seek to maximize the region's benefits from COPIN while minimizing its power over them.

Broadening Participation: More Can Be Less

The mobilization for the first pilgrimage and the events which followed demonstrate the power and importance of participation but also the potential dangers of increasing its breadth and depth. The first pilgrimage tapped into a regional analysis and decision-making model which relied on village representatives to discuss

issues, form proposals and return to their villages to seek approval for their ideas (see Chapter 2). After the pilgrimage COPIN and the municipal corporation changed this model in an effort to broaden participation and limit the power of village leaders. They began holding municipal assemblies, set up twelve commissions in each village and at the municipal level and abandoned their practice of meeting with village leaders.

The municipal assemblies did broaden participation by most standards: every adult was free to attend, the meetings gave villagers "direct" access to information as well as voice and vote on all issues. However, for villagers who were accustomed to discussing issues within networks of trusted friends and family, at their own pace, and coming to consensus, the large crowds coupled with the number of issues discussed and voted on were intimidating and frustrating. On the surface, the twelve commissions also appeared to increase the breadth and depth of participation--nearly every adult in the region was given a leadership role, and each commission was assigned an area of responsibility and the power to make decisions within that area. However, the number of commissions and the effort required to coordinate them created confusion, overextended the number of effective leaders and diluted the villagers' sense of responsibility so that eighteen months after their formation, ninety-five percent of the commissions were completely inactive. Finally, local leaders who had a substantial role in the first pilgrimage, were quite abruptly cut off from access to power and as a result felt distrusted and disrespected, angry and hostile.

Some villagers and COPIN seem to be realizing that while the assemblies and commissions are important, they cannot function without the assistance of a coordinating body representing the various village networks which can discuss problems, create proposals, develop mobilization frames, identify networks and build relationships. One leader remarked on how decisions used to be made:

There used to be more participation, there was a *patronato* in each community and a regional *patronato* where we could all meet to do joint projects in the communities. The leadership was visible...they promoted projects and carried them out. Now people are asleep...with so many commissions they all think someone else is going to do it (Basflico Lara, villager).

Salvador Zúniga (COPIN organizer) stated that:

there was more coordination and participation when San Francisco de Opalaca was a sector then now that it is a municipality. COPIN left a vacuum and the Municipal Corporation didn't fill it...In Plan de Barrios, Monteverde, Lajitas...there is participation but not coordination. There is a crisis in the municipality because there is no coordinating body.

The villagers' and COPIN's recognition of this problem, as well as the "rebirth" of the mobilization model in Plan de Barrios gives hope that the region will find appropriate participation structures and processes for analysis and decision-making.

Summary

One of the reasons I wanted to study a "successful" mobilization effort was to avoid writing yet another academic paper explaining in hindsight what should have been done. The mobilization for the pilgrimage was extremely successful and gave many insights into their mobilization strategies. In this chapter I have glossed over changes that for the residents are profound and very exciting. These include new houses, water systems, latrines, medical services and most of all their own municipality and a road.

However, the problems encountered in the first eighteen months of COPIN and local leaders' attempts to achieve some lofty goals has also yielded further insights. First, the "highlights" of the eighteen months illustrate the importance of the mobilization model in "everyday" mobilizations. Although COPIN and the municipal

corporation have not yet been successful in achieving many of their goals for the municipality, both their successes and their failures have given further insights into the role of frames, networks, participation, relationships and spirituality in everyday mobilizations. I will explore each of these concepts further in the next chapter in an attempt to discern the insights they offer to broader development theory and practice.

Second, the events recounted above demonstrate that COPIN and the Municipal Corporation's attempts to increase the breadth of participation resulted in damaged relationships and a decrease in their mobilization potential. The participatory model they developed made it difficult to develop powerful local mobilization frames and leaders felt disrespected and marginalized. These events also bring up interesting questions I will treat in the next chapter regarding breadth of participation, COPIN distrust of local leaders and information filters. Third, these highlights demonstrate COPIN's shift in strategy from relational-based power to coercion-based power. This shift results in compliance and resistance, fear and anger and the willingness of leaders to resist COPIN's attempts to impose its will. Finally, these highlights illustrate the functional power of spirituality to mobilize people in the region, as well as its volatility if not treated with respect and sensitivity.

CHAPTER 7: THE PILGRIMAGE AND DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

One of my goals for this dissertation was to write something which development theorists and practitioners would find both understandable and helpful. While I hope that the previous chapters give insights to academics and practitioners from various fields, I will address this chapter most specifically to development theorists and practitioners. I will review the mobilization model used for the pilgrimage and the events following it and outline the insights I believe it gives to development theory and practice. First, I will demonstrate how the neglected concepts of frames, networks, relationships and spirituality can both expand development theory and improve its practice. Second, I will question development models and assumptions which promote broad participation, foster distrust of local leaders and encourage grouping and focusing work on the poorest of the poor.

Before treating these two purposes, I would like to return briefly to the issue of transferability¹ of these findings to development theory and practice. It is not my intention in this chapter to develop a "grand" development theory or to argue that all of the findings of this study can be transferred to any development settings. Rather, I believe that some of the insights from this case may be "transferable" to other development contexts. Transferability is defined as "an empirical process for checking the degree of similarity between the sending and receiving contexts" (Guba and Lincoln, 1989:241). The San Francisco de Opalaca residents are neither so unique that others could learn nothing from their experience, nor so ordinary that their experience could be copied around the world. Opalacans are indigenous Lencas but much of their indigenous language and culture has been lost, they are relatively isolated yet

¹For a more complete treatment of the issue of transferability see the Introduction.

integrated into national and international economics, politics and society. They live in a small region, but are struggling with global issues including indigenous rights, land tenure, development, faith, participation and democracy.

Similarly, the pilgrimage and the events which follow are both unique and common. Mobilizing four thousand indigenous people to march to the capital is an atypical development project. However, the pilgrimage and more typical development activities such as agriculture projects are both seeking to mobilize participants for a risky and costly activity with uncertain benefits. Both usually depend on outside organizers promoting participation. Both are usually surrounded by differences of opinion within the village as some champion the activity and others criticize it. Chapter 6 also illustrates that the mobilization model used to mobilize thousands for the pilgrimage was also important in mobilizing participants for activities more generally associated with development projects such as training sessions, meetings and discussions regarding new projects. This chapter also dealt with another typical problem in development activities--the difficulty of maintaining initial motivation and participation. As a result, there is ample reason to explore how the insights from the pilgrimage and the events following it may be transferred to development theory and practice.

Frames

Within the social movement literature, the concept of frames is central to explaining how organizations are able to mobilize potential participants. A frame

refers to an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment." (Snow and Benford, 1992:136-7)

Movement organizations attempt to persuade potential participants to accept their framing of the situation, which calls for mobilization, instead of the dominant

frame which supports non-mobilization. Snow and Benford and other authors argue that a mobilization frame must identify an injustice, culpable agents and present a plan which gives hope and resonates with potential participants. Despite the similarity between the use of frames to mobilize participants for a social movement and a development activity, the concept of frames has not yet found its way into development literature.

The pilgrimage and the events following it illustrate the importance of frames in what can be characterized as a "social movement" followed by "development activities." Thousands of participants mobilized for the first pilgrimage, but only after a mobilization frame which drew on local history, economics and spirituality had gained their sympathy. Groups both for and against the pilgrimages, meetings and subsequent development projects constructed frames in an attempt to gain the sympathies of potential participants.

The literature on frames and my analysis of the mobilization for the pilgrimage has convinced me that development organizations will have greater success in mobilizing participants if they are more conscious of and active in the process of framing their projects. I am not arguing that the right frame will make any project a success but rather that a frame which fails to resonate with potential participants may explain why an apparently well designed project fails to mobilize potential participants or why the success of a project may vary from one village to another.

The pilgrimage and the events following it also give some suggestions as to how development organizations can be more conscious and active participants in the process of framing their projects. First, these events illustrate the potential mobilizing

power of factors such as local history, economics and spirituality.² Planning a "pilgrimage", rather than a "march" or a "protest," tapped into powerful spiritual symbolism and designating the road and the new municipality as two principal goals generated compelling historical and economic motivations. The power of these local themes in mobilization frames, suggests the value of thoroughly researching these topics in the regions where a development organization is working. Such research not only demonstrates a respect for residents but is also a source of knowledge which can be tapped when designing projects and constructing frames.

While researching these themes, the organization staff should be aware that local history, spirituality and economics are, like frames, also constructed, contested and dynamic. The framing of the pilgrimage demonstrated that an event such as land titling may be considered a success by one group and a failure by another. Therefore, it is important to seek out a variety of opinions on each theme to understand the often conflicting perspectives. Viewing these local themes and events as constructed and dynamic also implies that development organizations need not take their present constructions as givens but can be involved in the process of reconstructing and reframing them to encourage mobilization.

The pilgrimage and the events following it also demonstrate the local leaders' ability to construct and champion mobilization frames. It was local leaders who argued that "Christians can't spend all their time in church praying, they have to tend to the needs of others too," and asked "what do you prefer, to spend fifteen days suffering under the Congress building, or another fifty years hauling corn on your back."

²I believe these are three of the most powerful factors in frame development. I have dedicated the last section of this chapter to the role of spirituality because of its relative absence from development literature. However, I believe that history and economics are often as powerful, if not more so than spiritual themes.

Development organizations would benefit by identifying respected and trusted leaders, who represent the different networks in the village and involve them in framing their projects.

The organization could profit from working with the leaders, either together or in subgroups depending on the situation, to discuss the priority problems, identify those capable of solving them and how.³ Constructing the most powerful frame will require 1) involving local leaders in designing or at least redesigning the development projects to fit local priorities and context and 2) developing multiple frames and/or activities within the same project in order to address the priorities of the different potential participants.

Throughout these discussions with local leaders, all those involved should be conscious of the arguments used both for and against the ideas since these constitute the beginning of the mobilization frame. At some point in the process it may also be helpful to explicitly address the topic of frames by asking leaders why they believe this project is important and how they can best convince their neighbors--seeking to identify economic, spiritual and historical arguments as well as clearly identifying the potential criticisms, risks and benefits of the action. After their involvement in the process of developing the frame, the leaders should be both capable of and motivated to mobilize their networks. Development organizations may bolster local leaders efforts by widely circulating the mobilization frame and encouraging the village as a

³The social movement literature argues that a mobilization frame must identify an injustice and a culpable agent--which tend to transfer the responsibility to outsiders (the government and/or elites). However, because development efforts usually emphasize self-help activities, the necessary elements of the mobilization frame would include identifying priority problems, who can address them and how. This difference makes it clear how development organizations often take on responsibilities which the government and elites are unwilling or unable to address.

whole to discuss the proposed project, give input and decide whether or not they will support it.

The pilgrimage and the events following it also demonstrate that because frames are constructed, contested and dynamic, they require persistent attention and adjustments. Before the first pilgrimage, COPIN and village leaders worked together to construct and reconstruct frames in response to villagers' concerns and the opposition's criticisms. However, COPIN's framing of the *compostura*, World Vision and ONILH demonstrated that COPIN had become less able or less willing to reframe their position in response to local concerns and criticisms. These examples demonstrate that framing activities do not end once a project has been designed, framed and implemented. The organization and local leaders must regularly discuss the framing of the project in light of recent successes, failures and criticisms in a continuing attempt to maintain enthusiasm and increase the number of participants and their benefits.

The description of the framing process highlights another issue. Development organizations already are carrying out many of the activities suggested above: researching the sites where they are going to work, identifying key leaders, working with villagers to design and fit projects to their context and needs and holding regular evaluation sessions. In fact, in these same settings framing is already taking place. However, few organizations are conscious of the process and its importance, and as a result, are not guiding the process in a way which allows them to maximize the benefit of its mobilizing potential.

Networks

Social movement theorists (see della Porta, 1988; Gamson, 1992; McAdam, 1988; McAdam et al., 1988; Tarrow, 1991; and Klandermans, 1988) assert that participants are mobilized neither en masse nor as individuals but rather in the context of

networks. "If there is anything approximating a consistent finding in the empirical literature, it is that movement participants are recruited along established lines of interaction" (McAdam, 1988:715). Within the context of social networks, its members discuss and evaluate frames, apply and receive incentives and ultimately make their individual, but highly influenced, decision about whether or not to participate. Again, the rich social movement literature on networks has not been applied to development theory and practice.

During my study of the mobilization process for the pilgrimage, villagers regularly explained to me how their networks were constructed around relationships which included: family, friendship, godparents, political parties and even soccer teams. These networks provided a safe and dependable context in which to make decisions. Network members have plenty of time to discuss and evaluate frames and to consult their own "in-house experts," villagers with more education, experience and/or a proven track record. Within these networks, members also apply and receive social and economic incentives from the leader "down" as well as from the "bottom" up to encourage behaviors they believe will be beneficial to them and/or their network.

The pilgrimage and events following it also demonstrated the power of networks to mobilize participants. Examples include Santos Méndez who explained that despite the fact that he was gravely ill, he would have participated in the pilgrimage had his network leader, and the mobilization for the Third Pilgrimage for which two or three networks mobilized almost fifty people despite the almost total absence of a mobilization frame.

The social movement literature on networks and the analysis of the pilgrimage and the events which followed give several insights which may improve the mobilization efforts of development organizations. First, villagers decide whether or

not to participate in the context of networks, not in long meetings, big assemblies or because they sign-up (although each of these events may influence the decision either positively or negatively). While the networks themselves are outside of the development organization's control, they can influence the decision-making process by: 1) constructing a frame which resonates with members of target networks and especially network leaders 2) develop a relationship of trust and respect with network leaders and 3) widely disseminate the frame in order to support the efforts of sympathetic network leaders and gain sympathies of network members so that they apply incentives to their leaders.

Second, the role of networks in San Francisco de Opalaca clearly demonstrates the heterogeneity of the village. While there exists agreement that the village encompasses the relatively rich and the poor, men and women, authors such as Anderson continue to assert that "the individual and community interests blend and become one and the same" (1994:3). However, recognizing the conflicts between those promoting and those opposing the pilgrimage or between the mayor, who supported COPIN, opposed ONILH and sacked Basilico, and his neighbors Felix and Basilico who opposed COPIN, supported ONILH and publicly reproached the mayor demonstrates that no one "community interest" exists but rather a series of networks and leaders each attempting to seek what they believe is their own and the communal good.

Recognizing this heterogeneity illustrates the importance of actions and decisions which may align a development organization (or a researcher in my case) with one network or another. Such alignments may be the result of relatively major decisions such as hiring someone to work part time or as minor as where the staff eats lunch. While hiring or eating lunch within one network may well cement the support of that network, it may also ostracize the organization from other significant networks

in the village. Network competition and organizational alignment goes far in explaining why participation in many development projects is limited to one family, one church or one political party. And relatedly, demonstrates the significance of considering the workings of village networks in every-day decision-making.

Finally, networks and heterogeneity make problematic both participation and development models which target specific groups. While many authors, such as Burkey (1993) reject what he calls the "harmony model" (e.g., Anderson, 1994) which treats the village as an harmonious whole, he, and other participation theorists (see Oakley and Marsden's (1984) review of definitions), continue to refer to "people's" participation. He uses interchangeably the term "poor" and "people" which tends to both homogenize the "poor" and maintain ambiguous the humanity of the better-off (perhaps intentionally). The conflicts in San Francisco de Opalaca demonstrate the heterogeneity of the poor and underline the importance of asking *who* is participating and whose interests do they represent.

Although their language is problematic, Burkey (1993), Oakley and Marsden (1984) and others are not blind to heterogeneity in the village. They champion a model which ensures that the rich and powerful

do not appropriate the benefits of development activities. To do this we must discriminate in favor of the poor... [despite the fact that] the poor themselves are very often disunited and in competition with each other (Burkey, 1993:43-44).

Burkey purposes then, to replace the "harmony model" with a class-conflict model despite the lack of class-consciousness among the village's poor.

The class conflict model, which dominates development practice today, both distrusts village leaders and the relatively rich and attempts to "organize" groups based on socio-economic level, something its proponents admit is foreign but inescapable. As a result, a poor villager is asked to meet regularly not with his own

network but with other poor villagers from other networks, one of whom may have recently stolen his corn and another whose wife may have verbally abused his daughter. At the same time, that same villager is cut off from his wealthier and better educated brother, uncle and friends with whom he has always consulted before making important decisions.⁴

What would a development model look like which recognized both the heterogeneity of the village and its networks? Could a development organization work *within* networks and along with trusted and respected leaders to target groups such as the poor, women or indigenous peoples? Could networks and their leaders participate in designing appropriate models which used the network's own incentives to encourage both the altruism of the better-off and the acceptance of responsibility by the needier? Such a model may include different types of programs for different groups or one program with varying levels of assistance, such as sliding-scale subsidies or varying the intensiveness of training or visits. Such a model would also need to rely on the strengths of networks: in-depth analysis, consultation with "in-house experts" and the application of incentives outside of meetings. I believe such a model deserves further thought and attention.

Participation

Participation is defined by the Donnelly-Roark as "a process whose objective is to enable people to initiate action for self-reliant development and acquire the ability to influence and manage change within their society" (1993:3). The participation literature distinguishes between various degrees of participation, including the breadth of participation, denoting simply the number of people involved and the depth of

⁴While I refer to the villager as male, the same would hold true for women's networks which are based not on socio-economic level but on family, friendship, etc...

participation, which takes into account their level of control over the activity. Authors including Donnelly-Roark (1993), Korten (1983) and Bryant and White (1984) argue that participation is both good for development projects and good for people. They claim that participation increases the project's sustainability, adaptability, information base and local resources as well as increasing the "people's" self-confidence, creativity, initiative and power. Implicit, and sometimes explicit in these descriptions is the assumption that the more participation the better.

The pilgrimage and subsequent events offer several critiques and additions to this literature and the development practice based upon it. First, the pilgrimage and the events following it demonstrate that villages are always "participating"--the problem is that development organizations are seldom paying attention. The Donnelly-Roark definition states that the goal of participation is to "enable people to initiate action ... and acquire the ability to influence..." (1993:3). This definition and others like it leave the impression that unless "people" become involved in a participative process, they will be unable to initiate and influence or address their own problems.

However, in San Francisco de Opalaca, the networks and their leaders daily demonstrated their ability to initiate and respond to others' initiatives, framing and evaluating them in local terms. For over thirty years this small, isolated indigenous group initiated and influenced powerful actors without the help of any outside development organization. In addition to its own initiatives, Opalacans have evaluated and framed activities including land titling, the Toma del Aserradero and more recently the arrival of ONILH. While I am not arguing that development organizations can not improve this group's problem-solving and conflict resolution skills, I am arguing that participation is less about changing the village and more about increasing the receptiveness of development organizations. Perhaps the participation literature could better be called the listening literature and focus on how to tap into and focus

everyday village participation and together seek ways to improve it.

Second, the ability of a model with limited participation to mobilize thousands of participants suggests that such a model warrants further attention and calls into question the "more-is-better" participation approach. The participation in the mobilization for the pilgrimage was limited in both depth and breadth. While local leaders who attended planning meetings were able to influence some decisions, they certainly did not control the process. The participation of the broader community was limited to receiving updates and giving meager input in a few village meetings and regional assemblies.

The success of this model of limited participation suggest that some of its other characteristics be examined. First, local leaders⁵ helped construct a frame which resonated with potential participants in the region, something that would have been difficult without their participation. Second, local leaders identified key network leaders and knew how to convince them, another operation which would have been difficult without their participation. Third, the participation of local leaders allowed them to observe and test organizers which resulted in the development of a relationship of trust and respect. This relationship was essential given the high level of uncertainty, costs and risks involved in the mobilization. Finally, while the participation of the broader community was extremely limited, its was informed, had a few opportunities for input and finally made the choice whether or not to participate. This model suggests that limited participation in the context of relationships of trust and respect (both between the organizers and the leaders as well as between the village leaders and non-leaders) has the potential to be a very powerful mobilizer.

⁵The local leaders who participated often held no formal authority position but were informally recognized as trusted and respected leaders. I will continue to refer to them only as local leaders.

Third, the success of limited participation and the problems caused by attempts to broaden participation after the pilgrimage further call into question the "more-is-better" approach to participation as well as the accepted models for broadening participation. After the pilgrimage, COPIN and the new municipal corporation hoped to increase the breadth of participation and as a result, abandoned meetings with local leaders, set up twelve commissions at the village and municipal level and used municipal assemblies as the principal decision-making forum. COPIN's desire to increase participation was motivated by the dominant development paradigm which claims that increasing participation will result not only in better projects but also "greater social justice, and the development of self-confidence, pride [and] initiative..."(Burkey, 1993:56). This model also distrusts local leaders who have "considerable power over others...[and] will attempt to obstruct change" (Burkey 1993:208).

The introduction of this distrust of local leaders and the pursuit of broader participation by COPIN, had several results. First, while the twelve commissions did dramatically increase the number of people with leadership positions, it also diluted responsibility and the energies of effective leaders with the result that eighteen months later ninety-five percent of the commissions were not functioning. Second, while assemblies gave participants "direct" access to information, voice and vote; they were also intimidating, did not allow time for analysis, separated individuals from their consulting networks and called for binding votes without consulting and with uneven representation from villages. Third, the change in models from meetings with leaders to assemblies, left local leaders feeling marginalized and disrespected and later hostile and resistant.

COPIN argued, and many development organizations would do likewise, that the leaders' hostilities resulted from their loss of manipulative power. However, their

anger may have resulted from the fact that powerful outsiders were manipulating the local decision-making process and causing more harm than good. It seems worthwhile to consider the truth of the latter and listen to leaders' perspectives. While certainly the integrity of leaders varies from village to village, so does the integrity or at least the wisdom of development organizations. I would advocate that development organizations and theorists reevaluate their assumptions regarding local leaders, especially those who are trusted and respected by fellow villagers.

This leaves us with the general question of what is broad participation? COPIN's definition, and one I believe is most common in participative development circles, is that increasing participation involves increasing the number of people with "direct" access to information as well as increasing their input and control over decisions, most often through direct voting. This type of participation is touted as more democratic and sustainable and purportedly decreases the chances that an egoistic intermediary will manipulate the development process.

This definition assumes that the "direct" source of information, usually the development organization, is less manipulative and egoistic than are local leaders. In actuality development organizations are relatively unaccountable to the villagers with whom they work and have many reasons to try to manipulate the development process. This model also assumes that local leaders are manipulative and egoistic, when in San Francisco de Opalaca, leaders are both accountable and have gained trust and respect by giving of their time, money and energy to organize communal projects such as building bridges and repairing the church. This model also assumes that "direct" input into decisions and voting, often in the presence of powerful development organization staff, more truly represent the "whole's" interests, than decisions which are made in the context of networks.

This study suggests that development organizations and theorists should further

question their assumptions about broad participation and local leaders in light of these discussions of the role of networks and network leaders.

Relationships

I have defined relationships as an affinity between two individuals or groups characterized by trust and respect and which is perceived as yielding mutual and relatively equal benefits. Uphoff claims that such relationships are "probably one of the most under-reported factors in successful development work" (1992:365). Armonia argues that "development oriented institutions have too often overlooked friendship and patronage ties..." (1995:237).

Despite its absence in the development literature, relationships were clearly crucial to the mobilization for the first pilgrimage. While the framing of the event had gained the sympathy of many, the costs and risks were extremely high and the benefits highly uncertain. In order for leaders to participate and promote participation, they needed a relationship of trust and respect with COPIN: trust, that the organizers could follow through on their promises and not unnecessarily endanger them and respect that they were not being used or manipulated. Without trust and respect few if any villagers would have participated, with it, thousands took the risk of traveling to Tegucigalpa to confront the government.

The importance of relationships yields three insights into development theory and practice. First, if relationships are key to convincing individuals to take part in risky, costly and potentially beneficial activities then development organizations must have staff and structures which foster relationship building. In terms of staff, an individual's respectfulness and trustworthiness may be at least as important as his or her technical knowledge, one of the reasons "bare-foot" technicians often outperform professionals as field workers. Development organizations must recruit respectful and trustworthy individuals and reinforce those characteristics with training and structures.

In terms of structures,

recognizing the importance of relationships influences decisions regarding staff stability, the number of villages each staff person will be assigned, and incentives for "socializing" with villagers. The organization and its staff must also attempt in all its actions to demonstrate respect and trustworthiness by fulfilling its commitments on time, developing transparent criteria for assistance and treating villagers as equals.

Second, by strengthening their relationships with villagers, development organizations may be able to increase the likelihood that individuals will participate in risky but potentially beneficial activities and at the same time increase their sense of achievement. I make this observation because there appears to be a trade-off between risk and relationship. Because the costs and risks were high for the pilgrimage, the relationship between COPIN and the village leaders needed to be quite strong. However, the lower the risks, the less trust and respect would be necessary to convince individuals to participate. Development organizations recognize, at least subconsciously, the truth of this. They often artificially decrease the risks involved in participating in a development projects by subsidizing prices, offering no-interest loans or donating materials, which reduces the need for high trust between the organization's staff and potential participants.

However, as the first pilgrimage demonstrated, participating in an activity with high risk, high cost and uncertain benefits requires a higher level of commitment and, if successful, results in a much higher sense of achievement, while low risk and low cost activities with more certain benefits require little commitment and give little sense of achievement. Therefore, a stronger relationship between the organization's staff and potential participants will increase the likelihood that potential participants will become involved in more risky/costly activities and at the same time increase their level of commitment and sense of accomplishment. In fact it may well be that many of the

purported benefits of participation, such as sustainability and sense of achievement are in large part due not directly to the act of participation but to the *relationships* built *through* participation.

Third, both the use of coercion and the perception of coercion are increasingly likely as relationships are weakened. The events following the first pilgrimage demonstrated that as COPIN's and the mayor's relationship with local leaders disintegrated, they increasingly turned to coercion to produce the desired results. COPIN used the radio, municipal assemblies and their influence with the government to "encourage" villagers to oppose World Vision and ONILH and not to question COPIN's finances. Later that "encouragement" became perceived as (and at least occasionally was intended to be) coercive such as when COPIN insinuated the loss of individual and regional benefits and even prosecution of several local leaders.

The relationship between COPIN and these villagers was no longer based on trust, respect and mutually and relatively equal benefits. COPIN had taken a position of power over local leaders and they reacted with hostility and resistance. Local leaders reacted in kind--trying to maximize their benefits while minimizing COPIN's power over them. This explains why local leaders continued to use COPIN's political power while at the same time spreading rumors and even asking the government to begin a formal investigation of their finances.

Development organizations are often in similar situations. They have at their fingertips many incentives--agricultural inputs, loans, training and materials, which they can use to encourage certain types of behavior. Outside of a relationship, or as a relationship breaks down, these "encouragements" can be construed by individuals and their networks as coercion and result in hostility and resistance. Resistance to coercion helps explain why farmers rip out soil conservation methods they have been paid to install or why a latrine they were paid to build stands unused. Therefore,

relationships not only increase the likelihood that individuals will participate in risky but beneficial activities, but also enable development organizations to avoid applying coercive means and having their actions construed as coercive.

Spirituality and Development

I define spirituality as a relationship with the supernatural or spiritual realm which is a source of power and a basis for personal and communal reflection and action. The topic of spirituality is rarely treated in development research, theory and practice. This absence is especially curious given the centrality of spirituality to daily decision-making and life for the vast majority of the third-world poor.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of integrated rural development was popular. In their classic text on development, Bryant and White state that:

Integration is rooted in the fundamentally correct observation that the poverty of rural small farmers stems from a host of problems from health to literacy to access to credit and technology. Hence the idea was to try to address the many problems simultaneously (1984:290).

The idea of integrated development continues to direct development practice. The areas most often included are: agriculture or other types of production (including credit and technology), health, literacy, environment, infrastructure and the government policies associated with each.

During the 1980s and 1990s the concept of indigenous knowledge became increasingly popular in development circles. Indigenous knowledge has been defined by Chandler as "the accumulated experience of traditional people" (1991:60). Brokensha et al. stated in their initial book on indigenous knowledge and development that:

to incorporate in developmental planning indigenous knowledge: is a courtesy to the people concerned; is an essential first step to successful development; emphasizes human needs and resources [and] preserves valuable local knowledge" (1980:8).

In the field of development, an indigenous knowledge approach has been applied principally to three areas: agriculture (ie. intercropping, pest management and soil and water conservation), health (ie natural medicines and traditional medical practices) and the environment (ie water shed management and social forestry). I could find no references to spirituality in the extensive indigenous knowledge literature.

Despite its absence from the literature, spirituality is clearly powerful in villagers' lives. The first and second pilgrimages demonstrated the functional power of faith to mobilize thousands for risky and costly activities. However, for residents of San Francisco de Opalaca, like most of the "Third-World" poor, their spiritual beliefs are more than functional. They believe that God exists and acts in their daily lives. This belief directs their attitudes and actions, including how they plant their corn and how they treat a baby with diarrhea. Opalacans also believe that God sometimes acts in extraordinary ways, a fact which they cite to help explain the massive mobilization for the First Pilgrimage, their safety and their success.

While the lack of attention to the themes of faith and spirituality has many possible explanations,⁶ I believe it is crucial that more attention be given them. Exploring issues of faith and spirituality will help both theorists and practitioners to better understand the functional power of these themes in villagers' daily decisions and as potential mobilizers. It seems implausible to assume that the researcher has much to learn from the centuries of "accumulated experience" in agriculture and health but not in spirituality. As a result I would expect that an indigenous knowledge approach to spirituality has much to teach us about our own lives as well.

I believe there are at least four approaches for treating the issues of faith and

⁶One possible explanation is that scientists feel comfortable changing traditional agricultural and health practices but not cultural or spiritual ones. This argument however, fails to recognize the interrelatedness of these practices.

spirituality in development. First, the "COPIN model" which attempted to harness the mobilizing power of these themes without sharing the potential participants beliefs. While this model was successful in mobilizing thousands in the short term, COPIN was soon accused of insincerity and later of hypocrisy in manipulating meaningful symbols for their own ends.

Second, the "missionary model" carries out development practice while implicitly or explicitly attempting to change participants' spiritual beliefs to those of the development organization. This model is out of vogue, even among many historically religious organizations who now put non-sectarian in their self-description. Two of the principal problems with the model are 1) it often results in charges of coercion (ie rice-christians) and conflict with the "beneficiaries," and 2) those who "convert" often do so uncritically. They are not encouraged to reflect on what they are accepting or rejecting. By failing to take time to reflect, both converter and converted lose valuable insights.

Third, the "enlightenment model" seeks to carry out development work without addressing spiritual and faith issues. This is the model which is dominant in San Francisco de Opalaca and in development practice in general. The staff of development organizations, who are more educated, wealthy and "experienced," seldom go to church and do not discuss faith and spirituality. The medical professionals order villagers not to visit *rezadores* because they believe their mixture of prayers and traditional medicines are dangerous. The agriculture professionals either ignore or ridicule the *compostura*. Some residents are taking up this critical "scientific" approach, "There they are, [those who practice the *compostura*] all day, wasting time and it makes no difference, we get the same harvest" (Avelino Gómez, villager). It may be true that God does not respond to tests comparing plots planted with and without *composturas* but rather as another villager argued "if it weren't for

those of us who listen to the Word and do the *composturas*, there wouldn't be any corn or beans. I hope to God we never quit" (Isafas Vásquez, villager).

The professional's failure to treat the themes of spirituality mirrors a lack of models and research at the literature level. As a result, development practice contributes to the process by which spiritual beliefs are replaced with scientific ones. The *compostura* and prayers are replaced by fertilizers and penicillin and people's faith is subtly but surely weakened. The dominance of this scientific and materialistic paradigm and the subtlety of the process means that seldom are hostilities or charges of proselytizing raised. However, as in the "missionary model" the "scientific converts" are not encouraged to reflect on what they are accepting or rejecting. By failing to take time to reflect, both converter and converted lose valuable insights.

I would propose an indigenous knowledge model for addressing issues of faith and spirituality. Such a model would attempt to avoid imposing a foreign faith (either scientific or religious), but rather explore local faith and spirituality with respect and humility. As in other explorations of indigenous knowledge, the researcher/practitioner and the local community must begin by seeking to describe and understand local beliefs, practices and their implications. They must also reflect on the villagers' goals: spiritual, social and material. Finally, based on this understanding and reflection, villagers and the researcher/practitioner must reflect on how both science and faith can be used to achieve the villagers' goals.⁷

After such reflection, the villagers may decide that traditional spiritual practices such as the *compostura* and prayers are not "backward" but essential for their development. The researcher/practitioner may decide that these practices do not

⁷The principal problem I can envision with this model is that it requires individuals with a high degree of respect and humility, characteristics which are uncommon in people of faith (both religious and scientific).

need to be discouraged or abandoned but may enhance the effects of their penicillins and fertilizers. Finally, all involved may gain new insights into the role of science and faith in their lives.

Summary

In summary I would like to highlight several themes that run through this chapter. First, development organization will be more successful in mobilizing participants by being more conscious of the concepts of frames, networks, relationships and spirituality. Second, development organizations must question their assumptions and models which often include imposing class-based groupings, enlightenment ideals and foreign methods of broadening participation as well as distrusting traditional local leaders.

Third, I hope that this discussion has demonstrated the interrelatedness of the key factors in the mobilization for the pilgrimage. Constructing *frames* which resonated with potential participants required the *participation* of local leaders which in turn both depended upon and was the source of a *relationship* of trust and respect between the leaders and the COPIN organizers. The leaders' *participation* also resulted in their proficiency with the *frame* and the identification of key *network* leaders. Finally, the frame gains (or does not) the sympathy of villagers within the context of *networks*, and it is in the context of these *networks* that individuals make their decisions regarding *participation*.

I admit that at times in writing this chapter I felt overwhelmed by the number of questions and alternatives which I suggest development organizations consider. But I have tried to keep these suggestions within their context. Some of the activities that I am suggesting are already taking place. Organizations and their staff are building relationships, framing their projects, some are discussing spiritual issues and others are working with networks. What organizations are lacking is a way to conceptualize

the importance of these factors in development practice. Moreover, COPIN's experience during the pilgrimage and after serves as a reminder of the agency and wisdom of the villagers. The mobilization of thousands was due in large part to COPIN's tapping into the region's goals and their own methods of decision-making and mobilization. And that may be the most significant message of this dissertation--to advocate a greater recognition and respect for villagers methods, ideas and actions.

Appendix 1: Several Sample Interview Guides

The following gives a sample of the type of interview guide and the questions used in the qualitative interviews.

Networks

1. Who are the people most respected in the village? Why?
2. If this person would have stayed home from (or would have gone on) the pilgrimage, would others have stayed home (gone)? Who? How many? Why do they listen to this person? Where and how does this person convince others?
3. How did this person act during the Toma del Aserradero (or the pilgrimage)? Did they motivate others? Where? How? Whom?
4. Which are the strongest networks in the village?

Frames

1. What were the arguments used in favor of the pilgrimage? Against?
2. What was the most convincing argument for you?
3. How were you convinced that the pilgrimage would not be a waste of time or foolish?
4. Did you motivate others? Who? How?
5. Did the leaders use different arguments with different people like women, or poor people? How were they different?

Spirituality

1. Do you believe that God acts in your personal life? in the life of the community? How?
2. Why did people want an image of San Francisco? What is the importance of having him in the village?
3. Do you believe God was active in the Toma del Aserradero? In the first pilgrimage?
4. Do you think COPIN and the other organizations believe that God was responsible for the success of the Toma and the pilgrimage? Why?

Participation

1. Who was most influential in setting the goals for the Toma del Aserradero? the first pilgrimage? the second pilgrimage?
2. Who decided to take over the "asseradero"? What role did the people in the village play?

Appendix 2: Survey Questions and a Sample of the Survey Form

Survey Questions

1. The name of owner of the house was filled in from the map.
2. Does the owner of the house have a wife (or husband)? What is her (or his) name?
3. Are there any other adults who are not children of the owner who live in the house? What are their names?
 Note: The names given for these first three questions were each given a separate row in the first column and the following information was placed on the line of the head of the household, unless it pertained only to another of the adults in the household.
4. How many more people live in the house with them? (dependents)
5. What is the house made of? (sticks, sticks with mud, adobe or other)
6. To what political party did the household head belong?
7. Did anyone in this house participate in the Toma del Aserradero? How many?
8. Did anyone in this house participate in the first pilgrimage? How many?
9. Does this household attend the "Celebration of the Word" services never, sometimes or frequently?
10. Does this household practice the traditions like the "compostura" never, sometimes or frequently?
11. How many of the adults in this household can read and write? How many can not?
12. How much land does the household have in cultivation?
 Note: All land area was measured in *manzanas*, approximately equivalent to two acres.
13. How much land does the household have that they do not cultivate?
14. How much land does the household have planted in beans?
15. How much land does the household have planted in coffee?
16. How much land does the household have planted in sugar cane?
17. How many large animals (cows, horses or mules) does the household have?
18. How many months of the year does the household have to buy corn to feed the family?
19. How many months of the year does the household have to hire themselves out as day laborers?

Sample of Survey Form

Name	Depend	House	Party	Toma	Pilgrim	Celebr

Appendix 3: Results of Survey

Guide to the Survey Results

Table 1 Summary of data from all twenty villages and a comparison of households which sent at least one participant and those which did not.

Table 2 Comparison of the ten villages closest to Togopala (the starting point of the pilgrimage with the ten which are most distant.

Table 3 Comparison of the ten villages with highest participation (participants/household) with the ten which had lowest participation.

Meaning of Abbreviations

Villages	Column Headings
Storenzo	1. Name of village
Piedrara	2. Number of houses per village
StaMary	3. Number of adults per village
SantaFe	4. Number of people per village
StaCruz	5. Number of <i>Adobe</i> (mud bricks) houses
Guan2	6. Number of <i>Bajareque</i> (mud and sticks) houses
Monv	7. Number of <i>Cotquin</i> (stick) houses
ElPinal2	8. Number of houses of other material
OjoAjua	9. Percentage of <i>Adobe</i> houses per village
PlanBarr	10. Percentage of <i>Bajareque</i> houses per village
Lajita2	11. Percentage of <i>Cotquin</i> houses per village
Union	12. Percentage of houses of other materials
Ceibita	13. Number of Nationalist households
Agacal	14. Number of Liberal households
Rosario	15. Number of PINU households
Zacatal	16. Number of Christian Democrat households
Naranjo	17. Number of households with other affiliations
Aguasuc	18. Percentage of Nationalist per village
Chorrera	19. Percentage of Liberals per village
LasCruz2	20. Percentage of PINU per village

Appendix 3: (Continued)

	Column Headings
21.	Percentage of Christian Democrats per village
22.	Percentage of households with other affiliations
23.	Number of participants in <i>Toma del Aserradero</i>
24.	Number of participants in First Pilgrimage
25.	Number of participants per households in village
26.	Number of households which attend Catholic worship
27.	Number of households which do not attend
28.	Percentage which attend Catholic worship
29.	Percentage which do not attend
30.	Number of households which practice the <i>compostura</i>
31.	Number of households which do not
32.	Percentage which practice <i>compostura</i>
33.	Percentage which do not
34.	Number of literate adults (over 18) per village
35.	Number of illiterate adults per village
36.	Percentage of literate adults per village
37.	Number of <i>manzanas</i> (about 2 acres) in cultivations per village
38.	<i>Manzanas</i> in cultivation per household
39.	Number of <i>manzanas</i> not in cultivations per village
40.	<i>Manzanas</i> not in cultivation per household
41.	Number of <i>manzanas</i> in bean production
42.	<i>Manzanas</i> of bean production per household
43.	Number of <i>manzanas</i> in coffee production
44.	<i>Manzanas</i> of coffee production per household
45.	Number of <i>manzanas</i> in sugar cane production
46.	<i>Manzanas</i> of sugar cane per household
47.	Number of <i>animales mayores</i> (cows, horses and mules) per village
48.	Number of <i>animales mayores</i> per household
49.	Number of months a year household buys corn
50.	Number of months a year household works as day laborers

Table A3.1: Regional Totals and Comparison of Participating and Non-participating Households

<u>Village</u>	<u># Houses</u>	<u>Tot Adults</u>	<u>Tot Depen</u>	<u>Tot Peopl</u>	<u>NumA</u>	<u>NumB</u>	<u>NumC</u>	<u>NumOthr</u>	<u>%A</u>	<u>%B</u>
Slorenzo	23	40	66	106	1	17	5	0	0.043478	0.73913
Piedrara	57	97	194	291	9	11	33	4	0.157895	0.192982
StaMary	51	92	111	203	0	21	17	3	0	0.512195
SantaFe	30	65	67	132	0	6	23	0	0	0.206897
StaCruz	66	132	223	355	0	25	38	4	0	0.373134
Guan2	60	112	177	289	0	2	57	0	0	0.033898
Monv	127	248	406	654	6	64	56	1	0.047244	0.503937
EIPinal2	40	88	133	221	1	21	15	1	0.026316	0.552632
OjoAjua	95	159	312	471	9	14	69	3	0.094737	0.147368
PlanBarr	91	161	276	437	0	22	67	2	0	0.241758
Lajita2	22	37	77	114	0	2	20	0	0	0.090909
Union	62	117	219	336	12	46	4	0	0.193548	0.741935
Celbita	64	125	180	305	4	36	24	0	0.0625	0.5625
Aguacal	39	78	126	204	2	13	24	0	0.051282	0.333333
Rosario	47	87	130	217	0	16	31	0	0	0.340426
Zacatal	45	78	145	223	0	15	30	0	0	0.333333
Naranjo	60	109	211	320	4	9	46	0	0.067797	0.152542
Aguasuc	43	82	162	244	11	23	8	1	0.255814	0.534884
Chorrera	78	141	226	367	2	14	55	7	0.025641	0.179487
LasCruz2	24	42	68	110	4	3	11	3	0.190476	0.142857
Totals and Avgs	1124	2090	3509	5599	65	380	633	29	0.060836	0.345807
<u>Category</u>	<u># Houses</u>	<u>Tot Adults</u>	<u>Tot Depen</u>	<u>Tot Peopl</u>	<u>NumA</u>	<u>NumB</u>	<u>NumC</u>	<u>NumOthr</u>	<u>%A</u>	<u>%B</u>
Houses went	321	585	1079	1664	32	121	148	11	0.102564	0.387821
Houses didn't	798	1474	2425	3899	33	258	482	18	0.041719	0.326169

Table A3.1: (Continued)

<u>%C</u>	<u>%Other</u>	<u>NumN</u>	<u>NumL</u>	<u>NumP</u>	<u>NumD</u>	<u>NumOth</u>	<u>%N</u>	<u>%L</u>	<u>%P</u>	<u>%D</u>	<u>%Other</u>
0.217391	0	13	11	0	0	0	0.541667	0.458333	0	0	0
0.578947	0.070175	36	21	0	0	0	0.631579	0.368421	0	0	0
0.414634	0.073171	1	37	0	0	2	0.025	0.925	0	0	0.05
0.793103	0	21	6	0	0	1	0.75	0.214286	0	0	0.035714
0.567164	0.059701	33	35	0	0	0	0.485294	0.514706	0	0	0
0.966102	0	29	28	1	1	0	0.491525	0.474576	0.016949	0.016949	0
0.440945	0.007874	18	110	0	0	0	0.140625	0.859375	0	0	0
0.394737	0.026316	8	28	0	0	2	0.210526	0.736842	0	0	0.052632
0.726316	0.031579	55	39	1	0	0	0.578947	0.410526	0.010526	0	0
0.736264	0.021978	60	25	0	0	7	0.652174	0.271739	0	0	0.076087
0.909091	0	14	2	0	0	6	0.636364	0.090909	0	0	0.272727
0.064516	0	34	24	0	0	0	0.586207	0.413793	0	0	0
0.375	0	1	63	0	0	0	0.015625	0.984375	0	0	0
0.615385	0	5	34	0	0	0	0.128205	0.871795	0	0	0
0.659574	0	2	45	0	0	0	0.042553	0.957447	0	0	0
0.666667	0	25	20	0	0	0	0.555556	0.444444	0	0	0
0.779661	0	23	37	0	0	0	0.383333	0.616667	0	0	0
0.186047	0.023256	15	24	0	0	1	0.375	0.6	0	0	0.025
0.705128	0.089744	54	24	0	0	0	0.692308	0.307692	0	0	0
0.52381	0.142857	0	24	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.566024	0.027333	447	637	2	1	19	0.396124	0.576046	0.001374	0.000847	0.025608
0.474359	0.035256	107	194	1	1	6	0.346278	0.627832	0.003236	0.003236	0.019417
0.609355	0.022756	339	438	1	0	13	0.428571	0.553729	0.001264	0	0.016435

Table A3.1: (Continued)

<u>Tot TOMA</u>	<u>Tot 1Era</u>	<u>1era/hshl</u>	<u>#celeb_Y</u>	<u>#celeb_N</u>	<u>%celeb_Y</u>	<u>%celeb_N</u>	<u>#comp_Y</u>	<u>#comp_N</u>	<u>%comp_Y</u>	<u>%comp_N</u>	<u>Tot Lit</u>
18	26	1.130435	23	0	1	0	1	22	0.043478	0.956522	18
45	46	0.807018	52	4	0.928571	0.071429	2	54	0.035714	0.964286	66
1	25	0.609756	29	12	0.707317	0.292683	2	38	0.05	0.95	62
14	18	0.6	27	2	0.931034	0.068966	2	27	0.068966	0.931034	34
25	39	0.590909	63	5	0.926471	0.073529	30	37	0.447761	0.552239	83
35	31	0.516667	50	10	0.833333	0.166667	48	10	0.827586	0.172414	68
18	55	0.433071	110	17	0.866142	0.133858	58	70	0.453125	0.546875	128
14	17	0.425	43	0	1	0	1	23	0.041667	0.958333	44
38	38	0.4	74	21	0.778947	0.221053	32	62	0.340426	0.659574	99
18	34	0.373626	74	18	0.804348	0.195652	47	45	0.51087	0.48913	104
14	8	0.363636	18	5	0.782609	0.217391	2	20	0.090909	0.909091	41
11	21	0.33871	34	5	0.871795	0.128205	9	41	0.18	0.82	44
1	18	0.276923	55	10	0.846154	0.153846	9	56	0.138462	0.861538	74
0	10	0.25641	36	3	0.923077	0.076923	19	20	0.487179	0.512821	61
15	10	0.212766	34	13	0.723404	0.276596	29	18	0.617021	0.382979	44
7	9	0.2	36	9	0.8	0.2	14	31	0.311111	0.688889	76
15	8	0.133333	51	9	0.85	0.15	3	57	0.05	0.95	73
6	5	0.116279	38	6	0.863636	0.136364	7	35	0.166667	0.833333	92
1	1	0.012821	56	22	0.717949	0.282051	74	4	0.948718	0.051282	81
0	0	0	31	6	0.837838	0.162162	21	11	0.65625	0.34375	17
296	419	0.389868	934	177	0.849631	0.150369	410	681	0.3079	0.644481	1309
<u>Tot TOMA</u>	<u>Tot 1Era</u>	<u>1era/hshl</u>	<u>#celeb_Y</u>	<u>#celeb_N</u>	<u>%celeb_Y</u>	<u>%celeb_N</u>	<u>#comp_Y</u>	<u>#comp_N</u>	<u>%comp_Y</u>	<u>%comp_N</u>	<u>Tot Lit</u>
220	419	1.305296	297	13	0.958065	0.041935	89	212	0.295681	0.704319	473
71	0	0	616	162	0.791774	0.208226	313	464	0.402831	0.597169	833

Table A3.1: (Continued)

<u>Tot Illit</u>	<u>% Lit</u>	<u>Tot Tier C</u>	<u>TC/hshld</u>	<u>Tot TierNC</u>	<u>TNC/hshld</u>	<u>Tot Frij</u>	<u>Frij/hshld</u>	<u>Tot Café</u>	<u>Café/hshl</u>	<u>Tot Cana</u>	<u>Cana/hshl</u>
23	0.439024	23.6875	1.029891	125.625	5.461957	1.126	0.048957	5.941	0.258304	1.25	0.054348
58	0.532258	67	1.175439	614.75	10.78509	7.25	0.127193	18.325	0.321491	143.1875	2.512061
41	0.601942	42.25	1.030488	56.125	1.368902	6.751	0.164659	22.251	0.542707	2.751	0.067098
41	0.453333	28.125	0.9375	225.5	7.516667	0.625	0.020833	17.625	0.5875	6.5625	0.21875
118	0.412935	98.5	1.492424	592.75	8.981061	14.3749	0.217802	26.2812	0.3982	7.2655	0.110083
2	0.971429	57.90625	0.965104	295.25	4.920833	8.4064	0.140107	8.8752	0.14792	1.094	0.018233
174	0.423841	189.125	1.489173	737.9375	5.810531	8.75	0.068898	55.8125	0.439469	7.907	0.062226
21	0.676923	50.8125	1.270313	306.625	7.665625	5.2817	0.132043	16.7812	0.41953	5.9688	0.14922
94.25	0.51229	70.625	0.743421	300.0625	3.158553	4.75	0.05	25.8125	0.271711	17.9875	0.189342
98	0.514851	84	0.923077	227	2.494505	11.4749	0.126098	10.8748	0.119503	0.5312	0.005837
23	0.640625	19.875	0.903409	358	16.27273	1.2188	0.0554	9.5	0.431818	3.875	0.176136
45	0.494382	85.125	1.372984	202.25	3.262097	5.5	0.08871	15.6425	0.252298	7.5675	0.122056
89	0.453988	67.125	1.032692	404.875	6.228846	5.625	0.086538	78.375	1.205769	2.4064	0.037022
39	0.61	50.25	1.288462	420.5	10.78205	4.75	0.121795	28.8125	0.738782	4	0.102564
57	0.435644	50.875	1.082447	121	2.574468	3.3437	0.071143	16.1562	0.343749	3.8125	0.081117
30	0.716981	30.5625	0.679167	69.5	1.544444	3.6875	0.081944	10.875	0.241667	2.3437	0.052082
54	0.574803	50.125	0.835417	138	2.3	3.3125	0.055208	16.4375	0.273958	5.09375	0.084896
27	0.773109	52.875	1.229651	265	6.162791	12.75	0.296512	58.25	1.354651	3.3125	0.077035
81	0.5	54.035	0.692756	71.375	0.915064	8.9375	0.114583	53.9375	0.691506	0.5	0.00641
21	0.447368	19.375	0.807292	28.25	1.177083	3	0.125	17	0.708333	0.125	0.005208
1136.25	0.532654	1192.254	0.9991	5560.375	5.208728	120.9149	0.109671	513.5656	0.464232	227.5414	0.19675
<u>Tot Illit</u>	<u>% Lit</u>	<u>Tot Tier C</u>	<u>TC/hshld</u>	<u>Tot TierNC</u>	<u>TNC/hshld</u>	<u>Tot Frij</u>	<u>Frij/hshld</u>	<u>Tot Café</u>	<u>Café/hshl</u>	<u>Tot Cana</u>	<u>Cana/hshl</u>
301.5	0.610717	381.7188	1.189155	1980	6.168224	40.314	0.125589	148.8213	0.463618	173.6443	0.540948
831.75	0.500375	805.3475	1.009207	3500.875	4.387061	77.6009	0.097244	353.4943	0.442975	53.64705	0.067227

Table A3.1: (Continued)

<u>Tot V&B</u>	<u>V&B/hshl</u>	<u>AvgCM/hs</u>	<u>AvgDL/hs</u>
12	0.521739	5.956522	2.695652
77	1.350877	2.798246	1.140351
5	0.121951	7.268293	5.02439
5	0.166667	4.966667	1.783333
18.25	0.276515	6.257576	4.712121
14	0.233333	4.583333	2.352778
72	0.566929	3.80315	3.220472
10	0.25	3.64375	2.965625
56	0.589474	7.536842	5.442105
7	0.076923	4.054945	3.296703
28	1.272727	4.5	4.363636
30	0.483871	2.983871	2.629032
16	0.246154	5.107692	3.723077
21	0.538462	1.358974	1.769231
11	0.234043	4	3.595745
26	0.577778	5.822222	3.844444
111	1.85	5.833333	3.716667
45	1.046512	3.674419	2.906977
24	0.307692	5.24359	5.012821
4	0.166667	4.958333	3.833333
592.25	0.518015	4.717588	3.401425
<u>Tot V&B</u>	<u>V&B/hshl</u>	<u>AvgCM/hs</u>	<u>AvgDL/hs</u>
232	0.722741	3.479751	2.33541
343.25	0.430138	5.158208	3.941886

Table A3.2: Comparison of Closest and Most Distant Villages

<u>Village</u>	<u># Houses</u>	<u>Tot Adults</u>	<u>Tot Depen</u>	<u>Tot Peopl</u>	<u>Num A</u>	<u>Num B</u>	<u>Num C</u>	<u>Num Othr</u>	<u>% A</u>	<u>% B</u>
Storenzo	23	40	66	106	1	17	5	0	0.043478	0.73913
Piedrara	57	97	194	291	9	11	33	4	0.157895	0.192982
Lajita2	22	37	77	114	0	2	20	0	0	0.090909
SantaFe	30	65	67	132	0	6	23	0	0	0.206897
Stacruz	66	132	223	355	0	25	38	4	0	0.373134
Guan2	60	112	177	289	0	2	57	0	0	0.033898
Monv	127	248	406	654	6	64	56	1	0.047244	0.503937
Union	62	117	219	336	12	46	4	0	0.193548	0.741935
OjoAjua	95	159	312	471	9	14	69	3	0.094737	0.147368
PlanBarr	91	161	276	437	0	22	67	2	0	0.241758
Totals Lo-distance	633	1168	2017	3185	37	209	372	14	0.058544	0.330696
EIPinal2	40	88	133	221	1	21	15	1	0.026316	0.552632
StaMary	51	92	111	203	0	21	17	3	0	0.512195
Ceibita	64	125	180	305	4	36	24	0	0.0625	0.5625
Aguacal	39	78	126	204	2	13	24	0	0.051282	0.333333
Rosario	47	87	130	217	0	16	31	0	0	0.340426
Zacatal	45	78	145	223	0	15	30	0	0	0.333333
Naranjo	60	109	211	320	4	9	46	0	0.067797	0.152542
Aguasuc	43	82	162	244	11	23	8	1	0.255814	0.534884
Chorrera	78	141	226	367	2	14	55	7	0.025641	0.179487
Lascru2	24	42	68	110	4	3	11	3	0.190476	0.142857
Totals Hi-distance	491	922	1492	2414	28	171	261	15	0.058947	0.36

Table A3.2: (Continued)

<u>% C</u>	<u>% Other</u>	<u>Num N</u>	<u>Num L</u>	<u>Num P</u>	<u>Num D</u>	<u>Num Oth</u>	<u>% N</u>	<u>% L</u>	<u>% P</u>	<u>% D</u>	<u>% Other</u>
0.217391	0	13	11	0	0	0	0.541667	0.458333	0	0	0
0.578947	0.070175	36	21	0	0	0	0.631579	0.368421	0	0	0
0.909091	0	14	2	0	0	6	0.636364	0.090909	0	0	0.272727
0.793103	0	21	6	0	0	1	0.75	0.214286	0	0	0.035714
0.567164	0.059701	33	35	0	0	0	0.485294	0.514706	0	0	0
0.966102	0	29	28	1	1	0	0.491525	0.474576	0.016949	0.016949	0
0.440945	0.007874	18	110	0	0	0	0.140625	0.859375	0	0	0
0.064516	0	34	24	0	0	0	0.586207	0.413793	0	0	0
0.726316	0.031579	55	39	1	0	0	0.578947	0.410526	0.010526	0	0
0.736264	0.021978	60	25	0	0	7	0.652174	0.271739	0	0	0.076087
0.588608	0.022152	313	301	2	1	14	0.496038	0.477021	0.00317	0.001585	0.022187
0.394737	0.026316	8	28	0	0	2	0.210526	0.736842	0	0	0.052632
0.414634	0.073171	1	37	0	0	2	0.025	0.925	0	0	0.05
0.375	0	1	63	0	0	0	0.015625	0.984375	0	0	0
0.615385	0	5	34	0	0	0	0.128205	0.871795	0	0	0
0.659574	0	2	45	0	0	0	0.042553	0.957447	0	0	0
0.666667	0	25	20	0	0	0	0.555556	0.444444	0	0	0
0.779661	0	23	37	0	0	0	0.383333	0.616667	0	0	0
0.186047	0.023256	15	24	0	0	1	0.375	0.6	0	0	0.025
0.705128	0.089744	54	24	0	0	0	0.692308	0.307692	0	0	0
0.52381	0.142857	0	24	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.549474	0.031579	134	336	0	0	5	0.282105	0.707368	0	0	0.010526

Table A3.2: (Continued)

Tot TOMA	Tot 1Era	1era/hshl	#celeb_Y	#celeb_N	%celeb_Y	%celeb_N	#comp_Y	#comp_N	%comp_Y	%comp_N	Tot Lit
18	26	1.130435	23	0	1	0	1	22	0.043478	0.956522	18
45	46	0.807018	52	4	0.928571	0.071429	2	54	0.035714	0.964286	66
14	8	0.363636	18	5	0.782609	0.217391	2	20	0.090909	0.909091	41
14	18	0.6	27	2	0.931034	0.068966	2	27	0.068966	0.931034	34
25	39	0.590909	63	5	0.926471	0.073529	30	37	0.447761	0.552239	83
35	31	0.516667	50	10	0.833333	0.166667	48	10	0.827586	0.172414	68
18	55	0.433071	110	17	0.866142	0.133858	58	70	0.453125	0.546875	128
11	21	0.33871	34	5	0.871795	0.128205	9	41	0.18	0.82	44
38	38	0.4	74	21	0.778947	0.221053	32	62	0.340426	0.659574	99
18	34	0.373626	74	18	0.804348	0.195652	47	45	0.51087	0.48913	104
236	316	0.49921	525	87	0.857843	0.142157	231	388	0.373183	0.626817	685
14	17	0.425	43	0	1	0	1	23	0.041667	0.958333	44
1	25	0.609756	29	12	0.707317	0.292683	2	38	0.05	0.95	62
1	18	0.276923	55	10	0.846154	0.153846	9	56	0.138462	0.861538	74
0	10	0.25641	36	3	0.923077	0.076923	19	20	0.487179	0.512821	61
15	10	0.212766	34	13	0.723404	0.276596	29	18	0.617021	0.382979	44
7	9	0.2	36	9	0.8	0.2	14	31	0.311111	0.688889	76
15	8	0.133333	51	9	0.85	0.15	3	57	0.05	0.95	73
6	5	0.116279	38	6	0.863636	0.136364	7	35	0.166667	0.833333	92
1	1	0.012821	56	22	0.717949	0.282051	74	4	0.948718	0.051282	81
0	0	0	31	6	0.837838	0.162162	21	11	0.65625	0.34375	17
60	103	0.209776	409	90	0.819639	0.180361	179	293	0.379237	0.620763	624

Table A3.2: (Continued)

<u>Tot Illit</u>	<u>% Lit</u>	<u>Tot Tier C</u>	<u>IC/hshld</u>	<u>Tot TierNC</u>	<u>TNC/hshld</u>	<u>Tot Frii</u>	<u>Frii/hshld</u>	<u>Tot Café</u>	<u>Café/hshl</u>	<u>Tot Cana</u>	<u>Cana/hshl</u>
23	0.439024	23.6875	1.029891	125.625	5.461957	1.126	0.048957	5.941	0.258304	1.25	0.054348
58	0.532258	67	1.175439	614.75	10.78509	7.25	0.127193	18.325	0.321491	143.1875	2.512061
23	0.640625	19.875	0.903409	358	16.27273	1.2188	0.0554	9.5	0.431818	3.875	0.176136
41	0.453333	28.125	0.9375	225.5	7.516667	0.625	0.020833	17.625	0.5875	6.5625	0.21875
118	0.412935	98.5	1.492424	592.75	8.981061	14.3749	0.217802	26.2812	0.3982	7.2655	0.110083
2	0.971429	57.90625	0.965104	295.25	4.920833	8.4064	0.140107	8.8752	0.14792	1.094	0.018233
174	0.423841	189.125	1.489173	737.9375	5.810531	8.75	0.068898	55.8125	0.439469	7.907	0.06226
45	0.494382	85.125	1.372984	202.25	3.262097	5.5	0.08871	15.6425	0.252298	7.5675	0.122056
94.25	0.51229	70.625	0.743421	300.0625	3.158553	4.75	0.05	25.8125	0.271711	17.9875	0.189342
98	0.514851	84	0.923077	227	2.494505	11.4749	0.126098	10.8748	0.119503	0.5312	0.005837
676.25	0.503214	723.9688	1.143711	3679.125	5.812204	63.476	0.100278	194.6897	0.307567	197.2277	0.311576
21	0.676923	50.8125	1.270313	306.625	7.665625	5.2817	0.132043	16.7812	0.41953	5.9688	0.14922
41	0.601942	42.25	1.030488	56.125	1.368902	6.751	0.164659	22.251	0.542707	2.751	0.067098
89	0.453988	67.125	1.032692	404.875	6.228846	5.625	0.086538	78.375	1.205769	2.4064	0.037022
39	0.61	50.25	1.288462	420.5	10.78205	4.75	0.121795	28.8125	0.738782	4	0.102564
57	0.435644	50.875	1.082447	121	2.574468	3.3437	0.071143	16.1562	0.343749	3.8125	0.081117
30	0.716981	30.5625	0.679167	69.5	1.544444	3.6875	0.081944	10.875	0.241667	2.3437	0.052082
54	0.574803	50.125	0.835417	138	2.3	3.3125	0.055208	16.4375	0.273958	5.09375	0.084896
27	0.773109	52.875	1.229651	265	6.162791	12.75	0.296512	58.25	1.354651	3.3125	0.077035
81	0.5	54.035	0.692756	71.375	0.915064	8.9375	0.114583	53.9375	0.691506	0.5	0.00641
21	0.447368	19.375	0.807292	28.25	1.177083	3	0.125	17	0.708333	0.125	0.005208
460	0.575646	468.285	0.953737	1881.25	3.831466	57.4389	0.116984	318.8759	0.649442	30.31365	0.061739

Table A3.2: (Continued)

<u>Tot V&B</u>	<u>V&B/hshl</u>	<u>AvgCM/hsh</u>	<u>AvgDL/hsh</u>
12	0.521739	5.956522	2.695652
77	1.350877	2.798246	1.140351
28	1.272727	4.5	4.363636
5	0.166667	4.966667	1.783333
18.25	0.276515	6.257576	4.712121
14	0.233333	4.583333	2.352778
72	0.566929	3.80315	3.220472
30	0.483871	2.983871	2.629032
56	0.589474	7.536842	5.442105
7	0.076923	4.054945	3.296703
319.25	0.504344	4.744115	3.163619
10	0.25	3.64375	2.965625
5	0.121951	7.268293	5.02439
16	0.246154	5.107692	3.723077
21	0.538462	1.358974	1.769231
11	0.234043	4	3.595745
26	0.577778	5.822222	3.844444
111	1.85	5.833333	3.716667
45	1.046512	3.674419	2.906977
24	0.307692	5.24359	5.012821
4	0.166667	4.958333	3.833333
273	0.556008	4.691061	3.639231

Table A3.3: Comparison of Low and High Participation Villages

<u>Village</u>	<u># Houses</u>	<u>Tot Adults</u>	<u>Tot Depen</u>	<u>Tot Peop</u>	<u>Num A</u>	<u>Num B</u>	<u>Num C</u>	<u>Num Othr</u>	<u>% A</u>	<u>% B</u>
Storenzo	23	40	66	106	1	17	5	0	0.043478	0.73913
Piedrara	57	97	194	291	9	11	33	4	0.157895	0.192982
StaMary	51	92	111	203	0	21	17	3	0	0.512195
SantaFe	30	65	67	132	0	6	23	0	0	0.206897
StaCruz	66	132	223	355	0	25	38	4	0	0.373134
Guan2	60	112	177	289	0	2	57	0	0	0.033898
Monv	127	248	406	654	6	64	56	1	0.047244	0.503937
EIPinal2	40	88	133	221	1	21	15	1	0.026316	0.552632
OjoAjua	95	159	312	471	9	14	69	3	0.094737	0.147368
PlanBarr	91	161	276	437	0	22	67	2	0	0.241758
Totals high partic	640	1194	1965	3159	26	203	380	18	0.041467	0.323764
Lajita2	22	37	77	114	0	2	20	0	0	0.090909
Union	62	117	219	336	12	46	4	0	0.193548	0.741935
Ceibita	64	125	180	305	4	36	24	0	0.0625	0.5625
Aguacal	39	78	126	204	2	13	24	0	0.051282	0.333333
Rosario	47	87	130	217	0	16	31	0	0	0.340426
Zacatal	45	78	145	223	0	15	30	0	0	0.333333
Naranjo	60	109	211	320	4	9	46	0	0.067797	0.152542
Aguasuc	43	82	162	244	11	23	8	1	0.255814	0.534884
Chorrera	78	141	226	367	2	14	55	7	0.025641	0.179487
Lascru2	24	42	68	110	4	3	11	3	0.190476	0.142857
Totals Low Partic	484	896	1544	2440	39	177	253	11	0.08125	0.36875

Table A3.3: (Continued)

	<u>% C</u>	<u>Num N</u>	<u>Num L</u>	<u>Num P</u>	<u>Num D</u>	<u>Num Oth</u>	<u>% N</u>	<u>% L</u>	<u>% P</u>	<u>% D</u>	<u>% Other</u>
0.217391	0	13	11	0	0	0	0.541667	0.458333	0	0	0
0.578947	0.070175	36	21	0	0	0	0.631579	0.368421	0	0	0
0.414634	0.073171	1	37	0	0	2	0.025	0.925	0	0	0.05
0.793103	0	21	6	0	0	1	0.75	0.214286	0	0	0.035714
0.567164	0.059701	33	35	0	0	0	0.485294	0.514706	0	0	0
0.966102	0	29	28	1	1	0	0.491525	0.474576	0.016949	0.016949	0
0.440945	0.007874	18	110	0	0	0	0.140625	0.859375	0	0	0
0.394737	0.026316	8	28	0	0	2	0.210526	0.736842	0	0	0.052632
0.726316	0.031579	55	39	1	0	0	0.578947	0.410526	0.010526	0	0
0.736264	0.021978	60	25	0	0	7	0.652174	0.271739	0	0	0.076087
0.606061	0.028708	274	340	2	1	12	0.435612	0.540541	0.00318	0.00159	0.019078
0.909091	0	14	2	0	0	6	0.636364	0.090909	0	0	0.272727
0.064516	0	34	24	0	0	0	0.586207	0.413793	0	0	0
0.375	0	1	63	0	0	0	0.015625	0.984375	0	0	0
0.615385	0	5	34	0	0	0	0.128205	0.871795	0	0	0
0.659574	0	2	45	0	0	0	0.042553	0.957447	0	0	0
0.666667	0	25	20	0	0	0	0.555556	0.444444	0	0	0
0.779661	0	23	37	0	0	0	0.383333	0.616667	0	0	0
0.186047	0.023256	15	24	0	0	1	0.375	0.6	0	0	0.025
0.705128	0.089744	54	24	0	0	0	0.692308	0.307692	0	0	0
0.52381	0.142857	0	24	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.527083	0.022917	173	297	0	0	7	0.362683	0.622642	0	0	0.014675

Table A3.3: (Continued)

<u>Tot IQMA</u>	<u>Tot IEra</u>	<u>1era/hshl</u>	<u>#celeb Y</u>	<u>#celeb N</u>	<u>%celeb Y</u>	<u>%celeb N</u>	<u>#comp Y</u>	<u>#comp N</u>	<u>%comp Y</u>	<u>%comp N</u>	<u>%comp_Y</u>	<u>%comp_N</u>	<u>Tot Lit</u>
18	26	1.130435	23	0	1	0	1	22	0.043478	0.956522	0.043478	0.956522	18
45	46	0.807018	52	4	0.928571	0.071429	2	54	0.035714	0.964286	0.035714	0.964286	66
1	25	0.609756	29	12	0.707317	0.292683	2	38	0.05	0.95	0.05	0.95	62
14	18	0.6	27	2	0.931034	0.068966	2	27	0.068966	0.931034	0.068966	0.931034	34
25	39	0.590909	63	5	0.926471	0.073529	30	37	0.447761	0.552239	0.447761	0.552239	83
35	31	0.516667	50	10	0.833333	0.166667	48	10	0.827586	0.172414	0.827586	0.172414	68
18	55	0.433071	110	17	0.866142	0.133858	58	70	0.453125	0.546875	0.453125	0.546875	128
14	17	0.425	43	0	1	0	1	23	0.041667	0.958333	0.041667	0.958333	44
38	38	0.4	74	21	0.778947	0.221053	32	62	0.340426	0.659574	0.340426	0.659574	99
18	34	0.373626	74	18	0.804348	0.195652	47	45	0.51087	0.48913	0.51087	0.48913	104
226	329	0.514063	545	89	0.859621	0.140379	223	388	0.364975	0.635025	0.364975	0.635025	706
14	8	0.363636	18	5	0.782609	0.217391	2	20	0.090909	0.909091	0.090909	0.909091	41
11	21	0.33871	34	5	0.871795	0.128205	9	41	0.18	0.82	0.18	0.82	44
1	18	0.276923	55	10	0.846154	0.153846	9	56	0.138462	0.861538	0.138462	0.861538	74
0	10	0.25641	36	3	0.923077	0.076923	19	20	0.487179	0.512821	0.487179	0.512821	61
15	10	0.212766	34	13	0.723404	0.276596	29	18	0.617021	0.382979	0.617021	0.382979	44
7	9	0.2	36	9	0.8	0.2	14	31	0.311111	0.688889	0.311111	0.688889	76
15	8	0.133333	51	9	0.85	0.15	3	57	0.05	0.95	0.05	0.95	73
6	5	0.116279	38	6	0.863636	0.136364	7	35	0.166667	0.833333	0.166667	0.833333	92
1	1	0.012821	56	22	0.717949	0.282051	74	4	0.948718	0.051282	0.948718	0.051282	81
0	0	0	31	6	0.837838	0.162162	21	11	0.65625	0.34375	0.65625	0.34375	17
70	90	0.18595	389	88	0.815514	0.184486	187	293	0.389583	0.610417	0.389583	0.610417	603

Table A3.3: (Continued)

<u>Tot Illit</u>	<u>% Lit</u>	<u>Tot Tier C</u>	<u>IC/hshld</u>	<u>Tot TierNC</u>	<u>INC/hshld</u>	<u>Tot Frij</u>	<u>Frij/hshld</u>	<u>Tot Café</u>	<u>Café/hshl</u>	<u>Tot Cana</u>	<u>Cana/hshl</u>
23	0.439024	23.6875	1.029891	125.625	5.461957	1.126	0.048957	5.941	0.258304	1.25	0.054348
58	0.532258	67	1.175439	614.75	10.78509	7.25	0.127193	18.325	0.321491	143.1875	2.512061
41	0.601942	42.25	1.030488	56.125	1.368902	6.751	0.164659	22.251	0.542707	2.751	0.067098
41	0.453333	28.125	0.9375	225.5	7.516667	0.625	0.020833	17.625	0.5875	6.5625	0.21875
118	0.412935	98.5	1.492424	592.75	8.981061	14.3749	0.217802	26.2812	0.3982	7.2655	0.110083
2	0.971429	57.90625	0.965104	295.25	4.920833	8.4064	0.140107	8.8752	0.14792	1.094	0.018233
174	0.423841	189.125	1.489173	737.9375	5.810531	8.75	0.068898	55.8125	0.439469	7.907	0.06226
21	0.676923	50.8125	1.270313	306.625	7.665625	5.2817	0.132043	16.7812	0.41953	5.9688	0.14922
94.25	0.51229	70.625	0.743421	300.0625	3.158553	4.75	0.05	25.8125	0.271711	17.9875	0.189342
98	0.514851	84	0.923077	227	2.494505	11.4749	0.126098	10.8748	0.119503	0.5312	0.005837
670.25	0.512988	712.0313	1.112549	3481.625	5.440039	68.7899	0.107484	208.5794	0.325905	194.505	0.303914
23	0.640625	19.875	0.903409	358	16.27273	1.2188	0.0554	9.5	0.431818	3.875	0.176136
45	0.494382	85.125	1.372984	202.25	3.262097	5.5	0.08871	15.6425	0.252298	7.5675	0.122056
89	0.453988	67.125	1.032692	404.875	6.228846	5.625	0.086538	78.375	1.205769	2.4064	0.037022
39	0.61	50.25	1.288462	420.5	10.78205	4.75	0.121795	28.8125	0.738782	4	0.102564
57	0.435644	50.875	1.082447	121	2.574468	3.3437	0.071143	16.1562	0.343749	3.8125	0.081117
30	0.716981	30.5625	0.679167	69.5	1.544444	3.6875	0.081944	10.875	0.241667	2.3437	0.052082
54	0.574803	50.125	0.835417	138	2.3	3.3125	0.055208	16.4375	0.273958	5.09375	0.084896
27	0.773109	52.875	1.229651	265	6.162791	12.75	0.296512	58.25	1.354651	3.3125	0.077035
81	0.5	54.035	0.692756	71.375	0.915064	8.9375	0.114583	53.9375	0.691506	0.5	0.00641
21	0.447368	19.375	0.807292	28.25	1.177083	3	0.125	17	0.708333	0.125	0.005208
466	0.564079	480.2225	0.992195	2078.75	4.294938	52.125	0.107696	304.9862	0.630137	33.03635	0.068257

Table A3.3: (Continued)

<u>Tot V&B</u>	<u>V&B/hshi</u>	<u>AvgGM/hs</u>	<u>AvgDL/hs</u>
12	0.521739	5.956522	2.695652
77	1.350877	2.798246	1.140351
5	0.121951	7.268293	5.02439
5	0.166667	4.966667	1.783333
18.25	0.276515	6.257576	4.712121
14	0.233333	4.583333	2.352778
72	0.566929	3.80315	3.220472
10	0.25	3.64375	2.965625
56	0.589474	7.536842	5.442105
7	0.076923	4.054945	3.296703
276.25	0.431641	5.086932	3.263353
28	1.272727	4.5	4.363636
30	0.483871	2.983871	2.629032
16	0.246154	5.107692	3.723077
21	0.538462	1.358974	1.769231
11	0.234043	4	3.595745
26	0.577778	5.822222	3.844444
111	1.85	5.833333	3.716667
45	1.046512	3.674419	2.906977
24	0.307692	5.24359	5.012821
4	0.166667	4.958333	3.833333
316	0.652893	4.348243	3.539496

Appendix 4: The Story of Lempira

The rebellion led by the *cacique* Lempira took place in 1537. The following text is taken from Herrera (1730: vol.III, 79-80).

...se levantó un valiente Indio en una Provincia, Llamaca Cerquín, en los términos de la Ciudad de Gracias a Dios, puesta entre Sierras, dificultosa para ser conquistada. Este Indio, llamado Lempira, que significa Señor de la Sierra, convocò a todos los Señores de la comarca, con los quales, i los Naturales juntò treinta mil hombres persuadiòlos el cobrar la libertad, siendo cosa vergonçosa, que tantos, i tan valerosos hombres, en su propia Tierra se viesen en la miserable servidumbre de tan pocos Estrangeros; ofreciò de ser su Capitan, i ponerle à los maiores peligros; aseguro, que si estaban unidos seria cierta la Victoria para ellos, i prometiendo de seguirle, Vnos de voluntad, i otros por temor, se començo la Guerra, i mataron algunos pocos Castellanos, que hallaron descuidados por la Tierra. El Adelantado Montejo, sabido el Levantamiento, embiò desde Gracias à Dios al Capitan Caceres con algunos Soldados Castellanos, para que pusiese à Lempira en obediencia, el qual ià havia mandado fortalecer vn Peñol mui nombrado, que llamaban de Cerquin, i desde alli se defendia, con daño de los Castellanos, que padeciendo en el Sitio, que durò seis Meses, grandes trabajos, por haver invernado en Campaña, pudiera ser que no acabaran tan facilmente la Jornada, sino sucediera la muerte de Lempira, la qual sucediò de esta manera. Havia muchos Principales que le seguian en esta Guerra, vnos contra su voluntad, porque no los tuviesen por cobardes, otros por el respeto que tenian a Lempira, i otros huvo que le dixeron, que dexase aquella Guerra, i tomase por Amigos a los Castellanos, pues al cabo, havia de perder: pero èl era tan animoso, que jamas mostrò flaqueça, ni quiso dar oidos à los medios de Paz, que los Castellanos le ofrecían. antes los tenia en tan poco, que desde su Fuerte los decia muchas injurias. Visto su mucho atrevimiento, i que no se hallaba modo, para aprovecharse dèl, el Capitan Caceres ordenò que vn Soldado se pusiese à Caballo, tan cerca, que vn Arcabuz le pudiese alcançar de punteria, y que este le hablase, amonestandole, que admitiese la amista que se le ofrecia, i que otro Soldado, estando à las ancas, con el Arcabuz le tirase i ordenado de esta manera, el Soldado trabó su platica, i dixo sus consejos, i persuadisiones, i el Caciq8ue le respondia : Que la Guerra no havia de cansa à los Soldados, ni espantarlos, i que el que mas pudiese, venceria; i diciendo otras palabras arrogantes, mas que de Indio, el Soldado de las ancas le apuntò, quando viò la ocasion, i le dio en la frente, fin que le valiese vn Morrión, que à su vsança tenia, mui galano, i empenachado: caidò Lempira rodando por la Sierra abaxo, armado de aquellos Saios (Sayos) o Coseletes de Algodon, basteados, mui provechosos para Guerra de Indios, que vsan los Castellanos. Con esta muerte de Lempira, que el Dia antes anduvo mui triste, se levantò gran alboroto, i confusion entre los Indios, porque muchos huyendo se despeñaron por aquellas Sierra, i otros luego se rindieron.

Mucho antes que los Castellanos llegasen à aquellas partes, de Gracias à Dios, los Indios tuvieron noticia de ellos, i no por eso dexaban sus patrones, i Guerras; porque en particular los de Cerquin tenian por imposible, que se pudiese llegar adonde estaban, por la multitud de ellos, i porque primero havian de pasar por muchas tierras, i vencer muchas gentes, i en special à los Cares, i Potones, aunque entre ellos havia Guerra cruel, en la qual tenia Lempira tanta fama de valiente, que afirmaron que en vna Batalla mató ciento i veinte hombres de su mano ;i certificaron Indios viejos que se tenia por cierto, que Lempira estaba hechiçado, ò como dice el vulgo, encantado; porque en infinitas Batallas, en que se hallò, jamàs fue herido, ni le pudieron flechar, Era de mediana estatura, espaldudo, i de gruesos miembros, bravo, i valiente, de buena raçon, nunca tuvo mas de dos Mugerres, i murió de treinta i ocho à quarenta Años. Y los Indios tenian por cierta opinion, que si no muriera Lempira, Cerquin no se ganara tan presto: para esta Guerra se pacificò, i confederò con los Cares sus Enemigos: juntò los hombres de mas de doscientos Pueblos, i de Señores, i Caballeros conocidos tenia mas de dos mil. Su congregacion fue en la Sierra de las Neblinas, en su language Piracra, adònde estaba vna gran Poblacion, cuiò Señor era el Entepica, que en muriendo este, se dividió en muchos Pueblos, Aquí se concertó la guerra, i nombraron por General à Lempira, el qual muchas veces acometiò à los Castellanos, à los Indios Mexicanos, i Guatemalecos, que andaban con ellos, en los quales hacia mucho daño, i los suyos le recibian: pero como eran tantos, no lo echaban de ver. Alfonso de Caceres le embiò vna embaxada, rogandole, que acetase la Paz, i obediecise al Rei de Castilla, prometiendo de tratarle bien: fue la respuesta matar à los Mesageros, porque no queria conocer otro Señor, ni saber otra Lei, ni tener otras costumbres de las que tenia; i quando no se acertara la suerte de haverle muerto, como se ha dicho, con el se pasara mui gran trabajo. Muerto Lempira...

Appendix 5: *El Planteamiento Unico* (The Unified Proposal)

The following document is a copy of the original sixty-two point *Planteamiento Unico* presented to the government by COPIN and the pilgrimage on July 10, 1994 (see Chapter 4). This copy includes hand-made corrections made by Salvador Zúniga (COPIN organizer) during the course of the negotiations.

PLANTEAMIENTO UNICO

Los PUEBLOS INDIGENAS Y GARIFUNAS DE HONDURAS y EL COMITE DE ORGANIZACIONES POPULARES DE INTIBUCA (COPIN), ante los acontecimientos políticos, económicos y sociales que vive hoy el pueblo hondureño con más de 150 días de gobierno del Dr. CARLOS ROBERTO REINA y ante la situación empobrecida de injusticia y de violación a los derechos humanos fundamentales de los pueblos autóctonos de Honduras, principalmente los Lencas, Tolupanes, Garífunas y Misquitos que por la condición indígena, garífuna, siempre hemos sido víctimas de la marginación social de parte de todos los gobiernos de la República, soportando permanentemente discriminación racial y política, problemas de: analfabetismo, mortalidad, morbilidad, producción vivienda, alimentación crisis ecológica, expropiación de nuestros recursos (tierra, bosque, agua), muerte a nuestros dirigentes indígenas, un alto grado de desnutrición que tiene al borde de la muerte a todos los pueblos indígenas, dificultades de vías de comunicación y en general violación a los derechos humanos como pueblos indígenas y garífunas.- PRESENTAMOS AL PODER EJECUTIVO, AL SOBERANO CONGRESO NACIONAL Y A LOS HONORABLES MIEMBROS DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA EL SIGUIENTE PLANTEAMIENTO:

PRIMERO: Considerando la necesidad de una carretera que nuestras comunidades indígenas del sector Norte de Yamaranguila tiene, dada las largas distancias y lo incomunicado de la Zona Norte de Yamaranguila con la Esperanza para realizar actividades de subsistencia y que en muchas campañas electorales los activistas políticos nos han prometido realizar ésta obra a cambio del voto a sus candidatos.

SEGUNDO: Considerando que el Sector Norte de Yamaranguila siempre ha sido el escenario de la marginación, abandono y

miseria que vive el pueblo Lenca en todos los aspectos de la vida social, principalmente en salud, educación, producción e infraestructura,

produciéndose de ésta manera que de cada 10 niños nacidos vivos, mueren 6 a causa de enfermedades: Cólera, malaria; enfermedades respiratorias, desnutrición y gastrointestinales; y de cada 10 mujeres de maternidad mueren 3 a causa de las mismas enfermedades.- El analfabetismo apremia a las familias indígenas del sector, ya que el 80% de la población no sabe leer ni escribir. De cada 1,000 niños nacidos en Intibucá mueren 200 niños y 500 mujeres por maternidad al año.

FUENTE: Información de las familias del sector Norte de Yamaranguila.

TERCERO: Considerando que el sector Norte de Yamaranguila tiene una población numerosa en sus 23 comunidades que asciende a 5,995 habitantes, perteneciendo jurisdiccionalmente al Municipio de Yamaranguila; no existe capacidad ni voluntad de parte de la Corporación Municipal de éste Municipio para solucionar nuestros problemas concretos, que surgen cada día en la miseria a todas las familias indígenas.

CUARTO: Considerando que hace muchos decenios de años, el bosque de La Paz, Intibucá y Lempira han sido explotado irracionalmente por grandes empresarios extranjeros y hondureños como ser: JOSE MASSU NAZZAR, JUAN DE LA CRUZ AVELAR LEIVA, ROBERTO BABBUM, FRANCISCO MALDONADO, PABLO WILLS y otros.- Como consecuencia de éste acto despiadado se está produciendo más hambruna en las comunidades, baja producción, alteraciones climatológicas, contaminación ambiental, altos índices de muertos y enfermedades, y en general se pone muy difícil la situación de sobrevivencia de los indígenas.

QUINTO: Considerando que del 04 al 06 de abril el pueblo indígena de La Paz, Intibucá y Lempira, hemos organizado movimientos cívicos para presionar a las autoridades departamentales y municipales en la solución rápida de los problemas ecológicos y sociales que están afectando profundamente a la población indígena, estableciéndose así Convenios firmados entre ambas

partes el día 6 de abril, que en la práctica las autoridades municipales y departamentales no han tenido la altura ética legal para darle cumplimiento a la mayoría de los Acuerdos.

SEXTO: Considerando que las autoridades Departamentales, nacionales y algunas Municipalidades han violado la Veda de tres meses decretada por el señor Presidente de la República Dr. CARLOS ROBERTO REINA, como es el caso del señor Designado Presidencial JUAN DE LA CRUZ AVELAR LEIVA, que en Acuerdos con la COHDEFOR no ha parado las operaciones de su Aserradero en el Municipio de San Isidro, irrespetando a la vez, las disposiciones de la Corporación Municipal y omitiendo la Ley de Municipalidades.

SEPTIMO: Considerando los agudizantes problemas de tierra y conflictos Agrarios que tienen los pueblos indígenas y garífunas.

OCTAVO: Considerando que en éstos momentos el Gobierno de la República tiene previsto instalar una Refinería en Puerto Castilla, sin medir ni prever las graves consecuencias y efectos con la contaminación excesiva del medio ambiente.

NOVENO: Considerando la situación económica-social por la cual atraviesan actualmente los Buzos discapacitados de la zona de

La Mosquitia, que desde hace 30 años practican el trabajo del buceo sin ser reglamentado por las autoridades del Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social, y hasta la fecha existen más de 500 lisiados y 150 muertos, sin que por ello haya recibido una indemnización justa.

DECIMO: Considerando que el Congreso Nacional, recientemente ha ratificado el Convenio 169 de la OIT, pero que todavía no ha sido publicado en Diario Oficial La Gaceta.

ONCEAVO: Considerando que en Honduras no existe un Decreto Ley que permita reglamentar o regular el trabajo de las ONGs que apoyan a los pueblos indígenas y garífunas.

POR TANTO, el Comité Cívico de Organizaciones Populares de Intibucá COPIN, Pueblos Indígenas y Garífunas de Honduras ACUERDAN presentar al Presidente de la República Dr. CARLOS ROBERTO REINA como representante del Poder Ejecutivo, al Soberano Congreso Nacional y la Corte Suprema de Justicia los siguientes puntos ~~de~~ carácter de demanda:

- 1) Aprobar de inmediato la ejecución del Proyecto de apertura de la carretera del Sector Norte de Yamaranguila, partiendo de :

La Comunidad de Dulce Nombre de Togopala	- Ojo de Agua
De Ojo de Agua	- Monteverde,
De Monteverde	- El Naranjo,
Del Naranjo	- Pimienta y
	Nueva Esperanza

Los ramales hasta las Escuelas de las 23 comunidades indígenas del sector.- Este proyecto debe iniciarse a más tardar el 20 de julio de 1994.

- 2) Ejecutar a más tardar el 30 de julio de 1994, acciones que contribuyan a mejorar el sistema educativo en las comunidades indígenas, operativizando de prioridad lo siguiente:
- a) Mejoramiento de Escuelas en las Comunidades del Sector Norte de Yamaranguila:
- Monteverde
 - EL Pinal
 - Lajitas
 - Unión Lempira.
 - Ojo de Agua
 - Plan de Barrios
 - Piedra Rayada
- b) Construcción de Escuelas en las Comunidades del sector Norte de Yamaranguila:
- Guansauce
 - Santa Fé
 - El Rosario
 - Las Aguilas en el
 - Las Crucitas
 - Santa María de Concepción
 - San Lorenzo
 - Agua Caliente
- Municipio de Jesús de Otoro.
- En Marco de Sierra
- c) Apertura de plazas para Maestros de Educación Primaria en las comunidades:
- Santa Cruz
 - Guansauce
 - EL Rosario
 - Las Crucitas
 - las Aguilas de Jesús de Otoro.
 - Monteverde
 - Unión Lempira
 - Piedra Rayada
 - Santa Cruz
- d) Fundación y asignación de Presupuesto de un Centro de Educación Pre-escolar en la Comunidad de Monquecagua-Intibucá.
- e) Creación y asignación de Presupuesto de una Escuela de Capacitación Técnica Agrícola en el sector Norte de Yamaranguila.
- 1) - Oficiodización y asignación de presupuesto al Instituto Guatemalteco de Capacitación.*

- f) Oficialización y asignación de presupuesto del Instituto Faro de Celaque en el Municipio de San Juan Intibucá.
- g) Que se le apruebe el Presupuesto del Instituto San Matías de La Campa, Lempira.
- h) Destitución del Supervisor Departamental GUALBERTO HERNANDEZ por su irresponsabilidad y falta de interés para normalizar el funcionamiento de los Maestros en el Sector Norte de Yamaranguila.
- 3) A más tardar el 30 de julio, realizar actividades y proyectos para mejorar el sistema de salud en las comunidades indígenas.
- a) Creación de Sub-Centros de Salud en las Comunidades:
- | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| - Monteverde | - Monquecague |
| - Ceibita | - Valle de Angeles |
| - Las Lajas Yarula | - Río Blanco |
| la Paz | |
- b) Fortalecimiento de los Sub-Centros de Salud con medicamentos, equipo y personal Médico.
- c) Asignar 5 Médicos para el Sector Norte de Yamaranguila para que atiendan los cinco (5) Sub-centros de salud.
- d) Ejecutar proyectos de Agua Potable y Letrinización en las Comunidades del Municipio de Yamaranguila:
- | | |
|--------------|--------------|
| - El Picacho | - Guascotoro |
| - Inguages | - Yase |
| - Sequire | |

El mejoramiento del agua potable en el Municipio de San Juan, Intibucá.

- 4) Que la Administración Agrícola del Estado, desarrolle un verdadero plan de asistencia, técnica y crediticia en cada una de las 23 Comunidades del Sector Norte de Yamaranguila, con propósitos de mejorar la producción y productividad, *coordinado con las organizaciones sociales presentes en la zona.*
- 5) A más tardar el 30 de agosto de 1994, decretar y publicar en el Diario Oficial LA GACETA, la creación del Municipio en el Sector Norte de Yamaranguila que se denominará "San Francisco de Opalaca", con el propósito de establecer una dinámica de desarrollo municipal con estilos auténticos de indígenas que permitan la co-gestión y autogestión política, económica, social, cultural.- Este Municipio tendrá su Sede Central en la Comunidad de Monteverde.
- 6) Aprobar la creación de Banasupros en el Sector Norte de Yamaranguila y en otras comunidades indígenas:
- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| - Ojo de Agua SNY | -San Fernando - SNY <i>Yamaranguila centro</i> |
| - Monteverde SNY | -Centro de Yamaranguila |
| - El Naranja SNY | -San Isidro - Intibucá |
| - Ceibita SNY | -Las Aguilas de Jesús de Otoro |
| - Pimienta SNY | -San Juan - Intibucá |
| | - San Marcos de Sierra - Int. <i>San Marcos de Sierra - Int., colonia: co-gest</i> |
| | - Colonia |
- 7) Decretar VEDA para un período de 30 años con propósitos de regenerar el bosque y la fauna en los Deptos. de La Paz, Intibucá y Lempira.- En su defecto la explotación será de uso exclusivo para fines de autoconsumo y uso doméstico con la asistencia técnica y financiera de la administración forestal de Estado. *a beneficio de las comunidades.*
- 8) Hacer las reformas al Título VI del Capítulo Único de los aspectos forestales, contenidos en la Ley de Moderniza-

El mejoramiento del agua potable en el Municipio de San Juan, Intibucá.

- 4) Que la Administración Agrícola del Estado, desarrolle un verdadero plan de asistencia, técnica y crediticia en cada una de las 23 Comunidades del Sector Norte de Yamaranguila, con propósitos de mejorar la producción y productividad.
- 5) A más tardar el 30 de agosto de 1994, decretar y publicar en el Diario Oficial LA GACETA, la creación del Municipio en el Sector Norte de Yamaranguila que se denominará "San Francisco de Opalaca", con el propósito de establecer una dinámica de desarrollo municipal con estilos auténticos de indígenas que permitan la congestión y autogestión política, económica, social, cultural.- Este Municipio tendrá su Sede Central en la Comunidad de Monteverde.
- 6) Aprobar la creación de Banasupros en el Sector Norte de Yamaranguila y en otras comunidades indígenas:

- Ojo de Agua SNY	-San Fernando - SNY
- Monteverde SNY	-Centro de Yamaranguila
- El Naranjo SNY	-San Isidro - Intibucá
- Ceibita SNY	-Las Aguilas de Jesús de Otoro
- Pimienta SNY	-San Juan - Intibucá
- 7) Decretar VEDA para un período de 30 años con propósitos de regenerar el bosque y la fauna en los Deptos. de La Paz, Intibucá y Lempira.- En su defecto la explotación será de uso exclusivo para fines de autoconsumo y uso doméstico con la asistencia técnica y financiera de la administración forestal de Estado.
- 8) Hacer las reformas al Título VI del Capítulo único de los aspectos forestales, contenidos en la Ley de Moderniza-

ción Agrícola; para éste propósito se presenta la Propuesta de Ley.

- 9) Destituir a más tardar el 30 de julio al Gobernador Departamental de Intibucá, señor NESTOR AUGUSTO LOPEZ MILLA, por ser una autoridad opuesta a los intereses de las comunidades indígenas, adoleciendo de capacidad para resolver problemas concretos.

La Comunidad Indígena Lenca, el pueblo Intibucano en general precisa de un gobernador político enmarcado en el siguiente PERFIL ETNICO Y MORAL DE CAPACIDAD siguiente:

- Que sea una persona con un alto sentido de compromiso, de solidaridad y sinceridad hacia la Comunidad Indígena.
- Que no se doblegue ni se venda a los intereses de los poderosos del Departamento y otros cuyo único fin es enriquecerse sin importarles la condición de vida de los indígenas.
- Que sea una persona horada, incorruptible y que no permita actos de corrupción de las demás autoridades políticas departamentales y locales.
- Que sea del lugar; que tenga amplio conocimiento de la realidad de pobreza, miseria y sometimiento en que viven las comunidades indígenas, como del Departamento en general.
- Que tenga capacidad, voluntad y decisión de presentar alternativas de solución ante la problemática que viven nuestras comunidades Lencas.
- Que no tenga antecedentes negativos en su conducta

como persona y como dirigente político.

- ✓10) Demandamos al soberano Congreso Nacional que en el uso de sus facultades, destituya de inmediato a los cargos presidenciales y de gobierno al señor designado Presidencial JUAN DE LA CRUZ AVELAR LEIVA por arbitrariedad a la ley de municipalidad y del medio ambiente, irrespetando de manera deshonrosa disposiciones municipales de San Isidro y disposiciones del Presidente de la República.
- ✓11) Realizar auditorías a las Corporaciones Municipales de ~~La Esperanza e Intibucá~~ ^{los} del Depto. de Intibucá; ^{hacia y de la paz.} en los últimos tres periodos de gobierno para detectar los actos de corrupción administrativa y enseguida proceder judicialmente.
- ✓12) Se demanda a la Corte Suprema de Justicia la nulidad del proceso judicial contra compañeros indígenas que participaron en la lucha por la cancelación definitiva del aserradero del Municipio de Belén en el Depto. de Lempira.
- ✓13) Ejecución de un Proyecto de Carretera del Municipio de Guajiquiro hacia las Comunidades: Vegas del Paraíso, San Felipe, San Antonio, San Miguel, Monte Grande, San José del Rosario, Guanacaste y Dolores.
- ✓14) Demandamos a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, proceda contra el señor JOSE ALBERTO REYES VASQUEZ por ser una persona que a nombre del pueblo Lenca ha estafado Instituciones, agencias financieras y argumentando ser el máximo líder de los indígenas para beneficio personal.
- 15) Publicar en Diario LA GACETA la Ratificación del Convenio 169 de la OIT a más tardar el 15 de agosto/94.

- 16) Que se abra un proceso de titulación remedición, delimitación y saneamiento de las tierras de los pueblos indígenas y garífunas conforme a los títulos ancestrales que muchas comunidades poseen desde tiempos pasados, tomando en cuenta los límites que reconocemos como parajes naturales que señalan esos títulos y aquellas comunidades que no tienen título se les adjudique sus tierras tomando en cuenta el crecimiento poblacional.
- 17) Que se reglamente el trabajo de las ONGs en las comunidades indígenas y garífunas mediante un decreto Ley, en la que se designe que todas aquellas ONGs que apoyen a los pueblos indígenas y garífunas, deben coordinar trabajo con las organizaciones indígenas ^{reales} reconocidas por las comunidades .
- 18) El pueblo Pech cuenta con un título ancestral que data de 1862, terreno denunciado por el Padre Subirana ubicada en el Valle de Culmí, hoy éste pueblo se ve obligado a emigrar por falta de tierra donde vivir, pedimos que se les adjudique tierra que compense la que le fue quitada, sobre todo a la comunidad de Vallecito, Brisas del Pisijire, Culuco, Agua Zarca, Zopilote y Jocomico.
- 19) El pueblo Garífuna pide la derogación del Artículo # contemplado en los títulos entregados al inicio de éste año, el que contempla turismo; tiene la potestad para utilizar cualquier playa garífuna para fines turísticos sin el consentimiento de la comunidad, esto va en contra del Artículo del Convenio 169 de la OIT.
- 20) Que se emita una resolución definitiva al conflicto que está enfrentando la Comunidad de Punta Piedra, en un término no mayor de 30 días, conflicto innecesario ya que la comunidad cuenta con su título definitivo.

- 21) Que no se desalojen los Garífunas que viven en los Cayos Cochinos, al contrario, deben tener una participación directa en la planificación y ejecución de los proyectos de protección a los Cayos Cochinos, con representantes en la comisión.
- 22) Nos oponemos a la instalación de la Refinería en Trujillo, exigiendo más bien que se desarrollen otros Proyectos en generar fuentes de empleo.
- 23) Que se abra un proceso de investigación de los asesinatos de los líderes Tolupanes que hoy suman 21 (entre asesinatos y desaparecidos) para que sean castigados los culpables; para ésta investigación debe nombrarse una comisión especial en la que deben participar indígenas y del gobierno. Esta comisión debe estar instalada en un término no mayor de 15 días.
- 24) Que de una vez por todas se le dé solución inmediata y definitiva al problema de TIERRA que atraviesan actualmente las 27 Tribus XICAQUES O TOLUPANES del Depto. de Yoro Francisco Morazán, en especial las Tribus de Subirana, San Francisco, Locomapa y Candelaria.
- 25) Las Tribus Xicaques o Tolupanes exigimos que el Instituto Nacional Agrario INA coordine con las Instituciones que nosotros proponemos el proceso de Delimitación, saneamiento y ^{delimitación} remedia de las 27 tribus indígenas. Al mismo tiempo exigimos que se entregue el Título definitivo de propiedad de las tribus: Santa Rosita, Mina Honda, Luquique, Plan Grande, El Paraíso, La Lima, El Hollo ya que actualmente solo cuentan con una garantía de Posesión y constante ~~man~~ ^{con} objeto de violaciones por carecer de dicho título.

- 26) Pedimos al Gobierno que el Proyecto de Cooperación Indígena de Yoro (PROCOINY) se le siga dando continuidad, con una nueva política, encaminada a la reorientación y participación directa de los indígenas; que se le ponga un alto a la burocratización. En caso de no ser posible dicha reactivación que los bienes pasen a formar parte de la Dirección Representativa de las Tribus Tolupanes (FETRIX).
- 27) Exigimos que a todas las comunidades indígenas se les permita que ellos sean los beneficiarios del recurso BOSQUE, tomando en consideración los aspectos forestales que enuncia el título VI CAPITULO UNICO de la Ley de Modernización Agrícola en el sentido de hacerlo en una forma racional para evitar que la ecología sufra cambios drásticos y para ello solicitamos que la Corporación Hondureña de Desarrollo Forestal no nos ponga inconvenientes en la legalización de pequeños ^{lotes} aprovechamiento.
- 28) Pedimos que de inmediato se le dé trámite ante el Ministerio de Educación la aprobación de plazas para Maestros con el propósito de que nuestros hijos tengan acceso a la Educación como la contempla nuestra Carta Magna en el Título III Capítulo VII "De la Educación y la Cultura".
- 29) El pueblo Misquito exige la indemnización inmediata a todos los buzos discapacitados conforme a cálculos reales y justos correspondientes, así mismo exigimos que se emita una legislación especial sobre el trabajo de los buzos, ésto en un término no mayor de 15 días.

- 30) Que el gobierno junto con las Organizaciones representativas de los Misquitos (MASTA y CAHDEA) inicien un Proyecto que beneficie a los buzos discapacitados, tomando en cuenta que éstos no tienen una fuente de ingresos; además que son personas lisiadas de por vida; para ésto el Gobierno debe designar presupuesto específico para ésta área.
- 31) Exigimos la reglamentación del trabajo del buceo y que se legalice en el Código de Trabajo.
- 32) Exigimos que al momento de los trámites legales que realizan los trabajadores Camaroneros-langosteros (buzos), éstos cuenten con un traductor que facilite la comprensión de dichos trámites.
- 33) Que se legisle en el Ministerio de Trabajo sobre los estandars de puridad del aire en los cilindros de SUUBA.
- 34) Que se legisle para que antes de trabajar como buzo, se reciba capacitación y se otorgue certificación como profesionales.
- 35) Que se legisle para asegurar que los buzos tengan la posibilidad de recibir tratamiento médico, bajo el sistema de salud ^{seguro social} nacional.
- 36) Que se realicen contratos de trabajo entre los dueños y los buzos capacitados definiendo las responsabilidades de los dos.
- 37) Pedimos reconocimiento como un grupo organizado de "BUZCO" y "OBUPROZOCO" como un esfuerzo de los buzos en profesionalizarse y defender sus derechos

- 38) Exigimos que se inicie en una forma inmediata la titulación de tierras de los misquitos conforme a zonas y uso de las tierras que han practicado históricamente.- Este proceso de titulación debe coordinarse con las Federaciones por zonas ya establecidas en La Mosquitia.
- 39) Que se reconsidere el fallo con respecto a la devolución del Centro de Capacitación "Francisco Morazán" del Instituto Hondureño de Desarrollo Rural IHDER, ubicado en Villa Nueva Cortés.
- 40) Electrificación en las Comunidades y Municipios de San Fernando de Yamaranguila, Municipio de San Juan, San Miguelito. *y Dolores.*
- 41) Declarar el Departamento de Intibucá como región sanitaria # 9 para la cobertura mayor en salud ~~por~~ la toma de decisiones.
- 42) Exigimos la pavimentación de las calles de la ciudad de La Esperanza e Intibucá.
- 43) Exigimos la construcción de un sistema moderno de Agua Potalbe y Alcantarillado en la Esperanza Intibucá.
- 44) Exigimos la construcción de un centro ^{politécnico} de capacitación ~~artesanal~~ en Monquecagua, Intibucá.
- 45) Exigimos la creación de un sistema de comercialización de la producción de los indígenas.
- 46) Exigimos la creación de una sede regional Universitaria en el Depto. de Intibucá.

- 47) Exigimos la pronta titulación de tierras de la comunidad de Pueblo Nuevo Subirana, Culmí Olancho y que el Gobierno asuma la responsabilidad del pago de mejoras a los ladinos introducidos en ésta comunidad en un término no mayor de 30 días.
- 48) Exigimos que se haga la construcción del tramo de la carretera de 7 kilómetros desde la comunidad de Pisijire hasta la Comunidad de Pueblo Nuevo Subirana.
- 49) Que haya una legislación que establezca un sistema de conservación con el fin de tener cosechas sustentables en las aguas de la zona Norte.
- 50) Urge una legislación bajo Recursos Naturales para proteger una zona amplia por la crianza de las especies en etapa de crecimiento.
- 51) Si bien es cierto existe un decreto Ley de protección a la Biósfera de Río Plátano, ésto en la práctica no es efectivo, ya que el Gobierno no ha desarrollado políticas estratégicas para frenar el inmenso proceso de destrucción por parte de ladinos y campesinos que día a día emigran hacia ésa zona.
Por lo que demandamos que a partir de ésta fecha el Gobierno destine una partida especialmente para la protección de la Reserva de la Biósfera del Río Plátano, bajo la coordinación de los pueblos indígenas ubicados en la zona.
- 52) Exigimos que el Ministerio de Educación Pública haga efectivo la creación del Programa de Plan de Profesionalización de los docentes Maestros impíricos Tawahka, reación de las plazas y ubicación a los miembros de la Etnia FITH - CEBICUT, así mismo que se completen los grados de las Escuelas y que haya seis (6) Maestros por cada Escuela.

- 53) Exigimos que se instale una dependencia especial en el Instituto Nacional Agrario INA que se encargue única y exclusivamente de canalizar la resolución de los conflictos de tierra que enfrentan los diferentes pueblos indígenas y garífunas de Honduras. En dicha comisión, deben participar representantes indígenas.
- 54) Al término de ésta actividad el gobierno debe asegurar el transporte de todos los participantes en la Peregrinación para el regreso a sus casas.
- 55) Exigimos se rompa el Monopolio del Transporte Urbano, Interurbano a nivel Departamental.
- 56) Exigimos devolver la ruta a la cooperativa de transportes Limitados COTRAMIL.
- 57) Exigimos que el Gobierno de la Republica a travez del Comisionado Nacional de D.H., garantice la seguridad y la vida de los paricipantes en la Peregrinación.
- 58) Exigimos la creacion de nuevas Plazas de personal Medico y Paramedico que cubran los Municipios y Comunidades de los Departamentos de la Paz, Lempira e Intibuca.
- 59) Exigimos que el Nomenclamiento de Nuevo Gobernador sea de manera concertada con el COPIN.
- 60) A partir de este momento se debe decretar un congelamiento de precios.
- 61) Exigimos que a partir de este momento se elaboren Programas de Desarrollo de Integracion de las Mujeres Indigenas y de los Niños.
- 62) Que se resuelva de inmediato el reintegro de la plaza escolar, que le han quitado a la comunidad de las Mesitas, Sulaco ,Yoro.

Dado en la Ciudad de Comayagua, Municipio del Distrito Central a los ocho días del mes de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro.

**POR LOS PUEBLOS INDIGENAS Y GARIFUNA DE HONDURAS Y
EL COMITE DE ORGANIZACIONES POPULARES DE INTIBUCA (COPIN)**

Appendix 6: Presidential Agreement

The following is a copy of the original *Plan de Accion de la Comision Presidencial de Emergencia* (Action Plan of the President's Emergency Commission) signed by the president on July 15, 1994. Many of the agreements in this document refer to the numbered petitions from the Planteamiento Unico (see Appendix 5).

PLAN DE ACCION DE LA COMISION PRESIDENCIAL DE EMERGENCIA

La Comisión Presidencial de Emergencia para las Etnias reconoce que Honduras es un país multicultural y pluriétnico como ha quedado plasmado en el Convenio 169 ratificado por el actual Gobierno, en el que además se reconocen los derechos de los grupos Etnicos derivados de esa situación. La Comisión reconoce asimismo que estos derechos han sido violados tradicionalmente y que las étnias han sufrido una marginación discriminatoria que explica su situación actual. La Peregrinación por la Vida, La Libertad y la Justicia es una manifestación de estos reclamos legítimos.

Por ello y con instrucciones del Señor Presidente de la República, la Comisión se abocó a estudiar el Planteamiento Unico de peticiones para discernir las mas urgentes y factibles. Convenidas las soluciones se procede a instruir a las Secretarías de Estado y otras agencias Gubernamentales para que le dén cumplimiento inmediato a los compromisos que por este medio suscribe el Señor Presidente de la República.

1.- SECOPT contratará de inmediato el estudio y diseño de la Carretera del Sector Norte de Yamaranguila, partiendo de Dulce

Nombre de Topopala hasta Nueva Esperanza con los ramales a las escuelas de las comunidades indígenas.

Se terminará el estudio para el 15 de septiembre y se procederá inmediatamente despues a la construcción de dicha via.

2.- SECOPT procederá de inmediato al estudio, diseño y posterior construcción de la carretera que partiendo de RIO GRANDE conduzca a SAN NICOLAS, NARANJO, SAN BARTOLO, TEJERA, RIO BLANCO Y VALLE DE ANGELES.

3.- SECOPT procederá de inmediato a la reparación de las carreteras en los municipios fronterizos de Lempira, Intibucá y La Paz.

Además procederá a dar inicio al mantenimiento de la Red Vial en los Departamentos de la petición. Dicho mantenimiento se iniciará en un periodo no mayor de tres meses.

4.- SECOPT procederá a la inclusión de la carretera de JESUS DE OTORO a SAN ISIDRO en el Programa de la Red de Mantenimiento Vial.

5.- SECOPT procederá a la reconstrucción de la carretera PISIJIRE-PUEBLO NUEVO-SUBIRANA en el Departamento de Olancho, y se compromete a construir en el mediano plazo, el puente que conecte la comunidad de GUAJIQUIRO y OPATORO en el

Departamento de La Paz.

- 6.- SECOPT procederá a la ejecución de un proyecto de Carreteras del Municipio de Guajiquiro, hacia las comunidades de Vegas del Paraiso San Felipe, San Antonio, San Miguel, Monte Grande, San José del Rosario, Guanacaste y Dolores.

El Ministerio de Comunicaciones, Obras Públicas y Transporte hará lo indispensable para atender las demandas planteadas sobre asuntos de su competencia. Le dará prioridad al diseño y construcción de las vías comprendidas en el Sector Norte de Yamaranguila, Departamento de Intibucá, así como al mantenimiento de las carreteras existentes en el mismo sector; y posteriormente, procederá al diseño y construcción de los caminos solicitados.

En todos los casos, los trabajos se iniciarán tan pronto como la Secretaria cuente con los recursos indispensables. Se instará al Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público para que asigne los fondos necesarios para la ejecución de estos proyectos.

SECTOR TRANSPORTE

- 8.- La Dirección General de Transporte recibirá las peticiones en lo que concierne al numeral 57 del Pliego Unico y procederá de acuerdo con la Ley.

HONDUTEL

- 9.- Se solicitará a HONDUTEL dar un servicio Radio Telefónico en la Comunidad de Matanzas.

SECTOR AGRARIO

- 10.- El Gobierno de la República legalizará la tenencia de la tierra a las comunidades étnicas y garifunas del país. En tal sentido, el INSTITUTO NACIONAL AGRARIO dentro de los treinta días siguientes a la fecha de este documento, convendrá con los representantes de dichas comunidades el calendario dentro del cual hará los trabajos de Ingeniería necesarios para lograr aquel fin. En todos los casos, los parajes naturales se preferirán a cualquier otra referencia, coincidan o no con el título que a la fecha tengan las comunidades étnicas. En caso de necesidad, saneará los predios y los límites quedarán debidamente amojonados y protegidos a perpetuidad.
- 11.- EL INSTITUTO NACIONAL AGRARIO dará satisfacción inmediata a las peticiones de los numerales 19, 21, 25 y 26 del documento, en los cuales se han planteado conflictos no resueltos y proporcionará a las comunidades étnicas los Procuradores Agrarios necesarios para defender sus intereses.

COHDEFOR

- 12.- LA CORPORACION HONDUREÑA DE DESARROLLO FORESTAL, investigará las actividades de los Aserraderos de DON JUAN DE LA CRUZ AVELAR, JOSE MASSU NAZZAR, ROBERTO BABBUN, FRANCISCO MALDONADO Y PABLO WILLS.

Enviará una Comisión de la Oficina Central con instrucciones de comunicarse e informarse en las comunidades circunvecinas con los vecinos afectados y procederá de acuerdo a la Ley con el cierre de los aserraderos reñidos con la Ley o con las disposiciones provisionales del Gobierno.

- 13.- COHDEFOR declarará la "emergencia" en los Departamentos de Intibucá, La Paz y Lempira, lo que permitirá la suspensión de actividades de corte de madera en esa región mientras la Comisión Especial de Investigación con facultad para el cierre rinda su informe el 30 de Agosto.

La investigación deberá dar los resultados siguientes:

- a) La aplicación de sanciones para las empresas que hayan violado la moratoria declarada.
- b) La aplicación de sanciones a las empresas que hayan hecho cortes en las cuencas de los ríos, quebradas, fuentes de agua y hayan cortado árboles de diámetro no autorizado.

- c) La aplicación de sanciones a los funcionarios y empleados de la COHDEFOR u otra organización pública que hayan actuado en contravención de las normas legales y planes de manejo de los bosques.
 - d) La cancelación de los contratos de aprovechamiento que contravengan el derecho vigente.
 - e) La suspensión de las actividades de las empresas que hayan causado y estén causando daño al medio ambiente.
- 14.- COHDEFOR y el Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, diseñarán y ejecutarán una veda zonificada de las talas que será efectiva después del 30 de Agosto en los tres departamentos.
- 15.- COHDEFOR diseñará asimismo, un plan de reforestación de madera de uso múltiple en coordinación y cooperación con las organizaciones sociales indígenas.
- 16.- COHDEFOR diseñará un Sistema Social Forestal, para explotar las maderas comerciales de los ejidos en beneficio de las comunidades.
- 17.- COHDEFOR planificará un programa de reforestación masiva en la región.

MINISTERIO DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE

- 18.- La Comisión de Cayos Cochinos incluirá de ahora en adelante un representante de la Organización Etnica OFRANE en su Junta Directiva.
- 19.- Se modificará la veda de pezca en Cayos Cochinos establecida por el Decreto Presidencial, en forma absoluta, para que sea una veda ordenada, gradual y sostenible, que permita la sustentación de los pescadores.
- 20.- No se instalará ninguna refinería en Puerto Castillo sin un estudio técnico previo.
- 21.- El Ministerio de Recursos Naturales gestionará los fondos para establecer al más corto plazo posible una veda de la explotación de la pezca industrial que garantice la reproducción de los recursos marítimos.

MINISTERIO DE SALUD PUBLICA

- 22.- A través de las Regiones Sanitarias, el Ministerio de Salud Pública, gestionará ante el Patronato Nacional de la Infancia y el Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social, los fondos necesarios para construir y reabrir los centros de salud de las comunidades, previa constatación de la necesidad de

ubicarlos en los sitios aludidos en el Planteamiento Unico, así como en la comunidad de La Asomada en Gracias, Lempira, en el entendido de que los Centros de Salud se construirán con mano de obra y materiales locales de la región. Se procederá de inmediato a la evaluación técnica de las necesidades de los centros de salud para fortalecerlos.

En los lugares donde no se requiera un centro de salud, se ubicarán unidades comunitarias manejadas por voluntarios de la comunidad, que brindarán atención de la embarazada y vigilancia nutricional del niño. El personal será proporcionado por la comunidad, el Ministerio de Salud les capacitará y el FHS y el PANI proporcionarán el financiamiento inicial para establecer farmacias populares auto financiables, manejados por los grupos Etnicos.

- 23.- El Ministerio de Salud apoyará los esfuerzos para la elaboración y desarrollo de planes de acción municipal de carácter auto-gestionable en las diferentes comunidades étnicas del país. Dichos planes incluirán la capacitación de los grupos étnicos, para lo cual el Ministerio reforzará, de acuerdo a sus posibilidades, su personal de salud que tiene ubicado en los Departamentos necesitados.
- 24.- El Ministerio de Salud iniciará de inmediato las gestiones para unificar el Departamento de Intibucá como una área de Salud dependiente de la Región Sanitaria No. 2.

25.- El Ministerio de Salud se compromete a ubicar un médico en la Cabecera Municipal del recientemente creado municipio de San Francisco de Opalaca, para lo cual previamente se construirá un Centro de Salud en Monte Verde.

26.- El FHIS financiará la protección de fuentes, construcción de pozos y acueductos, así como la letrización para las diferentes comunidades étnicas.

MINISTERIO DE EDUCACION PUBLICA

27.- El FHIS procederá al mejoramiento de las escuelas del Sector Norte de Yamaranguila y del Municipio de San Marcos de la Sierra. Concluida esa actividad se procederá a la construcción de las escuelas solicitadas en el Planteamiento Unico, previo estudio de las necesidades efectivas de población de estudiantes existentes.

28.- La Ministra de Educación Pública dará prioridad a la asignación de las plazas solicitadas en el inciso c) de la petición 3.

29.- La Secretaria de Educación Pública investigará las denuncias contra el Supervisor WALTERTO HERNANDEZ y con base a los resultados de la investigación tomará las medidas que procedan.

30.- El Ministerio profesionalizará a los maestros voluntarios de la Comunidad de Tawaka y oportunamente los incorporará dentro del personal a su servicio.

MINISTERIO DE GOBERNACION

31.- La Comisión recibe las denuncias colectivas en contra del Gobernador Político de Intibucá, NESTOR AUGUSTO LOPEZ por:

- a) Venta ilegal de tierras ejidales
- b) Malversación de fondos municipales
- c) Abuso de autoridad
- d) Violación de leyes municipales
- e) Encubrimiento de actividades ilícitas

El Ministerio de Gobernación procederá a investigar dichas acusaciones. Comprobadas las denuncias de corrupción, la Comisión recomienda al Señor Presidente destituir a dicho funcionario, quién además representa riesgos políticos y sociales.

- 32.- El Ministerio de Gobernación y Justicia se compromete que a partir de la fecha procederá a reforzar el Decreto de cancelación del Aserradero Santa Elena, emitido por la Corporación Municipal de San Isidro, y a no permitir violaciones a la Ley de Municipalidades.
- 33.- El Ministerio de Gobernación y Justicia agilizará la publicación en La Gaceta del Convenio No. 169.

EL MINISTERIO PUBLICO

- 34.- El Presidente nombrará una Comisión Especial a través de la Fiscalía General de la República para investigar los desaparecimientos y asesinatos de líderes Tolupanes, y de otras Etnias, con participación de las Etnias y el Comisionado de los derechos Humanos.
- 35.- El Ministerio Público recibirá las demandas de las organizaciones, inciso 15, página 10 del planteamiento.

OTRAS ENTIDADES GUBERNAMENTALES

- 36.- El Poder Ejecutivo a través del INA proporcionará abogados y Procuradores para defender los presos que han sido encarcelados por los dueños de los aserraderos.

- 37.- El Ministerio de Cultura proveera un Asesor Jurídico para que las organizaciones presenten sus demandas en contra de aquellas personas que se representen falsamente los grupos étnicos.
- 38.- La Oficina de la Mujer a cargo de la Designada Presidencial, Licenciada GUADALUPE JEREZANO, el PANI, la Junta Nacional de Bienestar Social y el Ministerio de Salud Pública harán lo necesario para integrar a la mujer y niñez indígena en sus planes, mediante el desarrollo de proyectos específicos.
- 39.- El Ministro de Trabajo a través de la Procuraduría General del Trabajo brindará la asesoría profesional a los trabajadores despedidos por el Señor ZACARIAS BENDECK en el Aserradero de Locomapa.
- 40.- El SANAA planificará un estudio del sistema de alcantarillado y agua potable para La Esperanza.
- 41.- Brindará la asistencia técnica necesaria a la población étnica.
- 42.- El Ministro de Economía instruirá para que previo estudio técnico, proceda a la instalación de tiendas de consumo popular BANASUPRO en las comunidades solicitantes.

AL CONGRESO NACIONAL DE LA REPUBLICA

SE SOLICITARA:

- 1.- Dar instrucciones a la Contraloria General de la República para que realice las auditorias solicitadas en el numeral 12, página 10.
- 2.- Someter a consideración y aprobación una reforma al Código del Trabajo para que regule el trabajo de los buzos, en tal forma que el Ministerio pueda proteger a esos obreros.
- 3.- Aprobar la solicitud para la creación del Municipio de San Marcos de Kaiquin como un caso especial.
- 4.- Que emita una nueva Ley Forestal en que se sustituya el titulo a que se refiere el numeral 8 de la Página 8.
- 5.- Que se reforme la Ley de Reservas Naturales y Etnicas para incluir en su administración a un representante de las Organizaciones Etnicas involucradas.
- 6.- Dotar a la Reserva de la Biosfera del Rio Plátano de un presupuesto de supervisión y mantenimiento.

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